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1. SUMMARY: Petrs (a Local of the Teamsters Union 
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters) challenge 
the landmark holding of the CA 7 that an employee's interest 
in a compulsory, employer-funded pension plan constitutes a 
"security" within the coverage of the Federal securities laws 
and that material misrepresentations concerning the likelihood 
of obtaining a pension can be made the basis for a private right 
of action. 
2. FACTS: Respondent joined Teamsters' Local 705 in 
1950 when he became a truck driver with an employer who had a 
collective bargaining agreement with that union. He worked 
continuously for Local 705 contracting employers for the next 
23 years, except for a four-month interruption in 1960-61 when 
he was involuntarily laid off because of adverse economic con-
ditions. Respondent retired in 1973 because of cataracts and has 
not worked since. 
In 1955, Local 705 negotiated a collective bargaining 
), agreement with several multi-employer bargaining associations. 
t The contract established a Pension Trust Fund to which the 
employers agreed to contribute at a rate of 5 cents for each hour 
worked. The Fund was to be administered by a Board of Trustees 
composed equally of employee and employer representatives. The 
trustees adopted a plan under which employees would become 
eligible for a monthly pension after 20 years of continuous ser-





Accot:'ding to the affidavit 'filed by respondent in 
this case, respondent learned of the Pension Fund in 1955 and 
understood that he would be eligible to receive a pension after 
20 years of service with Local 705 covered employers. The 
possibility . of s ·.1ch a pension was a material factor in respondent' s 
decision to continue employment with those employers. In June, 
1971, respondent received a letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of 
Local 705 notifying him that after 20 years of covered service an d 
at 60 years of age, respondent would be eligible for a pension of 
$400 per month. After his retirement, however, respondent's ap-
plication for a pension was denied by the trustees, on the ground 
that the 4-month involuntary lay-off in 1960-61 constituted a 
break-in-service which rendered him ineligible for his pension . 
Respondent commenced this lawsuit in federal court with 
a complaint which, as amended, contained six counts. The firs t 
1/ ----
two counts - were based on Section lO(b) (and Rule lOb-5) of t he --1934 Act and Section 17(a) of the 1933. Act. These counts alleged -material misrepresentations in the form of omissi.ons to inform 
the members of the requirements for vesting, the possibility of 
forfeiting all contributions made and the actuarial likelihood tha t 
any member would receive a pension. Respondent sought as relie f 
1/ 
The. other four counts alleged a breach of the union's duty of 
fair representation under § 9a of the NLRA, the failure of t he 
pension fund to be established for the "sole and exclusive benefits 
of the employees," as required by § 302(c)(5) of the NLRA, and com-
mon law theories of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and deceit . 
c - 3 -
the reformation of the pension furid agreements by deleting 
the continuity requirements, and a judgment ordering petrs to 
pay pension benefits unlawfully withheld. Respondent also 
sought certification as a representative of the class of all 
members of the Teamsters International who had an interest in a 
pension fund. 
Petrs moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds 
but the district court (Kirkland, J.) refused. It held that 
Counts I and II stated claims upon which relief could be granted 
under the federal /securities acts. Since the reasoning of the 
district court was expanded in the CA 7 opinion, I shall not 
discuss it here. The district court also held that petrs were 
not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the statute of 
limitations, because factual disputes remained as to when 
respondent actually learned of the break-in-service rule and 
whether he exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud. 
The district court certified an application for interlocutory 
appeal with respect to its rulings on Counts I and II of the 
complaint. The CA 7 affirmed. 
!:_I 
3. CA 7 OPINION: The CA 7 opinion began by looking to 
the statutory language. "Security," as defined in the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, encompasses "investment contract," which was defined by 
~---------------~------------this Court in SEC v. W.J. Howrey Co., 328 U.S.C. 293, 298-99~ to 
mean: 
2/ 
The district court also found that respondent had stated a 
claim for relief in alleging that the pension fund rules were not 
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees," as required 
by § 302 of the NLRA. 
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"a contract, transaction or scheme 
whereby a person invests his money 
in a common enterprise and is led 
to expect profits from the efforts 
of the promoter or a third party. 
" 
) 
In the view of theCA 7, all of the elements of the Howrey 
test were satisfied here. The employee was an "investor" because 
part of his compensation, in the form of an employer contribution, 
was placed in the fund. That the employee's expectancy was "con-
tingent" did not change the characterization of the process, for 
the same might be said of an investment in the stock market. The 
pension fund was obviously a "common enterprise." The employee 
might receive a "profit" because his pension would clearly exceed 
the amount of his contributions. While some of his pension might 
be financed by the contributions of others, this did not mean it 
was not a "profit" within the meaning of the securities laws, for 
two circuits had already held . that the contributions obtained in 
pyramid sales schemes constituted "profits." In any event, petrs 
conceded that some portion of respondent's pension, at least as 
great as 25%, would be derived from the investment income on the 
assets of the trust fund, and would thus be "profits" in the 
classic sense. 
Passing beyond this literal analysis of the term 
"security," the CA 7 examined what it called the "economic 
realities." Respondent's interest in the trust fund embodied many 
of the significant characteristics typically present in instruments 
covered by the securities laws. Respondent has an undivided 
( 
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interest in a portfolio of stocks, 'bonds, mortgages and other 
! 
investments which was managed for his benefit by a third party. 
I 
Hence his interest resembled an investment in a mutual fund or 
t 
I 
in a variable annuity contract. The $1,248 invested each year 
I 
by a Local 705 member in his pension plan would probably be his 
I 
' largest investment. __ on an aggregate basis, pension funds hold 
I 
11% of the value of all New York Stock Exchange stock~ and ac-
1 
count for 23% of the dollar value of all trad~d shares. If the 
sole investment vehicle for millions of Americans is exempt from 
the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, then the 
policing of the capital markets is significantly neutralized. 
The CA 7 next turned to le i lative materials . 
..- -- --....;' Although --
it conceded that "The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 
Acts themselves is silent on the question of pension plans," 
App. at 25, the court noted that in 1934 a conference committee 
had rejected an amendment to the 1933 Act which would have ex-
empted offerings made in connection with "a bona fide plan for the 
I 
r 
payment of extra compensation . . • for the ixclusive benefit of 
such employees" for the reason that participants in such plans 
I 
I 
might be in "as great need of protection afforded by availability 
I 
of information concerning the issuer for whiJh they work as are 
I 
most other members of the public." In testi~ony before the Congres , 
in 1941, a Commissioner of the SEC had intert reted the rejection 
of the amendment as requiring the inclusion Lnder the Act of any 
I 
"plan under which employees are given the opportunity to place 
part of their earnings in a fund which is to be invested for their 
(~ 
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benefit and returned to ·them at a iater date." App. at 26 
(Testimony of Commissioner Purcell). This interpretation was 
confirmed in 1970, when Congress enacted an exemption to the 
registration requirements of the 1933 Act for "any interest in 
or participation in a single or collective trust fund maintained 
by a bank or in a separate account maintained by an insurance 
company .• II In the view of the 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)2(A). . . 
CA 7, this amendment codified a long-standing administrative 
practice of the SEC that interests in pension funds were exempt 
from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, even though 
they were in fact securities. 
The CA 7 recognized that the anti-fraud provisions of 
the securities acts would cover this case only if it involved a 
"sale," defined in the 1933 Act as "every 
---...: 
disposition of a 
security or interest in a security for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3). 
TheCA 7 found that the employee's contribution of his services 
to the employer met the "for value" requirement. It rejected a 
proposed distinction between "contributory" plans (in which the 
employee pays over cash received to the pension plan) and '~on­
contributory" plans such as the one at issue here. Although the 
SEC had utilized this distinction for many years, SEC counsel 
(participating as amicus curiae) advised the court that the agency 
now felt that a "sale" occurred in both situations and the SEC 
distinguished its earlier position as based on the concept that 
employer contributions were "gifts" and the outdated supposition 
that pension benefits would not be material to an employee's de-
cision whether to become or remain employed. 
- 7 -
TheCA 7 also rejected petrs' argument that no "sale" 
occurred here because contribution to the fund was compulsory. 
The definition of "sale" did not require volition. Even if it 
did, volition is present because of the vote of Local 705 mem-
bers to accept the contracts providing that the employer would 
compensate them through contributions to the fund rather than 
3/ 
through wages. - Volition was also present in the employee's 
decision to retain his job. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the CA 7 concluded that 
the transaction at issue here was covered by the securities laws. 
Only three more hurdles remained. First, in order to support 
its "unitary" analysis -- based on the assumption that the 
anti-fraud sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were identical 
the CA 7 found it necessary to confront and resolve the question 
whether a private right of action was available under the 1933 
Act. It held that such a right could be properly inferred. 
Second, the CA 7 held that the anti-fraud provisions of 
"-
the securities ot been pre-empted by ERISA. Sec---ion 514(d) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) is a general savings 
clause which provides that ERISA shall not be construed to 
supercede any federal law or rule. Even though the SEC had told -the Congress at the time ERISA was under consideration that pen-
_
--------------------------------------'~ -----____..,___- ----sian plans were exempt from coverage under the 1933 Act, the SEC --
3/ 
Although the vote of an individual union member might be 
overridden, this was also true of the vote of the individual 
shareholder in the corporate merger context. 
, .. ' , 
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was referring only to the registration, not the anti-fraud 
provisions. The securities laws and ERISA could be 
complementary: while ERISA requires only disclosure of the 
provisions of the plan within 90 days of employment, the 
securities laws would require disclosure upon a job offer of 
all material information, including the statistically determined 
risk that an employee covered by the plan will ever receive his 
4/ 
pension benefits. -
Third, the CA 7 rejected as "specious" the argument of 
the Secretary of Labor that affirmance of the judgment below 
would undermine a union's authority as exclusive bargaining agen t 
for its employees or will disrupt the bargaining process. "The 
only negative effect on ·unions qua unions will be in preventing 
them from defrauding their rank and file with impunity." App. 
at 49. 
In conclusion, the CA 7 emphasized that it was not holding 
either the registration requirements of the 1933 Act or the re-
porting requirements of the 1934 Act applicable to pension funds. 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Tone noted that 
he agreed with much of the majority opinion, but felt compelled 
to express some doubts. The CA 7 decision was admittedly in 
conflict with several district court decisions and the series of 
4/ 
-Due to such factors as risk of loss, breaks-in-service, death 
before retirement agela , and plan termination, the actuarial 
probability of obtaining a pension may be as low as 8%. CA 7 Op., 
App. at 8; DC Op., App. at 71. 
r - 9 -
transactions by which respondent scquired his interest did 
not fit neatly into the traditional concept of a "sale." 
Nevertheless, considering the breadth of the definitions of 
"investment contract" and "Sale," the balance tipped in 
respondent's favor. Judge Cummings also ·noted that he "found 
little comfort in the opinion expressed by the SEC" because 
"Apparently for the first time ever, 
[the SEC] takes the position in its brief 
before us that the employee's interest or 
expectancy in a plan such as this is sub-
ject to the anti-fraud provisions of the 
securities laws. _]he Commission has not 
been as candid as we mi ght have hoped in 
acknowledijing and expla~n~ng ~t s change - in 
p~1t ion , App. at 52. 
Although the members of Congress considering legtslative proposals 
after the passage of the securities acts may have relied on the 
SEC's earlier interpretation, they also understood 
"that the SEC is not infallible, that the 
Seupreme Court has been known to disagree 
with that agency's interpretation of t he 
securities acts, and that the applicability 
of those acts to various kinds of trans-
actions, including non-contributory pension 
plans, has yet to be determined by the Supreme 
Court. It appears likely that Congress has 
chosen to leave the matter in that posture." 
App. at 53. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Since there are two petns, a response 
and amici briefs, I condense here petrs' arguments: 
(1) The CA 7 failed to follow the teaching of United 
Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, that the securities 




(2) The interest held 'by respondent is not an 
"investment contract" because his return depends on such factors 
(entirely extraneous to commercial investment) as whether he meets 
the eligibility requirements, whether he is discharged by his em-
ployer, the . truf. tees' determination of how much should be paid, 
and his life expectancy. 
(3) The decision of the court below that employees 
acquire their interests in a pension as a result of a "sale" is 
inconsistent with the reasoning of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 431 U.S. 723, 746, which emphasized the need for an actual 
sale to provide an evidentiary basis for finding reliance. 
(4) The court below was wrong in assuming that the 
SEC's statements that the securities acts did not cover mandatory, 
pension plans referred only to the registration provisions. The 
theory of this disclaimer of jurisdiction, explained as recently 
as the SEC's Institutional I~vestor Study of 1971, was that 
'~ecurities Act does not apply because there is not 'sale' or 
'offer for sale' of a security." The SEC has never before sought 
to enforce the anti-fraud provisions with respect to such pension 
plans. 
(5) The CA 7 misreads the subsequent legislative 
actions of Congress. The rejected 1934 amendment and the 1941 
testimony did not deal with the kind of mandatory, noncontributory 
plan at issue here. The purpose of the 1970 Amendment to the 
1933 Act was not to exempt from registration requirements the 






transactions between the trustees of the fund and the bank or 
insurance company with which the trust fund was maintained. 
(6) During the congressional deliberations on 
ERISA, the SEC Chairman testified that pension plans should be 
subject to disclosure requirements, presumably because he felt 
that the Securities Acts did not cover them. One of the explicit 
statutory purposes of ERISA is "to protect • • . the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans • • • by requiring the 
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of 
financial and other information with respect thereto ..•. " 
29 u.s.c. § 1001. 
(7) The decision of the court below that § 17(a) of 
the 1933 Act encompasses a private right of action is in direct 
conflict with the decisions of the CA 8, Greater Iowa Corp. v. 
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (1967); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, 
561 F.2d 152 (1977). 
(8) Petrs emphasize that the CA 7 opinion has created 
massive, debilitating uncertainty in the pension field. The CA 7 
decision conflicts with a number of district court decisions. The 
CA 7 opinion does not make clear precisely what material informa-
tion must be disclosed or on what occasions. Pension fund trustees 
fear that the CA 7 decision has created an enormous retroactive 
liability for failure to disclose actuarial information. Because 
of the impossibility of disproving the "reliance" of employees who 





the claims against the funds may deplete them and thereby 
impair the interests of other employees legitimately entitled 
:2.1 
to their pensions. 
The respondent naturally repeats the arguments of the 
CA 7 and emphasizes that the CA 7 opinio:1 did not deal ~vith the 
question of appropriate relief, so that claims of massive liability 
are premature. 
The SG has filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Court 
grant review: 
"The decision has left the administrators 
and plan sponsors of many pension plans in 
considerable uncertainty as to possible 
liability which may arise from their past, 
as well as their future, conduct, and raises 
the possibility of significant liability for 
such plans as have not heretofore complied 
with the anti-fraud provisions." Brief at 4. 
Since the Labor Department and SEC participated in the proceedings 
below as amici curiae on_9~osite sides of the case, the SG has 
>' 6/ 
not yet determined what position the Government will take. 
5/ 
Petrs also make a somewhat technical argument that because 
the CA 7 gave several different explanations of why pension plans 
were exempt from the registration requirements of the securities 
laws, plan administrators cannot determine whether or in what 
circumstances registration is required. See, e.g., App. at 50 n. 6 
6/ 
Other amici urging a grant of certiorari (for somewhat differing 
reasons) include the National Association of Manufacturers, the 
National Coordinating Committee for Multi-employer Plans, the 
American Bankers Association, the AFL-CIO, and the ERISA Industry 
Committee. The Grey Panthers, represented by the National Senior 
Citizens Law Center, urge the Court to decline review . 
J 
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5. DISCUSSION: It seems to me that petrs raise very 
substantial questions about the correctness of the CA 7 decision. 
The opinion's construction of the statutory language is obviously 
strained. The subsequent legislative history upon which the CA 7 
relies is at best ambiguous. The traditi~nal position of the SEC 
seems to have been that mandatory, noncontributory pension plans 
do not involve a "sale." Most importantly, ERISA was apparently 
enacted on the basis of an understanding that the securities laws 
did not require disclosure. The Congress has specified in ERISA 
the disclosure it feels is appropriate. It is simply too late to 
assert that Congress intended the securities laws to handle this 
problem. 
Zl 
According to some of the amici, the CA 7 opinion is 
disturbing not only because of its holding that the securities lat·7S 
apply to respondent's interest in his pension, but also because of 
its broad view of the type of the "material" information v.1hich must 
be disclosed -- including, but not limited to, "the statistically 
determinable risk that many employees covered by a plan would never 
receive their pension benefits." App. at 47. Because the case 
reaches the Supreme Court on a motion to dismiss, it may lack the 
facts necessary to evaluate the correctness of the CA 7 view that 
such information is material and helpful to an employee. However, 
Zl 
E.G., Brief of· AFL-CIO; Brief of American Banking Association 
/ 
- 14 -
in all other respects this case ap'pears to be a good vehicle 
for deciding the broader question as to whether the anti-
fraud provisions of ,the securities laws provide any protection 
at all to employees participating in mandatory, employer-funded 
pension plans. 3ince this question would not seem to turn on 
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BENCH MEMO TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, No. 77-753 
Local 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 
No. 77-7 54 
DATE: August 21, 1978 
The primary question presented by this case is whether a 
compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension plan is a 
security for purposes of the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If 
the Court were to hold that such a plan is covered by the 
antifraud provisions, the case would present further questions as 
to the propriety of judicial implication of a retrospective 
damages remedy for such fraud. Because the answer to the primary 





Respondent Daniel retired as a teamster after 22 years 
of service, during 18 of which his employer~ paid contributions 
in the Local 705 pension fund on the basis of the number of weeks 
he worked. Under the terms of the plan, an employee needed 20 
years of continuous service with covered employers in order to 
qualify for a pension. Daniel applied for a pension, but the 
trustees turned him down because of a four-month involuntary 
layoff 12 years before his retirement. Daniel then sued the 
fund, its trustees, Local 705, and the International Union, 
alleging, inter alia, that these defendants had violated Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act, Section lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, and the SEC's Rule lOb-5.1 
Because the characteristics of pensions plans vary, it 
is important to focus on the nature of the Local 705 plan. The 
plan is compulsory, in the sense that coverage is a condition of 
employment over which an employee has no choice. The plan is 
noncontributory, in the sense that only the employer makes 
contributions to the plan's fund. The plan is called 
"defined-benefit" because the benefits a retiree will receive are 
fixed in advance on the basis of length of service and age, with 
employer contributions adjusted to meet these obligations. 
1. Daniel also alleged state law and labor law 
violations which are not at issue here. A good 
discussion of these alternate grounds of recovery is 
contained in the amicus brief of the American Bankers 
Association at pp. 26-33. 
3. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the securities law counts of 
the complaint on the ground that Daniel's interest in the pension 
fund was not a security sold to Daniel within the meaning of the 
Securities and Securities Exchange Acts. The district court 
denied the motion but certified its order for an appeal under 28 
U . S • C • § 12 9 2 (b) . 410 F . S u pp . 5 41 ( N . D. I 11. 19 7 6) . The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F.2d 1223 (1977). 
The district court and court of appeals both found 
Daniel's interest in the pension fund to be an "investment 
contract" and hence a security as defined by§ 2(1) of the 
~
Securities Act and § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Each applied the definition of an investment contract developed 
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946): 
"[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities 
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a 
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is 
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether 
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal 
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical 
assets employed in the enterprise." 
The lower courts believed an investment occurred because Daniel 
for~ore direct wages in return for employer contributions to the 
fund. "Realistically speaking, employers are putting money into 
a fund for an employee's future use which he would otherwise be 
getting in his paycheck." 561 F.2d at 1232. The pension fund, 
the investments of which were controlled exclusively by the 
fund's trustees, constituted the common enterprise. An 
expectation of profit existed to the extent successful management 
4. 
of the fund resulted in increased or more secure benefits for the 
pensioner. 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 
(1975), intervened between the two decisions. The court of 
appeals acknowledged the admonition in Forman that "[i]f an 
interest is not a security in economic reality, abuses should be 
remedied by Congress rather than by an over-liberal extension of 
the securities laws." Id. at 849. The court believed, however, 
that Daniel's interest in the pension fund in economic reality 
was a security. The court analogized the transaction between an -
employee and the fund to both a mutual fund investment and the -
purchase of a variable annuity. Although, like a variable -annuity, a pension fund interest has non-investment aspects, "the 
employment fringe benefit aspect of a pension fund can be 
separated from its security aspects." 561 F.2d at 1237. This 
\ 
separable security aspect transformed the entire transaction into 
a security. 
Both courts also held that Daniel had obtained his 
interest in the pension fund through a "sale", as defined by § 
2(3) of the Securities Act and § 3(a) (14) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, but their analyses differed somewhat. The district 
court believed there was a disposition of a security interest for 
value because Daniel eschewed greater pay in return for the 
employer's contributions to the fund on his behalf. It further 
ruled that this disposition was voluntary inasmuch as Daniel 
along with other union members was given an opportunity to ratify 
7 
5. 
the wage and benefit packages of which pension fund contributions 
were a part. The court of appeals agreed that "plaintiff's 
giving of his services and the employer's contribution on behalf 
of the employee constitutes value," 561 F.2d at 1242, but thought 
it to be unnecessary to determine if the acquiring employee 
exercised any volition as the statute made no mention of that 
element. To the extent volition was necessary, the court of 
appeals found it to be present either because of plaintiff's 
ratification vote or because, "[w]hen an employee decides to 
retain his job, his decision results in his continuing to give 
value in the future and in his further acquisition of interests 
in the pension fund." Id. at 1243. 
The lower courts also agreed that congressional action 
subsequent to enactment of the Securities and Securities Exchange 
Acts and the SEC's behavior with respect to pension funds 
indicated that the antifraud provisions of the securities laws 
applied to compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension 
plans. They saw nothing inconsistent between their 
inter~retation of the securities laws and Congress's enactment of 
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 or the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as the latter 
legislation "is concerned with administration of such funds, so 
as to protect the interest of its [sic] participants, rather than 
regulation of circumstances of entry into the plan." 410 F. 
6 . 
Supp. at 549.2 
The decision below seems so far off base that I have ~I . 
--~-~·------
trouble knowing where to begin my discussion. I will deal first 
_____...,______----- -------
with the application of the Howey "investment contract" test as ~~ 
~~~ 
it relates to pension plans of this type. As far as I can ~~ 
determine, none of the elements set forth by gowey is present ~ 
here. Next I will discuss the definition of a "sale". Finally, 
I will survey the evidence of congressional and administrative 
perceptions of the scope of federal regulation of pension plans. 
This evidence buttresses the conclusion that Congress never meant 
the securities laws to apply to pension plans of this type, and 
that the SEC until now had been of the same mind. As this case 
has been both thoroughly briefed and analyzed with some care by 
2. Judge Tone wrote a concurring opinion expressing his 
reservations about the decision. 
->I " ... I have found little comfort in the opinion 5-£.C-expressed by the SEC, as am1cus curiae. Apparently ; .' . J~ for the first time ever, it now takes the position in ~' 
its brief before us that the employee's interest or J~ 
expectancy in a plan such as this is subject to the ~ 
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. The  
Commission has not been as candid as we mi ht have 
hopea-1n acknowledging and explaining its change in 
position. As late as 1971 in its Institutional 
Investor Study submitted to Congress in connection 
with the consideration of the ERISA legislation, the 
Commission's view was that although a 
non-contributing pension plan might well be an 
investment contract, the element of sale was 
lacking. Before that, not even the existence of a 
security was acknowledged." 
561 F.2d at 1251 (footnote omitted}. Judge Tone ''~~ J a'~ 
reluctantly agreed with the majority, however, on the ~~ 
ground that Congress should have known that even if the 
SEC believed a pension plan not to be a security, the 
courts could take a different view. 
7 . 
several law review notes, for the most part I will organize and 
summarize the arguments presented rather than make much of a 
contribution of my own. 
The Presence of An Investment Contract 
Howey sets forth three elements of an investment 
Rl .~ contract~nvestment~ common enterprise; 
of profits produced by the efforts of others. 
an~n expectat1on 
I will discuss 
each element in turn. 
1. Investment 
In all of the previous decisions of the Court concerning 
the definition of a security, it was clear that one party had 
given up something in return for an interest in something else. 
See Forman, supra; Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); 
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 u.s. 65 (1967); SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., supra; SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 
(1943). Here it is difficult to discern exactly what respondent 
gave up as his "investment" in the pension plan. In a 
contributory plan, whether voluntary or compulsory, an employee 
surrenders his contributions to the fund, but here there were no .,____..., 
contributions to make. The court below instead found an 
investment in the employer's contributions to the pension fund, 
which it regarded as compensation which otherwise would have been 
available to an employee to dispose of as he saw fit. A closer 
look suggests that this finding cannot stand up. 
The linchpin of the court's analysis lay in the supposed 
equivalence of employer pension fund contributions with other 
8. 
aspects of compensation. Respondent emphasizes the compensatory 
nature of pension contributions, going so far as to describe this 
plan as a direct payout to the individual employee with the fund 
acting as an intermediary only because of the tax laws. This 
characterization is misleading. Although an employer's 
contributions are part of his wage costs and may be considered 
compensation with respect to the labor force as a whole, the 
value realized by an individual employee is by no means 
equivalent to the contribution paid into the fund on the basis of 
his weeks worked. Indeed, these contributions are not made to or 
"on behalf" of that employee at all. The use of man-weeks as the 
unit for measuring employer contributions is completely 
arbitrary-- in the coal industry, for example, contributions are 
~ 
tied to coal produced. The purpose of the contributions ~Te not 
to compensate any individual for services rendered-- --in fact, =-
contributions must be paid even if an employee performed no work 
during the week in question-- but rather to ensure the fund 
possesses sufficient assets to meet pre-set benefit obligations. 
In addition, if an employee were giving up a portion of 
his wages for an interest in a pension plan, one would expect him 
to be receiving something in return. Although in theory an 
employee could be said to receive some value, measured by the 
value of his chance of receiving a pension, the worth of this 
interest both would vary widely among employee and have little 
relation to services rendered. ~ A 25 year old teamster with a M/ 
family history of heart disease would be receiving a contingent ~ 




family included many octogenarians. 
that each was setting aside the same 
It w~uld be absurd to. assert I ~ 
sum 1n forgone wages 1n 0 
return for their future pensions. 
Further, from an employer's point of view contributions 
to a pension fund would not necessarily be a substitute for 
increased wages: 
"Elimination of a pension plan would not necessarily 
produce an increase in current employee compensation. 
The vesting provisions generally present in pension 
plans tend to promote personnel stability by providing 
an incentive for employeees to remain with their 
employer. As the Court said in Alabama Power [Co~ v. 
Davis, 431 u.s. 581, 592 n.l6 (1977)], 'By rewarding 
lengthy service, a plan may reduce employee turnover and 
training costs and help an employer secure the benefits 
of a stable work force.' One of the benefits of 
personnel stability may be increased employee 
productivity, and it is conceivable that the reduction 
in training costs and higher productivity might actually 
'pay' for some pension plans. Even if elimination of I 
pension plans would free some resources, it is not -r ~ 
clear, especially in view of the tax advantages of I 1 
pension arrangements, that those resources would 
necessarily be passed on to employees in the form of 
increased wages." 
Comment, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to 
Noncontributory, Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 45 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 124, 142-43 (1977) (footnotes omitted). In short, "[t] he 
relationship between pension benefits and forgone wages is 
tenuous at best." Id. at 142. 
As it did throughout its opinion, the court below in 
finding an investment stressed an insignificant aspect of 
Daniel's employment relationship at the expense of the economic 
realities of the situation. Whatever additional wages or fringe 
benefits Daniel ~)~l return for his participation in the 
1 pension plan were too speculative to provide the basis for a 
10. 
finding of investment. Consequently, an essential element of an 
investment contract, or for that matter any other kind of 
security, is absent here. 
2. Common Enterprise 
The court below found a common enterprise in the 
investment and money management activities of the pension fund. 
In its view, the trustees did not serve merely as depositories 
for employers' contributions, but rather invested the 
contributions in a profitable manner. Although this 
characterization has a superficial plausibility, again it 
overlooks the realities of the situation. The value of an 
employee's pension interest depends "on repeatedly negotiated 
c:; 
benefit levels, and not on the sucess of investment efforts 
1\ 
Note, The ~plication of the Antifraud Provisions of the 
Securities Laws to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pension Plans 
After Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 Va. L. 
Rev. 305, 315 (1978). The growth of the Local 705 pension fund 
-----------------------------------------~~ over the years for the most part ~ attributable to increased 
employer contributions, not successful money management. Between ----------------- ----------------- ~~----~ 1955 and 1977 employers' contribution per man-week increased from 
$2.00 to $30.00.3 Only 8.6% of the actuarial value of a pension 
·~· 
·. 
3. During the same period a pensioner's monthly 
benefits increased from $75.00 to $550.00. Although at 
first blush it might appear that the employers' 
contribution dollar bought less than half as much 
benefits per pensioner in 1977 as it did in 1955, I 
assume the ratio of pensioners to active workers 
increased by a like proportion during this period. 
" 
11. 
received by an employee who retired in 1975 could be attributed 
to investment income on contributions tied to his employment; ~~ 
the balance of the value came from increased contributions and ;
proportional share of forfeited contributions and earnings ~ 
attributable to other employees. As a result, the role of the ~ 
trustees as passive depositories of employers' contributions ~ 
substantially outweighs their investment management function. 
On a more fundamental level, a common enterprise does 
not exist because the efforts of others play only a slight role 
in determining whether an employee receives a pension. Before an , 
1 . . h h lA -t. ~
1;.-emp oyee can rece1ve a pens1on, e must meet t e v~ng ~ _ ~ 
- (f) - - -- ~ lA-'~~~·-• 
requirements' : which means living to a certain age ~a working a r--'r''~-~ 
. "'1 /~ 
fixed number of years. Whether a worker achieves these goals 1s - ~-
~
entirely outside the control of the trustees. If he achieves  
these goals, the only remaining contigency on which his pensio~~ 
rests is the solvency of the pension fund. The record in this ~ 
case indicates that the risk of not meeting the vesting 
requirements ordinarily is substantial, while the risk of the 
trustees driving the fund into bankruptcy generally is slight. 
See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as Securities: Daniel v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 
201 (1978). Because an employee's success in realizing his Jof~ 
~ "investment" depends almost entirely on his ~ efforts to stay *~
alive and remain employed, one of the most basic attributes of a~ l,., 
security is absent. The employee does not surrender his capital 
to others in hope they might use it more profitably; rather he 
12. 
participates in a plan that rewards him for his own continued 
service. See Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 u.s. 581, 594 
(1977) .4 
3. Expectation of Profit 
In Forman, supra, your opinion emphasized a purchaser's ~ 
motivation as a test for whether the interest purchased 
constituted a security. The expectation of profit, in the 
of either capital appreciation or participation in earnings, was 
seen as the hallmark of an investment contract. Id. at 853. 
Further, the expected return had to be material: The hope of 
"speculative and insubstantial" income did not convert a 
commodity for consumption into an investment contract. Id. at 
856. Applying this test here, it seems clear that the 
expectation of profit had little to do with whether Daniel 
participated in the Local 705 plan. 
4. The amicus brief of the American Academy of 
Actuaries indirectly supports this point. It emphasizes 
the absurdity of the disclosure requirements suggested 
by the court of appeals, in particular the requirement 
that the trustees inform employees of the 
likelihood they will receive a pension. ~e brief 
points out that calculations of this sort are not made 
for individual empl oyees in the normal course of · 
p repari ng a pl an, ana that in any event it defies reason 
to require the trustees to inform an employee how long 
he can exEect to rema1n at a par t 1cular i ob, ~e 
employee is in a better position than the trustees to 
know what his plans for the future may be. The employee 
is in a better position because in large part he is in 
control of the factors that will determine whether he 
will meet the vesting requirements, while the trustees 
have no control at all over those events. 
13. 
"Significantly, neither the focus of the promotional 
efforts involved nor the magnitude of profit actually 
generated by the Local 705 plan suggests that employees 
were induced to participate in the plan primarily by the 
prospect of realizing an investment profit. The only 
'promotional' materials for the Local 705 plan 
considered by the Seventh Circuit, for example, 
consisted of a brochure that did not stress either the 
prospects of capital appreciation or the possibility of 
sharing in earnings from the investment of funds. 
Instead of promoting the plan as a superior investment 
scheme, the brochure objectively and tersely described 
the trustees' investment of employer contributions as a 
necessary, albeit advantageous, aspect of the plan 
without mentioning the magnitude of possible investment 
return." 
Note, 64 Va. L. Rev. 305, supra, at 312 (footnotes omitted). As 
indicated above, investment income played only a slight role in 
determining whether an employee would receive a pension and how 
large the pension would be. 
Further, the degree expectation of profit entered into 
an employee's decision to participate in the plan must be 
determined in light of what he actually decided. Because this 
plan was compulsory, Daniel's choice was not between coverage and 
some other fringe benefit, but between coverage and working 
somewhere else. Pretermitting whether either retention of 
employment or a vote to affirm a wage-benefit package containing 
a pension plan constitutes a "purchase" of an interest in the 
pension plan, it seems clear that the prospect of profit through 
the plan would have little influence on these decisions.5 What 
5. Daniel alleged in an affidavit that if had known of 
the stringent vesting requirements of the Local 705 
plan, he would have sought other employment. While this 
allegation may be true as to his final years on the job, 
it stretches credulity to believe that from the start 
Daniel based his decision to work entirely on the 
. . 
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Daniel obtained for his services was an income consisting of cash 
and various fringe benefits, one of the latter being a contingent 
interest in a future fixed income. The prospect that this one of 
several fringe benefits might turn out better or worse than 
expected could have played only an insignificant role in his 
choice of jobs. 
Further, it is difficult to see what distinguishes this 
~ ··---
particular kind of fringe benefit from other forms of 
-------------
compensation. If the reasoning of the court below were upheld, I 
--.--~ 
can see no reason why any offer and acceptance of employment 
would not be regarded as an investment contract. Services would 
constitute the investment, and the employer's business would be 
the common enterprise. The expectation of profit would come in 
the belief that if business was good, wages would increase. 
Presumably an employee could sue the employer if an expected wage 
increase was withheld because of an unforeseen slump in sales. 
This line of reasoning goes way beyond the pyramid sales cases or 
anything else this or any other court has approved. 
1 I l,-l 
The Presence of a Sale 
The determination of the court below that an interest in 
a compulsory, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension fund 
constitutes a security seems by far its most significant error; 
the question of whether participation in a pension plan also 
[5. cont.] prospects of receiving a pension. 
his final years, one wonders whether he could 
another job that provided appreciable pension 
on the basis of a few years of service. 
'. 




involves a "sale" as defined by the securities laws seems of 
lesser importance. If one were to accept the proposition that a ...___ __ __ _ _ 
pension plan can be a security, the idea that an employee 
-------...__....-..-. 
purchases this interest by offering his services seems j~f 
------------------------
u~~~~ble. Of course, it is hard to tell what portion of ~ 
the employee's services is offered for the interest, but this ~ 
problem is intrinsically no different than sorting out from other 
kinds of compensation the interest received by the employee in 
the form of possible propective pension benefits. If one accepts 
the idea that an employee receives something each time he gets 
closer to fulfilling a plan's vesting requirements, it would seem 
to follow that he gives up something in return. Conversely, if 
one believes that an employee does not acquire a substantial 
separable interest when part of his wage-benefit package includes 
a pension plan such as this one, then it seems illogical to try 
to isolate a portion of the services tendered to his employer as 
"value" for which this amorphous interest is disposed. 
Two minor points are of some interest in considering 
whether this transaction can be considered a "sale", however. 
First, although the policy considerations expressed in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723 (1975), should have ~~ 
given the court of appeals some hint that it was straying from~~ 
the reservation, I do not believe that Blue Chip Stamps directl~~ 
controls this case. The International Union argues that Daniel's 
ongoing retention of employment, which the court of appeals 
believed to constitute the "purchase" here, is the same as 
16. 
Manor's ongoing retention of Blue Chip's stock, which was held 
not to be a purchase in Blue Chip Stamps. Although the analogy 
seems attractive at first, the circumstances are different here. 
Daniel was not retaining employment but giving up his services, 
for which he purportedly received a continually growing interest 
in the pension fund. Unlike Blue Chip Stamps, there was an 
exchange of one thing for something else. Thus, although the 
policy against strike suits expressed there certainly applies 
5t!?C 
here, the precise holding of that case does not control this one~~ 
Second, to a great extent the position of the court -~ 
below rested on the idea that what constitutes a sale for w-~;fH-
purposes of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts need ~'~ 
not be the same as what constitutes a sale for purposes of 
~~~ 
registration. This concept has been of immense value to the SEC, ~~ 
as through it that agency has been able to interpret the ~~ 
antifraud provisions very broadly while avoiding the crushing 
administrative burden an equally broad reading of the 
registration requirements would bring. Indeed, this case is a 
~ perfect example of the SEC's practice. The problem is that the a.c..h-.d2c 
statutes do not support such a distinction: Where Congress ~~t-
~ 
intended to except certain transactions from registration but not 
the antifraud provisions, it said so. This Court hinted that the 
SEC practice might be acceptable, but did not expressly endorse 





"But whatever may be the validity or effect of [former 
SEC Rule 133, treating certain transact i ons as exempt 
from registration]-- and we intimate absolutely no 
opinion on these questions-- it certainly does not 
determine the result here. The rule is specifically 
made applicable only to cases involving § 5 of the 1933 
Act; this case arises under § lO(b) of the 1934 Act. 
Although the interdependence of the various sections of 
the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in 
any interpretation of the language Congress has chosen, 
ordinary rules of construction still apply. The meaning 
of particular phrases must be determined in context, SEC 
v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 
(1943). Congress itself has cautioned that the same 
words may take on a different coloration in different 
sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 
1934 Acts preface their list of general definitions with 
the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires.' . 
We must therefore address ourselves to the meaning of the 
words 'purchase or sale' in the context of§ lO(b). 
Whatever these or similar words may mean in the numerous 
other contexts in which they appear in the securities laws, 
only this one narrow question is presented here." 
(citation omitted). As can be seen, the Court, although 
~· --- · 
expressing tacit support for the SEC's practice, left open the 
question of the statute's meaning. 
I would recommend reaching the question of whether a 
sale for purposes of registration is the same as a sale for 
purposes of fraud and hold that it is. 
~ 
~ 
First, I think National 
~ Securities is wrong in suggesting the "unless the context 
otherwise requires" language refers to the regulatory context. ~~~ji 
-~-~~ 
s£c~ ~ 
economic context of the transaction, not the posture of the SEC ~ 
~~--
in attempting to supervise it. Cf. Forman, ~upra, 421 u.s. attl/1  
848-50. Second, experience since National Securities indicates.~ 
that the concept of separate meanings has undesirable ~~ 
consequences, particularly in its effect on the SEC. As this ~ 
Subsequent decisions suggest that the reference is to the 
~ 
18. 
case illustrates, the SEC has taken the position that almost ...._____ ___ -----
every form of injustice that results from a failure to disclose 
------·------ - -··-. ------------------~ 
information violates§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See 
Forman, ~upra, 421 u.s. at 858 n.25. That agency has been free 
to do this in part because it has not enforced a concomitant 
registration requirement, a burden that would both swamp the 
agency and engender substantial political pressure to amend the 
securities laws. A determination that a sale means the same 
thing for both registration and fraud might encourage the SEC to 
take a more responsible position in these cases and to husband 
its resources for those situations where the securities laws were 
meant to apply. 
Legislative and Administative Interpretation 
I will summarize briefly the legislative and 
administrative interpretation of the definitions of a security 
and a sale, which is discussed extensively and for the most part 
fairly in the petitioners' briefs. I found the amicus brief of ~ 
/3~ 
the American Bankers Association most helpful ~ in understanding ~~
~~~ the 1970 amendment to§ 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act. 
1. 1934 Amendment to§ 4(1) of Securities Act 
Congress in 1934 rejected the following amendment to the 
Securities Act: 
.. -
"As used in this paragraph, the term 'public offering' 
shall not be deemed to include an offering made solely 
to employees by an issuer or by its affiliates in 
connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of 
extra compensation or stock investment plan for the 
exclusive benefit of such employees." 
19. 
The court below at the SEC's prompting inferred that the 
rejection of this amendment showed that Congress understood both 
that the Securities Act applied to pension plans and that it 
should continue to apply. Although this amendment probably would 
have applied to voluntary, contributory plans, it does not follow 
that Congress meant anything at all with respect to compulsory, 
noncontributory plans. 
2. Investment Company Act of 1940 
I agree with petitioners that the court below confused 
an "employees' security company", which was covered by § 2 (a) (13) 
of the Investment Company Act, with a pension fund, essentially 
on the same grounds as it confused the meaning of the rejected 
1934 amendment. 
3. 1941 SEC Opinions and Testimony 
In 1941 the SEC took the position that voluntary, 
contributory pension pla~s fell within the scope of the ---·-- -
securities laws. The SEC did not state one way or the other 
whether compulsory, noncontributory plans were securities 
(~~ary to the statement on p. 21 of the Solicitor General's ........_________, 
brief), but rather concluded that no sale could take place with 
respect to these plans because there was no element of volition. 
In testimony before Congress that year, SEC Commissioner 
Purcell expressed the agency's position that voluntary, 
contributory plans were securities. Committee reaction to even 
this assertion was hostile, and the matter was dropped. 
\ 
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4. SEC Practice After 1941 
From 1941 until the present case, the SEC took the 
position that a voluntary, contributory plan had to be registered 
under the Securities Act only if it invested in the employer's 
securities in an amount greater than the employer's 
contributions. The agency continued to maintain that the 
securities laws (and not just the registration provisions) did 
not reach the kind of plan involved here because no sale took 
place. Two SEC attorneys criticized the agency in an article 
written in 1964 for not taking a more aggressive role in the 
regulation of pension plans, including the application of the 
antifraud provisions to them. Mundheim & Henderson, 
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and 
Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Prob. 795, 806-14. In 
testimony before Congress in connection with enactment of the 
- ·- .......__..~- -
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 and ERISA and in 
the 1971 Institutional Investor Study, the SEC held to the same __... 
position: voluntary, contributory plans involving the employer's 
securities were covered by the securities laws~ other voluntary, -------contributory plans fell into a grey area~ and all other types of 
pension plans were outside its jurisdiction. At no time did the 
agency suggest to Congress that the antifraud provisions did 
apply to these plans. 
5. The 1970 Amendment to § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act 
The court of appeals regarded the 1970 amendment, which 
exempted certain kinds of bank-maintained trust funds from 
21.. 
registration but not the antifraud provisions, as demonstrating a 
clear Congressional understanding that bank-maintained trust 
funds, including pension plans, generally were subject to the 
securities laws. The 1970 amendment was a mess, and the 
International Union's discussion is not entirely helpful. At 
least according to the American Bankers Association brief, the 
change in the amendment to include single as well as collective 
trust funds was intended to reach certain kinds of pension plans, 
although not the kind at issue here. As I read the amendment, it ;q7 {) 
indicates: ( 1) voluntary, contributory plans involving the ~-
employer's securities are not exempt from registration; (2) all 
other voluntary, contributory plans are exempt from registration 
but, one may infer, not exempt from other provisions of the 
securities laws; (3) compulsory, noncontributory plans are not 
mentioned because no one believed them to be covered by any part 
of the securities laws. 
6. ERISA 
Although ERISA contained express language indicating 
that it was not preempting other federal legislation, cf. Malone 
v. White Motor Corp., 98 s. Ct. 1185, 1187 n.l (1978), one can 
infer that Congress chose not to preempt the securities laws only 
------------~ -----~--'-~~--~--------~-------------------~ because it believed it did not have to do so. The SEC certainly 
contributed to this impression during the time Congress 
contemplated the legislation that became ERISA. The structure of 
ERISA reinforces the inference. Congress chose to limit 
disclosure to pension plan participants both by requiring only an 
--------~---------------------~-
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abbreviated summary of the plan's terms and by allowing delivery 
of the summary well after participants had joined the plan. In 
contrast, Congress did choose to regulate the substantive terms -------- -------------
of pension plans, including setting limits on vesting 
requirements that would have prevented Daniel from losing his 
pension. Significantly, Congress chose not to make these vesting 
limits retroactive, as it was aware of the disruptive and unfair 
impact on existing plans such a move would have. The decision of 
the court below, if allowed to stand, would undermine this ---feature of ERISA and almost certainly prompt immediate 
legislative reaction. 
I will be happy to do further work on the legislative 
and administrative history and to explore the questions of an 
implied damages remedy and retroactivity, but at this point it 
seems to be the case can be decided squarely on the issue of 
whether a pension plan constitutes a security. Only two 
additional points require comment. First, for what it is worth I 
am a bit offended, if not totally surprised, by the conduct of 
the SEC in this case, and I note that at least some of misleadin~ 
st~ements made by the SEC in the court below are perpetuated in
the Solicitor General's brief. The latter seems to reflect a 
compromise to some extent between the conflicting views of the 
Department of Labor and the SEC. In light of Forman, Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 u.s. 1 (1977), and other past cases where 
the SEC has taken unwarranted and unduly expansive positions on 
the scope of the securities laws, some comment might be 
appropriate. 
23. 
Second, it has occurred to me that summary reversal 
might be appropriate in this case. The court below seems clearly 
wrong, and the briefs we already have received are thorough and 
extensive. As long as the decision below stands, a substantial 
cloud lies over pension plans, and employers will be reluctant to 
commit resources to them. In addition, summary reversal would 
convey a strong message, one which I think is appropriate in this 
case. Of course, it may be better to have oral argument and then 
write a strong opinion, but I raise the matter for your 
consideration. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Int~rnational · Broth~rhood · of · T~amst~rs v. Dani~l, Nos. 77-
753 and 77-754 
Mr~ · Justic~ · Pow~ll delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a non-
contributory, compulsory, defined-benefit pension plan with 
substantial vesting requirements constitutes a "security" 
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts"). 
the unprecedented extension of these Acts to su 
interests by the court be 
I 
-In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between 
"' 
Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees -
represented by the Local. f-Th; ~ust agreement establishing 
Ut.L/. - ~-
lan required the employers to contribute, starting in 1955, 
to the Pension Trust Fund for each man-week of cove ed 
employment. 1 Because employees made no contributions to the 
lfp/ss 12/7/78 
The plan was compulsory and noncontributory. 
Employees had no choice as to participation in the 
plan, and did not have the option of demanding that the 
employers' contribution be paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension eligibility.2 The trust 
agreemment establishing the plan initially required 
employers to contribute, commencing in 1955, $2.00 a 
week to the Pension Trust Fund for each man-week of 
covered employment. The Board of Trustees of the Fund, 
a body composed of an equal number of employer and 
union representatives, was given sole authority to set 
the level of benefits3 but had no authority with 
respect to the required contributions. Initially the 
Fund paid eligible employees $75.00 a month in 
benefits. Subsequent collective bargaining agreements 
called for greater employer contributions, which in 
turn led to higher benefit payments for retirees. At 
the time respondent brought suit, employers contributed 
$21.50 per employee-man week and pension payments 
ranged from $425 to $525 a month depending on age at 
retirement. 
2. 
Paul: The foregoing is merely a rearranging of several 
of the sentences, including moving note 3 to the text. 
2. 
~ 
Fund, the plan was "non-contributory". § verec;J ~ployees had 
no choice about participating in the plan; they could not, for 
example, demand that the employers' contribution be paid 
directly to them as a substitute for pension eligibility. 
~~-k>~·4~ 
Because employees could not~ out, the plan was 
1\ 
"compulsory". 2 The board of trustees of the Fund, a body 
composed of an equal number of employer and union 
representatives, was given sole authority to set the level of 
l bene ~ its~ Because equal payments were made to each employee 
who qualified for a pension, regardless of the amount of 
employer contributions attributable to his period of service, 
the plan provided a "defined benefit". 4 In order to receive a 
pension, an employee was required to have twenty years of 
continuous service, with work before 1955 counted toward this 
total. This substantial service prerequisite was the plan's 
"vesting requirement." 
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center 
of this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver in 
the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following 
year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent 
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20 year 
service requirement because of his earlier work experience. He 




pension. The administrator determined that respondent was 
ineligible because of a break in service between December, 
1960, and July, 1961. 5 Respondent appealed the decision to the 
trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the trustees to 
waive the continuous service rule as it applied to him. After 
the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent brought suit 
in federal court against the International union (the 
"Teamsters"), Local 705 (the "Local"), and Louis Peick, a 
trustee of the Fund. 
-r. 0 ..... ,.}(;::;~--
Respondent's complaint alleged that the 
the Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state 
material facts with respect to the value of a covered 
employee's interest in the pension plan. Count I of the 
complaint charged that these misstatements and omissions 
constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security 
in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 u.s.c. § 78j(b), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's Rule 10b-5, 17 C.P.R. 240.10(b)-5.6 Count II 
charged that the same conduct amounted to a violation of § 
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q. 7 Other 
counts alleged violations of various labor and common law 
duties. 8 Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all 
prospective beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans and 
4. 
9 
against all Teamsters pension funds. 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts 
of the complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of§ 2(1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 u.s.c. § 77b(1), and§ 3(a)(10) of the 
10 Securities Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. § 78c(a)(10), because the 
plan created an "investment contract" as that term had been 
interpreted in SEC v. W;J; · aow~y · co~, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). It 
also determined that there had been a "sale" of this interest 
to respondent within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Securities 
Act, 15 u.s.c. § 77b(3), and§ 3(a)(14) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14). 11 It believed respondent 
voluntarily gave value for his interest in the plan, because he 
had voted on collective bargaining agreements that chose 
~ employer contributions to the Fund instead of other 
wages or benefits. 
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal 
pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F.2d 1223 (1977). Relying 
on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans 
5. 
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to 
such plans, the Court ruled that respondent's interest in the 
I( ~' 
Pension Fund was a security. According to the Court, a "sale" 
took place either when respondent ratified a collective 
bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he accepted or 
retained covered employment instead of seeking other work. 12 
The Court did not believe the subsequent enactment of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001 et · seq~, affected the application of the 
Securities Acts to oension plans, as the requirements and 
purposes of ERISA were perceived to be different from those of 
the Securities Acts. 13 We granted certiorari, 434 u.s. 1061 
(1978), and now reverse. 
II · 
~~!! r,1e -!\aye- obst:rved befo~ "The starting point in 
every case involving the construction of a statute is the 
language itself." Blue ·chtp ·stamps v. Manor ·orug ·stores, 421 
u.s. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); see Ernst · & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 197, 199 & n. 19 (1976). 
Neither§ 2(1) of the Securities Act nor§ 3(a)(10) of the 
)c&_l ~ ~ -1 ~ ~~~ ~.:,·4 ,.J. 
Securities Exchange ActArefers to pension plans of any type. 
Acknowledging this omission in the statutes, respondent ~ 
s 
contendQd that an employee's interest in a pension plan is an ,. 
6. 
"investment contract," an instrument which is included in the 
statutory definitions of a security. 14 
To determine whether a particular financial 
relationship constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is 
whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others." Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in 
light of "the substance-- the economic realities of the 
transaction-- rather than the names that may have been employed 
by the parties." united ·Housing · corp~ v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 
851-852 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 336 
(1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. variable ·Annuity ·Life 
Ins~ · co~, 359 u.s. 65, 80 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("(O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of the 
Feder a 1 Acts • • • " ) • Looking separately at each element of 
the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's participation 
in a non-contributory, involuntary, defined-benefit pension 
plan with a substantial vesting requirement does not comport 
with the commonly held understanding of an investment contract. 
A~ · · rnvestment ·of ·Money 
~)- An employee who participates in a non-contributoryr,~~ 
/ $" \../ ?) 
~~ (i,voluntar~!nsion ?lan by definition makes no ?ayment into 
~,·AV ( the pension fund He only accepts employment, one of the 
V\Y'. ~ Jl..~ . • 
~~ pP~rr 
7. 
conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on 
retirement. Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" 
in the pension fund by permitting part of his compensation from 
his employer to take the form of a deferred pension benefit. 
By allowing his employer to pay money into the fund, and by 
contributing his labor to his employer in return for these 
payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of investment 
which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate. 
In every decision of this Court recognizing the 
presence of a "security" under the Securities Acts, the person 
found to have been an investor chose to give up something of 
£vi::IL 
value in return for a separable financial interest ~
~ 
l~ 7 
R_,_._._/ .... -L ' I --- ,1~
' 
maRi£ee~ed the characteristics of a security. See Tcherpnin, ---
supra (money paid for bank capital stock); SEC v. United 
Benefit · Life · rns; · co~, 387 u.s. 202 (1967) (portion of premium 
paid for variable component of mixed variable and fixed annuity 
contract); variable ·Annuity · Life · rns; · co~, supra (premium paid 
for variable annuity contract); Howey, supra (money paid for 
purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. 
C;M; ·Joiner ·Leasing ·corp;, 320 u.s. 344 ( 1943) (money paid for 
land and oil exploration ser~ees). Even in those cases where 
the interest acquired had intermingled security and non-
security aspects, the interest obtained had "to a very 
8. 
substantial degree elements of investment contracts •.•• " 
variable ·Annuity ·Life · rns; ·co;, supra, at 91 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). With a pension plan such as this one, by 
contrast, the purported security interest is a relatively 
insignificant part of an employee's total and indivisible 
compensation package. No portion of respondent's compensation 
other than the potential pension benefits constituted an 
~ 
investment in a security, yet these non-security interests werj 
tied to the pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sense 
may it be said that respondent "exchanged" some portion of his 
labor in return for these possible benefits. 15 Looking at the 
economic realities, it seems clear that respondent was sellinq 
his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment for 
the future. 
~ 
Respondent argues that employer contributions on his 
~ 
behalf constituted his investment into the fund. But it is 
inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on 
behalf" of any employee. The trust agreement used employee man-
weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer's overall 
obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the 
employer's obligation to any particular employe~rrn other 
dustries production figures, such as the amount of coal 
~ 
ined, fulfill the same purpose~man-weeks serve here. See, 
9. 
------ ~~~ .. 
Robinson v. ~, 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977) ",{ 'ftri"'s 
~r.c4'J;~~t /4) ~ ~ 
obligation~~o AO~ fungible with other forms of 
compensation, because tax benefits and other economic 
considerations tend to make pension plan contributions more 
16 
desirable for an employer than straight wage payouts. 
~,.;-~, -
-~ F~rtRQ~, there was no 
---
fixed relationship between 
contributions to the Fund and an employee' potential benefits. 
A pension plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does 
not tie a qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has 
worked. See note 5, supra. ~ne who has engaged in covered 
employment for twenty years will receive the same benefits as a 
person who has worked for forty, even though the latter has 
worked twice as long and induced a substantia~ly larger 
employer contribution. 17 Again, it ignores the economic 
realities to equate employer contributions with an investment 
by the employee. 
The court below believed that the "trust fund 
investing in the capital markets" constituted the common 
enterprise in which respondent had an interest. 561 F.2d, at 
1233. Respondent was held to have an undivided interest in the 
Fund and its assets. Although superficially plausible, this 
argument begs the question. The Fund's trust agreement was 
1 0. 
explicit in stating "(n]o employee, or other person shall have 
any vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in any 
payments from the Trust Fund • • " until the employee met the 
L.k 
vesting requirements. 18 By ~ terms ~ the Fund 
J b 
gave respondents no legally enforceable rights against it. As 
we a~y have indicated, respondent did not "invest" in the 
pension fund in any realistic sense of the word, and therefore 
""""' did ot have any equitable claim for restitution. In order for 
~ 
respondent to have acquired an interest in the Fund, he must 
have obtained it through some legal requirement independent of 
the trust agreement itself. Yet the only independent source 
for his interest cited to the court below was the Securities 
Acts, and the application of these laws to the Fund was the 
very question to be decided. Absent some kind of legally 
binding relationship between respondent and the Fund, it cannot 
be said that the Fund was a "common enterprise" in which Daniel 
had an "interest". 
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the 
Howey test "is the presence of an investment in a common 
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be 
derived from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of 
others." 421 u.s., at 852. The 
;f:tt~e..-
66urt ~believed that 
/\ 
1 1 • 
Daniel's expectation of profit derived from the Fund's 
successful management and investment of its assets. To the 
extent pension benefits exceeded employer contributions and 
;_-r~~tJ-
depended on earnings from the assets ~ they contained a profit 
element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial efforts 
which produced this profit element. 
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below 
~~----ffiffi•~a~n~a~g~e~Jn-~~ · fi~pectat~on of profit in the pension plan 
""' 
only by focusing on one of its less important aspects to the 
exclusion of its more significant elements. It ~flao~edl~ is 
$ 
true that the Fund, like~ other holde~of large assets, 
depends to some extent~~ Aoeot. ~on earnings from its 
assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a far larger 
portion of its income comes from employer contributions, which 
a-~ 
~Ain no way dependent on the efforts of the fund's managers. 
The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned a total of$ 31,000,000 
through investment of its assets between February, 1955, and 
January, 1977. During this same period employer contributions 
dtAc,.c... ~ 
Not only e4d the rianLs share of a 
~ 1\ 
totaled $ 153,000,000.19 
pension plan's income ordinarily come from new contributions, 
but~ unlike most entrepeneurs who manage other people's money, 
it"~· ·d.t 
A can count on increased employer contributions Ae§otiaeee hy ~€ 
20 
~ilia~ed M"ie~ to cover shortfalls 
1 2. 
The importance of asset earnings is diminished evoR ~ 
~·~k 
further by the fact that where a plan has substantial vesting , 
-1 
~ui~em&~t., the principal barrier to an individual employee's 
realization of ?ension benefits is not the financial health of 
"',;;/- ,...._ 
the Fun~ ~ rather his own ability to meet the Fund's 
O l A 
eligibility requirements. Thus :he ~EEill~ cleat! tlolat., even if it 
were proper to describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on 
some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would 
J:rN-·~··4 
depend mo~tly on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting 
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success. 21 In 
addition, the significance to the employee of this purported 
"profit" must be assessed in light of the total wage and 
benefit package he receives from his job, as these other forms 
of compensation are an inseparable part of the employement 
relationship on which the pension benefits depend. When these 
factors are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that for 
an employee the possibility of participating in a plan's asset 
earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the 
entire transaction within the Securities Acts." Forman, supra, 
at 856. 
III 
The court below believed that its construction of the 
term "security" was compelled not only by the perceived 
1 3 0 
resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by 
various actions of Congress and the SEC's ~ interpretation 
of the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, an ? 
explanation which for the most part is repeated here. Our own 
.... --
1 
review of the record leads us to believe that this reliance on ~ 
<:_~ -!,) 
the SEC's exegesis was not justified. 
A; ·Actions ·of ·congress 
~~:e ... t.J~~ 
The SEC in its ~~~ns refers to several 
actions of Congress said to evidence an understanding that 
pension plans were securities. A close look at each instance, 
however, reveals only that Congress might have believed certain 
kinds of pension plans, radically different from the one at 
~ ...... -K, ~ 
issue here, ~ within the 3eope of the Securities Acts • . I\ 
There is a~~be~ no evidence that Congress at any time 
d~~~~-bene~ plans 
were subject to federal 
regulation as securities. 
~~ 
The first iAoido~t cited to~ was the rejection by 
Congress in 1934 of an amendment to the Securities Act that 
would have exempted employee stock investment and stock option 
1 f h 1 • • • 22 p ans rom t e Act s reg1strat1on requ1rements. The 
amendment passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. 
1 4. 
The defeated proposal,.... Ji:loweve~ dealt with plans under which 
employees contributed their own funds to a segregated 
~ 
investment account on which a return was realized. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934): Hearings Before 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed 
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (1941). It 
did not contemplate, and could not have been construed 
reasonably to apply to~ non-contributoryr iAvol~n6a~y plan. 
employee would receive no 
uirements were 
~QJ.V 
The SEC also ~~ giteGA an 1970 amendment of the 
Securities Act which extended§ 3(a)(2) 's exemption from 
registration to include "any interest or participation in a 
single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank • • • 
which interest or participation is issued in connection with 
(A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets 
the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title 
2 6, • • • II 1 23 5 u.s.c. § 77c(a) (2). It argues that in 
creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested 
Congress' understanding that the interests covered by the 
amendment otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.24 It 
interprets "interest or participation in a single ••• trust 
15. 
fund ••• issued in connection with ••• a stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing plan" as referring to a prospective 
beneficiary's interest in a pension fund. But this 
construction of the 1970 amendment ignores that measure's 
central purpose, which was to relieve banks and insurance 
companies of certain registration obligations. The amendment 
recognized only that a pension plan had "an interest or 
participation" in the fund in which its assets were held, not 
that prospective beneficiaries of a plan had any interest in 
either the plan's bank-maintained assets or the plan itself. 25 
B~ · ·sEc · rnterpretation 
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, 
that almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension 
plans as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We 
~ 
are asked to defer to what is seen as a eeRoioteAt~ 
longstanding interpretation of these statutes by the agency 
~higA i~ responsible for their administration. It is of course 
a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative 
agency's consistent~lQ~&taAaiA~ interpretation of the statute 
under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight. 
United ·states v. National ·Ass•n ·ot ·securities ·nealers, 422 u.s. 
694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 u.s. 65, 74 (1974); 
Investment · co~ · rnstitute v. camp, 401 u.s. 617, 626-627 (1971); 
1 6. 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 u.s. 1, 16 (1965). This deference is a 
product both of an awareness of the practical expertise which 
an agency normally develops ~ t-Be -e-et:Kse of_ its enca11nter wi.t,h 
~ ""'41' ~ ... ,,_z 
wil l ingness to accord a ge~59€ of flexibility to such an agency 
as it encounters new and unforeseen ~anifestations of these 
problems over tim~ ~~t becomes apparent that an "' 
1aqency has shaped its interpretation of a statute solely to I 
determine the outcome of a particular case, without regard to ~ 
the ongoing problems of policy and purpose that underlie that ~ 
agency's regulatory function, this deference is forfeited. Ad 
hoc, unprincipled decisionmaking does not draw on developed 
expertise and constitutes an abuse of accorded flexibil~. 
On a number of occasions in recent years this Court 
has found it necessary to reject the SEC's interpretation of 
various provisions of the Securities A~~In those cases the --s C either had shifted its position , had not previously 
Qeveloped a position, or had developed its position without 
onsideration of the statutory authorization under which it 
See SEC v. Sloan, 436 u.s. 103, 117-19 (1978); Piper v. 
Chris~craft · rndustries~ · rnc~, 430 u.s. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); 
Ernst · &·Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 212-214 (1976); 
Forman, supra, at 858 n.25; Blue · chip ·stamps v. Manor ·orug 
f _!__h 
~~ ~~" ~ 4-c.(.. ~ 
~J A-~~~.(~~~~ 
~~h4~&<?~~~,~~~ 
a.,_ ~~~4( r ~ ~ 
~~~ ~ . ~~~~5::;l&:::r-x:., 
~d!Jac7 9-/-~~~k ~ 




tor~s, 421 u.s. 723, 759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); ) 
Reliance Electric ·co; v. Emerson ·Electric ·co;, 404 u.s. 418 ) 
425-427 (1972). This case falls into the same category. Our ______ ........_ - ........_ 
review of the SEC's past actions convinces us that until the 
instant litigation arose that agency never had considered the 
Securities Acts applicable to non-contributory, involuntary 
pension plans., and t.h.a& .it-& arg!J..U!ARLto 'ehe- conttar~ =+Hn;g ~ 
In 1941 the SEC articulated its position on pension 
plans through two opinion letters of its Assistant General 
Counsel and testimony of Commissioner Purcell before the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In the SEC's 
view, voluntary, contributory pension plans did constitute 
securities and, when employee contributions were used to 
purchase the employer's securities, registration would be 
required. Non-contributory, compulsory plans, however, did not 
involve a "sale" as defined in the Securities Acts and 
therefore were not regulated by these laws. Opinions of 
Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. 
L. Rep. ' 75,195 (1941); Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941). At the same time 
1 8. 
the SEC~~:~:~;~:~ion that would ratify its position. 
J\ ------- --
Even thi ~ limited assertion of SEC jurisdiction over certain 
pension plans met with strong opposition from at least one 
member of the committee, who asserted that Congress never had 
meant to reach such interests. 26 World War II intervened, and 
Congress never acted on the proposed legi~i~~hf~Ao 
"'-- -....... 
the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even contributory, 
voluntary pension plans except where the employees' 
contributions were invested in the employer's securities. It 
also continued to disavow any authority to regulate non-
contributory, compulsory plans. See Letter from Assistant 
Director, Division of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. • 2105.51~ Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of 
Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. • 
2105.52~ Hearings Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. 
on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1326 
( 1 9 6 7 ) ~ 1 L • Loss , Sec u r it i e s Reg u 1 at ion , 5 1 0-5 1 1 ( 1 s t e d • 
1961)~ · 4 id~, at 2553-2554 (2d ed. 1969)~ Hyde, Employee 
Stock Plans and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 
75, 86 (1964)~ Mundheim & Hen.derson, Applicability of the 
Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 
L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-811 (1964)~ Note, Pension Plans 
as Securities, 96 u. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-551 (1948). 
1 9. 
The SEC now argues, however, that its policy toward 
pension plans always had entailed two additional positions. 
First, it is contended, the 1941 opinions and testimony made 
clear the SEC's belief that non-contributory, compulsory plans, 
although not involving a "sale" under the Securities Acts, did 
constitute "securities" for purposes of those Acts. Second, 
the concession that non-contributory, compulsory plans did not 
involve a "sale" was meant to apply only to the registration 
and reporting requirements of the Securities Acts: these plans 
~1- LA-o ~~1~ I 
did involve a "sale" for purposes of the antifraud provisions 
/\_ 
) 
of these Acts. Our own review of the SEC's past statements, 
) , 
however, leads us to conclude that first of these ,., 
~~~~J -h,~~· 
assertions is A~ be~t~dubi~~ second is-de~~~bly 
7L.-~ ~-~d'.w~dr 
~ J.C,; ~~ t '1 );./!, .... -t./, 
As for the first assertion, neither the 1941 opinion , 
letters no/(:he testimony of Commissioner Purcell~ ~ 
91C:~sM::¥ hat non-contributory, compulsory pension plans. ~iel'!e 
1\ 
' 
s~t.ie~sfarrure to · aavert to the question can be 
I explained not only by the &B~e~i~ theoretical nature of the 
1 problem, in light of the SEC's understanding of a "sale," but 
I 
! 
also by the logical inconsistency of regarding participation 
a compulsory plan as ~e ..:,::u'iva:::nt of an investme~ As 
Commissioner Purcell observed, "As a practical matter, people 
~ 
20. 
) do not decide, it seems to me, to take jobs because th~ ike or 
' A 
dislike the company's investment plan." Hearings Before the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed 
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exc~ange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 897 (1941). 
Accordingly, it would have been highly unlikely for the SE 
) 
have concluded that a decision to accept a particular job wa ~ 
equivalent to an investment of time or money in a job-relate 
-------------------- ------- t/1....-~ u~ ~ ~ 
~~~~· t1 ~I ~.an-.. ~~~ .... , 
J;Qr ~he-~~· ~ <1~~&£~ ~1 "'\ 
~e~ether it is possible~ 
transaction as constituting a sale under certain provisions of 
the Securities Acts but not under others. Neither the 
Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act contains express 
-;z., ; 
support for such an anomalous construction ef ese term .. 
"~ In any event, it is clear that the SEC never 
intended this bifurcated definition to apply to pension plans. 
Neither the 1941 opinions nor Commissioner Purcell's testimony 
were limited to re~istration requirements. Both the opinions 
and testimony discu~sed the definition of a "sale" in terms of 
the Acts as a whole. See Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, 
[1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. L. Rep. • 75,195, at 
75,387 (1941); Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate 
21. 
and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941). In subsequent 
statements of its position, including communications to 
Congress concerning legislation affecting pension plans, the 
SEC repeated without qualification its belief that non-
contributory, involuntary pension plans did not involve a 
"sale" for the purposes of the Securities Acts. See 
Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and 
ql-
Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No.A64, 92d Cen~., 1~t gess.,~ 
f· 996 (1971) ("[T)he Securities Act does not apply ••• "); 
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess., 869 (1963); Hearings Before A Subcommittee of 
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Comm. on Welfare and Pension 
Plans Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955). 
Congress acted on this understanding when it proceeded to 
develop the legislation that became ERISA. See, ~~g~, Interim 
Reprot of Activities of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan 
~~- ~ 
Study, S. Rep. No.~634, ~2~ Con~., 2d ~ess~~96 (1972) 
("Pension and profit-sharing plans are ~x~mpt · from · co~~rag~ 
under the Securities Act of 1933 ••• unless the plan is a 
voluntary contributory pension plan and invests in the 
22. 
securities of the employer company an amount greater than that 
u. 
paid into the plan by the employer.") (emphasis added). ; Xt AG-
1\ 
~~~ this period, or indeed at any time before this 
1\ 
case arose, did the SEC intimate that the antifraud provisions 




If any further evidence were needed to prove that 
,1'\ 
t::hl-'-~  1/J 
involved hereA~~ tfl~ meet~Gf the Securities Acts, the 
enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the matter to rest. 
Unlike the Securiti~s Acts, ERISA deals expressly and in detail 
with pension plans. ERISA requires pension plans to disclose 
specified information to employees in a specified manner, see 
29 u.s.c. §§ 1021-1030, in contrast to the indefinite and 
uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by the antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Acts, see santa · Fe · Industries; 
Inc~ v. ~~, 430 u.s~ 462, 474-477 (1977)~ Tsc · Industries; 
Inc~ v. Northway; · Inc~, 426 u.s. 438 (1976). Further, ERISA 
regulates the substantive terms of pension plans, setting 
standards for plan funding and limits on the eligibility 
requirements an employee must meet. For example, with 
respec~o the underlying issue in this case-- whether 
23. 
respondent served long enough to receive a pension-- § 203(a) 
of ERISA, § 29 u.s.c. 1053(a), now sets the minimum level of 
benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified 
2., 
years of service,~ and§ 203(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b), governs 
'JO 
continuous service requirements.~ Thus if Daniel had retired 
after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been required to 
pay him at least a partial pension. The Securities Acts, on 
the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of 
financial transactions. 
The existence of this comprehensive legislation 
governing the use and terms of employee pension 






Acts to non-contributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress 
~t,~ ~believed that it 
t)JI"- ~' 





it enacted ERISA, a belief which the SEC actively encouraged. 
Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court 
below unsupported by the language and history of the those 
Acts, but in light of ERISA it serves no purpose. See Califano 
v. sanders, 430 u.s. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys · M~rket~ 
Inc~ v. Retail .Clerks ·union, 398 u.s. 235, 250 (1970). 
Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the 




n conclusion, we stress the 1m1ts o 1ng. 
express no views on the applicability of the Securities Act 
o pension plans unlike that at issue here. Neither do we 
intimate any opinion as to the merits of respondent's other 
claims for relief. We hold ~ that the Securities Acts do 
not reach a non-contributory, compulsory, Gef±ned~enefit 
pension pla; ~~ reqyH;~. Because 
the first two counts of respondent's complaint do not provide 
grounds for relief in federal court, the District Court should 
have granted the motion to dismiss them. The judgment below is 
therefore 
R~v~rs~d 
I -a. I If 
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Footnotes 
1. Contributions were tied to the number of employees 
rather than the amount of work performed. 
payments had to be made even for weeks where an employee was on 
leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of 
the week. Conversely, employers did not have to increase their 
contribution for weeks in which an employee worked overtime or 
on a holiday. Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a. 
2. For examples of other non-contributory, compulsory 
pension plans, see Allied ·structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 
u.s. I (1978); Malone v. White Motor · corp~, 435 u.s. 
497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama Power · co~ v. Davis, 431 u.s. 581, 
590 (1977). 
3 ~ See 29 u.s.c. § 1002(35); Alabama · Power · co~ v. 
Davis, supra, at 593 n.18. 
5. Daniel was laid off from December, 1960, until 
April, 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his 
behalf between April and July, 1961, bec~use of embezzlement by 
. his employer's bookkeeper. During this seven month period 
respondent could have preseved his eligibility by making the 
contributions himself, but he failed to do so. 
6. Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means of 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange--
"To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares, 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interestate commerce, or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
2. 
connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
7. Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mainls, directly or indirectly--
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
3. 
8. Count III charged the Teamsters and the Local with 
violating their duty of fair representation under § 9(a) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and Count V 
(later amended as Count VI) charged the Teamsters, the Local, 
Feick and all other Teamsters pension fund trustees with 
violating their obligations under§ 302(c)(5) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 186(c)(5). Count IV accused 
all defendants of common law fraud and deceit. 
9. As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
the District Court had not yet ruled on any class certification 
issues. 
10. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines a 
"security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a 
'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any 
of the foregoing." 
4. 
The definition of a "security" in§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities 
Exchange Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of 
this case, the coverage of the two Acts may be regarded as the 
same. United Housing ·Foundation, · rnc~, v. Forman, 421 u.s. 
837, 847 n.12 (1975): Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 342 
( 1967). 
11. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides, in 
pertinent part, that "[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include 
every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest 
5. 
in a security, for value." Section 3(a)(14) of the Securities 
Exchange Act states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each 
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 
Although the latter definition does not refer expressly to a 
disposition for value, the court below did not decide whether 
the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless impliedly incorporated 
the Securities Act definition, cf. note 10, supra, as in its 
view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension 
plan. In light of our disposition of the question whether 
respondent's interest was a "security," we need not decide 
whether the meaning of "sale" under the Securities Exchange Act 
is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act. 
12. The Court of Appeals and the District Court also 
held that § 17(a) provides private parties with an implied 
cause of action for damages. In light of our disposition of 
this case, we express no views on this issue. 
13. Respondent did not have any cause of action under 
ERISA itself, as that Act took effect after he had retired. 
14. Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes 
a "certificate of interest in or participation in a profit-
sharing agreement." The court below did not consider this 
claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the argument and the 
disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it 
6. 
unnecessary to decide the question. 561 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.15 
(1977). Similarly, Daniel here does not seriously contend that 
a "certificate of interest in ••• a profit-sharing agreement" 
has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts than an 
"investment contract." In Fq;man, supra, we observed that the 
Howey test, which has been used to determine the presence of an 
investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes that 
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 
421 u.s., at 852. 
15. We need not decide here whether a person's 
"investment," in order to meet the definition of an investment 
contract, must take the form of cash only rather than of goods 
and services. See Forman, supra, at 852 n.16. 
16. Under the terms of the Local's pension plan, for 
example, Daniel received credit for the five years he worked 
before the Fund was created, even though no employer 
contributions had been made during that period. 
17. Article 13 of the original trust agreement 
provided in full: 
"No employee, or other person shall have any 
vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in 
any payments from the Trust Fund; provided, 
however, the rights of any person who has become 
eligible for benefits hereunder by fully meeting 
the requirements of this Trust Agreement shall 
not be affected, changed, or altered by an 
amendment to this Trust Agreement, unless the 
Trust Fund, in the opinion of the Trustees, is 
inadequate to meet the payments due, in which 
event the Trustees shall determine whether such 
benefits shall be reduced or the Trust 
terminated." App. 63a. 
7. 
This provision was carried over in subsequent amended trust 
agreements. Daniel concedes that under the terms of the Fund 
he is not eligible for benefits. 
18. In addition, the Fund received $ 7,500,000 from 
smaller pension funds with which it merged over the years. 
19. See Note, The Application of the Antifraud 
Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory, 
Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel v~ · rnternational 
Brotherhood of ·Teamsters, 64 va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978 
20. See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as 
Securities: Daniel · v~ International Brotherhood of ·Teamsters, 
7 8 Co 1 urn • L • Rev • 1 8 4 , 2 0 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) • 
21. The amendment would have added the following 
language to§ 4(1) of the Securities Act: 
"As used in this paragraph, the term 'public 
offering' shall not be deemed to include an 
offering made solely to employees by an issuer or 
by its affiliates in connection with a bona fide 
plan for the payment of extra compensation or 
stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit 
of such employees." 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934). 
8. 
22. Section 17(c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
77q(c), and§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. § 
78j(b) (when read with§§ 3(a)(10) and (12) of that Act), 
indicate that the antifraud provisions of the respective Acts 
continue to applly to interests that come within the exemptions 
created by§ 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act and§ 3(a}(12) of 
the Securities Exchange Act. 
23. Sees. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings 
Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual Fund 
Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967); 
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities 
Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller, Common Trust 
Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994 (1965). The SEC argues 
the addition by the House of the language "single or" before 
"common trust fund" indicated an intent to cover the underlying 
plans that invested in bank-maintained funds. The legislative 
history, however, indicates that the change was meant only to 
~ eliminate the negative inference suggested by the unrevised 
language that banks would have to register the segregated 
investment funds they administered for particular plans. 
9. 
Because the provision as a whole dealt only with the 
relationship between a plan and its bank, the revision did not 
affect the registration status of the underlying pension plan. 
See 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970). This was consistent with the 
SEC's intrepretation of the provision. Hearings, supra, at 
1326. The subsequent addition of another provision excepting 
from the exemption funds "under which an amount in excess of 
~ the employer's contribution is allocated to the purchase of 
securities ••• issued by the employer or by any company 
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under 
common control with the employer" appears to have been simply 
~ se.c 's o.......tlov\~ t: If~~ 
an additonal safeguard to confirmLsuch plans, and only such 
plans, to register. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1631, p. 31 
(1970). 
24. It is Gf r;;:ou;r;fiie a commonplace in our 
jurisprudence that an administrative agency's consistent, 
longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it 
operates is entitled to considerable weight. United States v. 
National ·Ass•n ·of securities Dealers, 422 u.s. 694, 719 (1975); 
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 u.s. 65, 74 (1974); rnvestment ·co. 
Institute v. camp, 401 u.s. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. 
Tallmqn, 380 u.s. 1, 16 (1965). This deference is a product 
both of an awareness of the practical expertise which an 
1 0 0 
agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some 
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new 
and unforeseen problems over time. But this deference is 
constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a 
~ statute, as revealed by its language, &tr~ctur~ and history. 
On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found 
it necessary to reject the SEC's interpretation of various 
provisions of the Securities Acts. In those cases the SEC 
either had shifted its position , had not previously developed 
c£~«. 
a position, or had developed its position without~consideration 
f the statutory authorization under which it acts. See SEC v. 
Sloan, 436 u.s. 103, 117-19 (1978); Piper v. Chris~craft 
Industries, Inc., 430 u.s. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); Ernst · & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 212-214 (1976); Forman, supra, at 
858 n.25; Blue ·chip ·stamps v. Manor orug ·stores, 421 u.s. 723, 
759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Reliance Electric Co~ 
v. Emerson Electric · co~, 404 u.s. 418, 425-427 (1972). 
category. 
25. Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further 
efforts to regulate even contributory, voluntary pension plans 
except where the employees' contributions were invested in the 
employer's securities. Cf. note 23 supra. It also continued 
to disavow any authority to regulate non-contributory, 
11 • 
compulsory plans. See Letter from Assistant Director, Division 
of Corporate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. • 
2105.51; Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate 
Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~I 2105.52; 
Hearings Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual 
Fund Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1326 (1967); 
1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 510-511 (1st ed. 1961); 4 
id., at 2553-2554 (2d ed. 1969); Hyde, Employee Stock Plans 
and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 75, 86 
(1964); Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal 
Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-811 (1964); Note, Pension Plans as 
Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-551 (1948). 
26. We doubt as a general matter whether the 
definitions of the Securities Acts may be read to permit a 
single transaction to constitute a "sale" for one purpose of 
the Securities Act but not others. On occasion the SEC has 
contended that because § 2 of the Securities Act and § 3 of the 
Securities Exchange Act apply the qualifying phrase "unless the 
context otherwise requires" to the Acts' general definitions, 
it is permissible to regard a particular transactions as 
involving a sale or not depending on the form of regulation 
involved. See Schillner v. H~ ·vaughn -clark · & Co~, 134 F.2d 
1 2. 
875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 524-
~uS" 
528 (1st ed. 1961); 4 id~ 2562-2565 (2d ed. 1969).t('~he SEC 
has not always taken this position: In 1943 it submitted an 
amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit arguing to the contrary, and 
it did not begin to rely on its "regulatory context" theory 
until 1951. 1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n. 211; Cohen, Rule 133 
of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 
162, 164-165 (1959). This Court noted the doctrine but 
~t 
expressly chose not to ~"eeree it in SEC v. National 
7 
Securities; · rnc~, 393 u.s. 453, 465-466 (1969). ""-oCJf 
the -Bectltities :A:ct~jt seems more likely that the "context" 
referred to in the Acts' definitional sectio~ is the economic 
context of a particular transaction, not the form of regulation 
that might be applied to that transaction. Cf. United Housing 
Foundation, Inc~ v. Forman, 421 u.s. 838, 848-850 (1975). See 
"l.'L 
also note M& supra. We note that with respect to statutory 
mergers, the area where the SEC originally developed its theory 
about the bifurcated definition of a sale, the SEC since has 
abandoned its position and now treats such transactions as 
entailing a "sale" for all purposes of the Securities Act. See 
17 CFR 230.145. 
27. Judge Tone, in an opinion concurring in 
1 3. 
e ult of the court below, observed that "[t]he SEC has not 
been as candid as we might have hoped in acknowledging and 
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SECOND .DRAFT .OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, Nos. 77-
753 and 77-754 
Mr~ Justice ·Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a non-
contributory, compulsory ( aefiAQd-beRefie) pension plan w4t~ 
•St:ie&tantial vo&tiREJ reqaire-meRe:s constitutes a "security" 
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts"). 
I 
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between 
Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees 
represented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and non-
contributory. Employees had no choice as to participation in 
the plan, and did not have the o~n of demanding that the 
employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension eligibility.2 The collective bargaining 
agreement initially set employer contributions to the Pension 
2. 
~ 
Trust Fund at $ 2.00 a week for each man-~ of covered 
t 
employment. The Board of Trustees of the Fund, a body composed 
of an equal number of employer and union representatives, was 
given sole authority to set the level of benefits but had no 
control over the amount of required employer contributions. 
Initially eligible employees received upon retirement $ 75.00 a 
month in benefits. Subsequent collective bargaining agreements 
called for greater employer contributions, which in turn led to 
higher benefit payments for retirees. At the time respondent 
brought suit, employers contributed$ 21.50 per employee-man 
week and pension payments ranged from $ 425 to $ 525 a month 
-t. . 
depending on age at re1rement. Because the Fund made equal 
A 
payments to each employee who qualified for a pension, 
regardless of the amount of empioyer contributions attributable 
to his period of service, the plan provided a "defined 
benefit".~ In order to receive a pension, an employee was 
required to have twenty years of continuous service, with work 
before 1955 counted toward this total. 
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center 
of this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver in 
the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following 
year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent 
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20 year 
3. 
service requirement because of his earlier work experience. He 
retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for a 
pension. The administrator determined that respondent was 
ineligible because of a break in service between December, 
~ 
1960, and July, 1961.1 Respondent appealed the decision to the 
trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the trustees to 
waive the continuous service rule as it applied to him. After 
the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent brought suit 
in federal court against the International union (the 
"Teamsters"), Local 705 (the "Local"), and Louis Feick, a 
trustee of the Fund. 
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the 
Local, and Feick misrepresented and omitted to state material 
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's 
interest in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged 
that these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in 
connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5, 17 C.P.R. 
s 
240.10(b)-5.6 Count II charged that the same conduct amounted 
to a violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
~ 
u.s.c. § 77q.J Other counts alleged violations of various 
i 
labor and common law duties.$ Respondent sought to proceed on 
4. 
behalf of all prospective beneficiaries of Teamsters pension 
g 
plans and against all Teamsters pension funds.• 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts 
of the complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of§ 2(1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), and§ 3(a)(10) of the 
q 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. § 78c(a)(10), 1D because the 
plan created an "investment contract" as that term had been 
interpreted in SEC v. W.J~ Howey Co., 328 u.s. 293 (1946). It 
also determined that there had been a "sale" of this interest 
to respondent within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Securities 
Act, 15 u.s.c. § 77b(3), and§ 3(a) (14) of the Securities 
10 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) ... It believed respondent 
voluntarily gave value for his interest in the plan, because he 
had voted on collective bargaining agreements that chose 
employer contributions to the Fund instead of other wages or 
benefits. 
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F.2d 1223 (1977). Relying 
5. 
on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans 
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to 
such plans, the ;Court ruled that respondent's interest in 
Pension Fund was a "security." According to thejourt, a 
the 
"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collective 
bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he accepted or 
l!at /I 
retained covered employment instead of seeking other work. 
The fourt did not believe the subsequent enactment of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 2"9 
u.s.c. §§ 1001 et seq., affected the application of the 
Securities Acts to pension plans, as the requirements and 
purposes of ERISA were perceived to be different from those of 
IZ. 
the Securities Acts.~ We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 
(1978), and now reverse. 
II 
"The starting point in every case involving the 
construction of a statute is the language itself." Blue ·chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, 
J., concurring); see Ernst · &·Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 
185, 197, 199 & n. 19 (1976). In spite of the ~
substantial use of employee pension plans at the time they were 
enacted, neither§ 2(1) of the Securities Act nor§ 3(a)(10) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" 
6. 
in considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to 
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in the 
statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest in a 
pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument which 
..... 13 
is included in the statutory definitions of a sec~rity. 
To determine whether a particular financial 
relationship constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is 
whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others." Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in 
light of "the substance-- the economic realities of the 
transaction-- rather than the names that may have been employed 
by the parties." united · Housing · corp~ v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 
851-852 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 336 
(1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. variable ·Annuity Life 
Ins~ ·co., 359 u.s. 65, 80 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of the 
Federal Acts • • . " ) . Looking separately at each element of 
the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's participation 
plan W::i..U1:.. ~equire~ does not comport 
with the commonly held understanding of an investment contract. 
A~ · · Investment of ·Money 
7. 
~..J,d 
An employee who participates in a non-contributory, ~,; 
payment into the pension 
He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of 
which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retirement. 
Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" in the 
pension fund by permitting part of his compensation from his 
employer to take the form of a deferred pension benefit. By 
allowing his employer to pay money into the fund, and by 
contributing his labor to his employer in return for these 
payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of investment 
which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate. 
In every decision of this Court recognizing the 
presence of a "security" under the Securities Acts, the person 
found to have been an investor chose to qive up something of 
value in return for a separable financial interest with the 
characteristics of a security. See Tcherpnin, supra (money 
paid for bank capital stock); SEC v. United ·Benefit ·Life · Ins. 
Co~, 387 u.s. 202 (1967) (portion of premium paid for variable 
component of mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); 
variable ·Annuity Life Ins. Co~, supra (premium paid for 
variable annuity contract); Howey, supra (money paid for 
purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. 
C~M~ Joiner · Leasing Corp~, 320 u.s. 344 (1943) (money paid for 
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8. 
land and oil exploration). Even in those cases where the 
interest acquired had intermingled security and non-security 
aspects, the interest obtained had "to a very substantial 
degree elements of investment contracts • • • II variable 
Annuity ·Life · rns. · co~, supra, at 91 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
With a pension plan such as this one, by contrast, the 
purported~urity intere~ is a relatively insignificant part 
of an employee's total and indivisible compensation package. 
No portion of respondent's compensation other than the 
potential pension benefits constituted an investment in a 
security, yet these non-security interests were tied to the 
pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sense may it be 
said that respondent "exchanged" some portion of his labor in 
l'f 
return for these possible benefits ... Looking at the economic 
realities, it seems clear that respondent was selling his labor 
to obtain a livelihood, not makinq an investment for the 
future. 
Respondent also ·argues that employer contributions on 
his behalf constituted his investment into the fund. But it is 
inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on 
behalf" of any employee. The trust agreement used employee man-
weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer's overall 
obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the 
9. 
employer's obligation to any particular employee. Indeed, there 
was no fixed relationship between contributions to the Fund and 
an employee• potential benefits. A pension plan with "fixed 
benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a qualifying 
employee's benefits to the time he has worked. See note 5, 
supra. One who has engaged in covered employment for twenty 
years will receive the same benefits as a person who has worked 
for forty, even though the latter has worked twice as long and 
15" 
induced a substantially larger employer contribution.~ Again, 
it ignores the economic realities to equate employer 
contributions with an investment by the employee. 
B~ ·common ·Enterprise 
The court below believed that the "trust fund 
investing in the capital markets" constituted the common 
enterprise in which respondent had an interest. 561 F.2d, at 
1233. Respondent was held to have an undivided interest in the 
Fund and its assets. Although superficially plausible, this 
argument begs the question. The Fund's trust agreement was 
explicit in stating "[n]o employee, or other person shall have 
any vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in any 
payments from the Trust Fund ••• " until the employee met the 
tb 
vesting requirements.tJ-By its terms, the Fund gave respondents 
no legally enforceable rights against it. As we have 
1 0. 
indicated, respondent did not "invest" in the pension fund in 
n 
any realistic sense of the word, and therefore didAot have any 
equitable claim for restitution. In order for respondent to 
have acquired an interest in the Fund, he must have obtained it 
through some legal requirement independent of the trust 
agreement itself. Yet the only independent source for his 
interest cited to the court below was the Securities Acts, and 
the application of these laws to the Fund was the very question 
to be decided. Absent some kind of legally binding 
relationship between respondent and the Fund, it cannot be said 
that the Fund was a "common enterprise" in which Daniel had an 
"interest". 
C~ Expectation ·of Profits From the Efforts of Others 
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the 
Howey test "is the presence of an investment in a common 
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be 
derived from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of 
others." 421 u.s., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that 
Daniel's expectation of profit derived from the Fund's 
successful management and investment of its assets. To the 
extent pension benefits exceeded employer contributions and 
depended on earnings from the assets, it was thought they 
contained a profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the 
11. 
managerial efforts which produced this profit element. 
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below 
found an expectation of profit in the pension plan only by 
focusing on one of its less important aspects to the exclusion 
of its more significant elements. It is true that the Fund, 
like other holders of large assets, depends to some extent on 
earnings from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, 
however, a far larger portion of its income comes from employer 
contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of 
the fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned a 
total of$ 31,000,000 through investment of its assets between 
February, 1955, and January, 1977. During this same period 
I 7 tMl'1 
employer contributions totaled $ 153,000,000. ~ NotLdoes ~ 
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come 
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who manage 
r 1d !'1""· other people's money, 8 usufally can count on increased 
~·~ 
employer contributions to cover shortfalls in earnings. 
The importance of asset earnings is diminished 
further by the fact that where a plan has substantial pre-
conditions to vesting, the principal barrier to an individual 
employee's realization of pension benefits is not the financial 
health of the Fund. Rather, it is his own ability to meet the 




to describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some 
hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would 
depend primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting 
~ 
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success.~ In 
addition, the significance to the employee of this purported 
"profit" must be assessed in light of the total wage and 
benefit package he receives from his job, as these other forms 
of compensation are an inseparable part of the employement 
relationship on which the pension benefits depend. When these 
factors are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that for 
an employee the possibility of participating in a plan's asset 
earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the 
entire transaction within the Securities Acts." Forman, supra, 
at 856. 
III 
The court below believed that its construction of the 
term "security" was compelled not only by the perceived 
resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by 
various actions of Congress and the SEC's interpretation of the 
Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court gave 
great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, an 
~15 d /)N1/t?, . ? ,.;-;. $ 
explanation which for the most part is repeated here. Our own C"ov,..r.? 
review of the record leads us to believe that this reliance on 
The SEC in its amicus ·curiae brief refers to several 
actions of Congress said to evidence an understanding that 
a.r-e.. 
pension plans ~ securities. A close look at each instance, 
however, reveals only that Congress might have believed certain 
kinds of pension plans, radically different from the one at 
issue here, came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. 
There is no evidence that Congress at any time thought non-
contributory plans similar to the one before us were subject to 
federal regulation as securities. 
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress 
in 1934 of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have 
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans from 
11 
the Act's registration requirements.~ The amendment passed 
the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The defeated 
proposal dealt with plans under which employees contributed 
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which a 
return was realized. See H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess.,~ (1941). It did not contemplate, and 
14. 
could not have been construed reasonably to apply to a non-
contributory plan. 
The SEC also relies on an 1970 amendment of the 
Securities Act which extended§ 3(a)(2) 's exemption from 
registration to include "any interest or participation in a 
single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank • • • 
which interest or participation is issued in connection with 
(A) a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets 
the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title 
26, • • • II 15 u.s.c. § 77c(a)(2). It argues that in 
creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested 
Congress' understanding that the interests covered by the 
zo 
amendment otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.~ It 
interprets "interest or participation in a single ••• trust 
fund ••• issued in connection with ••• a stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing plan" as referring to a prospective 
beneficiary's interest in a pension fund. But this 
construction of the 1970 amendment ignores that measure's 
central purpose, which was to relieve banks and insurance 
companies of certain registration obligations. The amendment 
recognized only that a pension plan had "an interest or 
participation" in the fund in which its assets were held, not 
that prospective beneficiaries of a plan had any interest in 
either the plan's 
/.A.J~A a?{ iii~ 
~/L.~~ ..,w~:-.25~ 
 ... ~ rtu.-~~04~ 
bank-maintained assets or the plan itself. 1 ~~ 
B~ SEC Interpretation ~~ 
~~. 
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, 
that almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension 
plans as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We 
are asked to defer to what is seen as a longstanding 
interpretation of these statutes by the agency responsible for 
-/.MJ 
their administration. But there are limits, grounded ~ the 
language, ~nd history of the particular statute, ~ 
~ how far an agenc~ in its interpretative role. 
1\ 
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is 
clear here that the SEC's position xce~s tb8ffi.1{As we have 
demonstrated above, the type of pension plan at issue in 
case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests 
~\------
the Securities Acts were designed to regulate. ~v 
Further, the SEC's position Q.e~e-I:M5 is flatly 
contradicted by its past actions. Until the instant litigation 
arose, the SEC never had considered the Securities Acts 
applicable to non-contributory pension plans. In 1941, the SEC 
first articulated the position that voluntary, contributory 
~ 
plans had invested characteristics that rendered them 
II. 
"securities" under the Acts. At the same time, however, the 
SEC ~at non-contributory plans were not covered by 
" 
1 6. 
the Securities Acts because such plans did not involve a "sale" 
within the meaning of the statutes. Opinions of Assistant 
General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. L. Rep. ~I 
75,195 (1941); Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
l;S 1-3> 
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941). 
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of 
the Securities Acts with is present stand, the SEC now augments 
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it 
"'T";fo~? '' 
is argued, non-contributory plans are "securities" even G~~ a 
. 
~~ 
"sale" is not involved. Second, theJconcession that non-
contributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to apply 
only to the registration and reporting requirements of the 
Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions, a 
"sale" !§. involved. As for the first proposition, we observe 
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimony cited to 
' 
~ ~~~~~~~~~ 
us address the question. As for the second, 
h.eat.o;;-e the contrary. ~'l Both in its 1941 statements and 
~ then, the SEC ~red that its "no sale" position 
~ ~ 
applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See Opinion of 
Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Sec. 
L. Rep. ~I 75,195, at 75,387 (1941); Hearings Before the House 
r~- ~ e ~~"ir-:--­
~~1 ..9 ~ ~~17. 
c.i.,fz-~ ·& fi;V .£-t_~ ~ .,.,.., 
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Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments ·~ 
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to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
~.t 
Act ·




Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and y..~~ 
Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971) ("[T]he 
Securities Act does not apply ••• ")~ Report of Special Study 
of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
869 (1963)~ Hearings Before A Subcommittee of Senate Labor and 
Public Welfare Comm. on Welfare and Pension Plans 
Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955). Congress 
( acted on this understanding when it proceeded to develop the 
1 legislation that became ERISA. See, e.g., Interim Rep!Pt of 
Activities of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S. 
Rep. No. 92-634, p. 96 (1972) ("Pension and profit-sharing 
plans are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 1933 
unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension plan 
and invests in the securities of the employer company an amount 
greater than that paid into the plan by the employer.") 
(emphasis added). As far as we are aware, at no time before 
this case arose did the SEC intimate that the antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Acts nevertheless applied to non-
contributory pension plans.~ 
1 8. 
IV 
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate 
that pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the 
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put the 
matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals 
expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires 
pension plans to disclose specified information to employees in 
a specified manner, see 29 u.s.c. §§ 1021-1030, in contrast to 
the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by 
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, see Santa Fe 
Industries~ Inc. v. Green, 430 u.s. 462, 474-477 (1977): TSC 
Industries~ Inc. v. Northway~ · Inc~, 426 u.s. 438 (1976). 
Further, ERISA regulates the substantive terms of pension 
plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits on the 
eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For example, 
with respect to the underlying issue in this case-- whether 
respondent served long enough to receive a pension-- § 203(a) 
of ERISA, § 29 U.S.C. 1053(a), now sets the minimum level of 
benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified 
years of service, and§ 203(b), 29 u.s.c. § 1053(b), governs 
continuous service requirements. Thus if Daniel had retired 
after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been required to 
pay him at least a partial pension. The Securities Acts, on 
19. 
the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of 
financial transactions. 
The existence of this comprehensive legislation 
governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely 
undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to 
non-contributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress believed 
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a 
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the 
extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported 
by the language and history of the those Acts, but in light of 
ERISA it serves no purpose. See Califano v. sanders, 430 u.s. 
99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets; · Inc. v. Retail -clerks 
Union, 398 u.s. 235, 250 (1970). Whatever benefits employees 
might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now 
provided in more definite form through ERISA. 
We hold 
contributory, compulsory pension plan. Because the first two 
counts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for 
relief in federal court, the District Court should have granted 
the motion to dismiss them. The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed 
I 
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Footnotes 
1. Contributions were tied to the number of employees 
rather than the amount of work performed. For example, 
pa~nls had to be made even for weeks where an employee was on 
leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of 
the week. Conversely, employers did not have to increase their 
contribution for weeks in which an employee worked overtime or 
on a holiday. Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a. 
2. For examples of other non-contributory, compulsory 
pension plans, see Allied · structural · steel · co~ v. Spannaus, 
u.s. (1978); Malone v. White · Motor · corp~, 435 u.s. 
497,500-501 (1978); Alabama · Power · co~ v. Davis, 431 u.s. 581, 
590 (1977). 
3. Initially the Fund paid eligible employees $ 75 a 
month in benefits. Subsequent collective bargaining agreements 
called for greater employer contributions, which in turn led to 
higher benefit payments for retirees. At the time respondent 
brought suit, employers contributed$ 21.50 per employee man-
week, and pension payments ranged $ 425 to $ 525 a month, 
depending on age at retirement. 
4. See 29 u.s.c. § 1002(35); Alabama Power ·c 0 ; v. 
2. 
Davis, supra, at 593 n.18. 
5. Daniel was laid off from December, 1960, until 
April, 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his 
behalf between April and July, 1961, because of embezzlement by 
his employer's bookkeeper. During this seven month period 
respondent could have preseved his eligibility by making the 
but he failed to do so. 
6. Section 10(b) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means of 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange--
"To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of 
investors." 
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares, 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interestate commerce, or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national 
1 
securities exchange, 
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 
7. Section 17(a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mainls, directly or indirectly--
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
3. 
8. Count III charged the Teamsters and the Local with 
violating their duty of fair representation under § 9(a) of the 
4. 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and Count V 
(later amended as Count VI) charged the Teamsters, the Local, 
Peick and all other Teamsters pension fund trustees with 
violating their obligations under§ 302(c)(5) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5). Count IV accused 
all defendants of common law fraud and deceit. 
9. As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
the District Court had not yet ruled on any class certification 
issues. 
10. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act defines a 
"security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a 
'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any 
of the foregoing." 
The definition of a "security" in§ 3(a) (10) of the Securities 
5. 
Exchange Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of 
this case, the coverage of the two Acts may be regarded as the 
same. united ·Housing · Foundation; - ~, v. Forman, 421 u.s. 
837, 847 n.12 (1975): Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 342 
(1967). 
11. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act provides, in 
pertinent part, ~hat "[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include 
every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest 
in a security, for value." Section 3(a) (14) of the Securities 
Exchange Act states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each 
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 
Although the latter definition does not refer expressly to a 
disposition for ·value, the court below did not decide whether 
the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless impliedly incorporated 
the Securities Act definition, cf. note 10, supra, as in its 
view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension 
plan. In light of our disposition of the question whether 
respondent's interest was a "security," we need not decide 
whether the meaning of "sale" under the Securities Exchange Act 
is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act. 
12. The Court of Ap?eals and the District Court also 
held that § 17(a) provides private parties with an implied 
cause of action for damages. In light of our disposition of 
6. 
this case, we express no views on this issue. 
13. Respondent did not have any cause of action under 
ERISA itself, as that Act took effect after he had retired. 
14. Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes 
a "certificate of interest in or participation in a profit--
sharing agreement." The court below did not consider this 
claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the argument and the 
disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it 
unnecessary to decide the question. 561 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.15 
(1977). Similarly, Daniel here does not seriously contend that 
a "certificate of interest in ••• a profit-sharing agreement" 
has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts than an 
"investment contract." In Forman, ~upra, we observed that the 
Howey test, which has been used to determine the presence of an 
investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes that 
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 
421 u.s., at 852. 
15. We need not decide here whether a;/ person's 
"investment," in order to meet the definition of an investment 
contract, must take the form of cash only rather than of goods 
and services. See Forman, supra, at 852 n.16. 
16. As one commentator has noted, 
"Elimination of a pension plan would not 
necessarily produce an increase in current 
employee compensation. The vesting provisions 
generally present in pension plans tend to 
promote personnel stability by providing an 
incentive for employees to remain with their 
employer. As the Court said in Alabama ·Power, 
[supra], 'By rewarding lengthy service, a plan 
may reduce employee turnover and training costs 
and help an employer secure the benefits of a 
stable work force.' One of the benefits of 
personnel stability may be increased employee 
productivity, and it is conceivable that the 
reduction in training costs and higher 
productivity might actually 'pay' for some 
pension plans. Even if elimination of pension 
plans would free some resources, it is not clear, 
especially in view of the tax advantages of 
pension arrangements, that those resources would 
necessarily be passed on to employees in the form 
of increased wages." Comment, Application of the 
Federal Securities Laws to Noncontributory, 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 45 u. Chi. L. Rev. 
124, 142-143 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
7. 
17. Under the terms of the Local's pension plan, for 
example, Daniel received credit for the five years he worked 
before the Fund was created, even though no employer 
contributions had been made during that period. 
18. Article 13 of the original trust agreement 
provided in full: 
"No employee, or other person shall have any 
8. 
vested interest or right in the Trust Fund or in 
any payments from the Trust Fund; provided, 
however, the rights of any person who has become 
eligible for benefits hereunder by fully meeting 
the requirements of this Trust Agreement shall 
not be affected, changed, or altered by an 
amendment to this Trust Agreement, unless the 
Trust Fund, in the opinion of the Trustees, is 
inadequate to meet the payments due, in which 
event the Trustees shall determine whether such 
benefits shall be reduced or the Trust 
terminated." App. 63a. 
This provision was carried over in subsequent amended trust 
~ 
agreements. Daniel &eee- ne~---<Hepl:l&e that under the terms of 
. " 
the Fund~ he is not eligible for benefit~e ~Rerefor~ 
&= +ack.s eP¥ r.~ats ~er i=Ais e:rt:icle. 
19. In addition, the Fund received$ 7,500,000 from 
smaller pension funds with which it merged over the years • 
.2D .J..e-: See Note, The Application of the Antifraud 
Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory, 
Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel · v~ · International 
Brotherhccd ·cf ·Teamsters, 64 va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978 
21. See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as 
Securities: Daniel · v~ · rnternaticnal ·Brctherhccd ·cf ·Teamsters, 
78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 201 (1978). 
22. The amendment would have added the following 
language to§ 4(1) of the Securities Act: 
"As used in this paragraph, the term •public 
offering• shall not be deemed to include an 
offering made solely to employees by an issuer or 
by its affiliates in connection with a bona fide 
plan for the payment of extra compensation or 
stock investment plan for the exclusiv~ benefit 
of such employees." 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934). 
23. The exemption, in full, provides: 
"Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the 
provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to 
any of the following classes of securities: 
any interest or participation in a single or 
collective trust fund maintained by a bank or in 
a a separate account maintained by an insurance 
company which interest or participation is issued 
in connection with (A) a stock bonus, pension, or 
profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements 
for qualification under section 401 of title 26, 
or (B) an annuity plan which meets the 
requirements for the deduction of the empoyer•s 
contribution under section 404(a)(2) of title 26, 
other than any plan described in clause (A) or 
(B) of this para·graph ( i) the contributions under 
which are held in a single trust fund maintained 
by a bank or in a separate account maintained by 
an insurance company for a single employer and 
under which an amount in excess of the employer's 
contribution is allocated to the purchase of 
securities (other than interests or 
participations in the trust or separate account 
itself) issued by the employer or by any company 
9. 
1 0. 
directly or indirectly controling, controlled by 
or under common control with the employer or (ii) 
which covers employees some or all of whom are 
employees within the meaning of section 401(c)(1) 
of title 26." 
The 1970 act similarly amended§ 3(a)(12) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. § 78c(a) (12). The differences between 
the two exemptions as amended are not significant for our 
purposes. 
24. Section 17(c) of the Securities Act, 15 u.s.c. ~ 
77q(c), and§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 u.s.c. § 
78j(b) (when read with§§ 3(a)(10) and (12) of that Act), 
indicate that the antifraud provisions of the respective Acts 
continue to apply to interests that come within the exemptions 
created by§ 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act and§ 3(a)(12) of 
the Securities Exchange Act. 
25. The version of this amendment that passed the 
Senate referred only to a "collective trust fund", and, the SEC 
concedes, was directed only at certain bank-maintained 
commingled investment funds that were developed to achieve 
economies of scale for individual holders of certain investment 
accounts. 561 F.2d 1222, 1240 & n. 37. (7th Cir. 1977). See 
p. 
S. Rep. No. 91-184, ~1st Cor,..,., 1st Sess A 27 (1969) ~ Hearings 
Before the Senate Banking and Currency Comm. on Mutual Fund 
1 1 • 
Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967). 
See generally Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the 
Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 
L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller, 
Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L.J. 994 (1965). The SEC argues, 
however, that the addition by the House of Representatives of a 
reference to single funds in the final version abruptly changed 
the focus of the amendment to cover the underlying plans that 
invested in bank-maintained funds. 
The legislative history to the 1970 amendment of § 
3(a)(2) is not a model of clarity. The most explicit 
congressional explanation of the change in the amendment, 
however, cuts strongly against the interpretation advanced. 
During floor debate in the House, a colloquy between 
Congressman Moss, the chairman of the subcommittee responsible 
for the amendment, and Congressman Springer, the ranking 
minority member of the subcommittee, indicated that the change 
would not limit the continued authority of the SEC to require 
registration of voluntary, contributory pension or investment 
plans that purchased the employer's stock with the employees' 
contribution. 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970). Cf. Hearings, 
supra, at 1326. The addition of "single or" defeated the 
negative inference possibly suggested by the unrevised language 
1 2. 
that banks would have to register the segregated investment 
funds they administered for particular pension plans, but 
because the provision as a whole dealt only with the 
relationship between a plan and its bank the revision did not 
affect the registration status of the underlying pension plan. 
Another portion of the same amendment qave the SEC authority to 
exempt any pension plan qualifying under the Internal Revenue 
Code from registering under the Securities Act: the House 
Report makes clear that Congress thought this measure, as the 
1970 amendment as a whole, dealt only with the relationship 
between a bank or insurance company and its customer. H.R. 
1t• f>• 
Rep. No. ~382, Q1s'e Cou~., :2tJ .Seee.:J 44 (1970). The subsequent 
addition of another provision excepting from the exemption 
funds "under which an amount in excess of the employer's 
contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities .•• 
issued by the employer or by any company directly or indirectly 
controlling, controlled by or under common control with the 
employer" appears to have been simply an additional safeguard 
to confirm the SEC's authority to compell such plans, and only 
ql· 
such plans, to register. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.~ 631, ~1~L ~ 
p. 
~e.g, 2tJ Sess • .,t'\31 (1970). 
The court below believed that coverage of employees' 
securities companies by§ 2(a)(13) of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-2(a) (13), and the exemption from 
this coverage provided by§ 3(c)(11) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§80a-3(c)(11), for pension plans, revealed Congress' 
understanding that pension plans were a kind of employees' 
security company. 561 F.2d, at 1238. But§~ 2(a)(13) and 
3(c)(11) reveal only that Congress might have believed certain 
kinds of pension plans, where an employee owned directly an 
interest in the assets of the plan, could be considered 
securities companies. See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 506 
n.145 (1st ed. 1961). Nothing in the Act suggest that all 
pension plans, including non-contributory, compulsory, defined-
benefit plans, came within§ 2(a)(13). The SEC has abandoned 
this argument in its amicus brief filed before us. See Brief 
for the SEC as Amicqs curipe 62-63. 
~b 
2i. Responding to Commissioner Purcell's testimony, 
Congressman Wolverton, a member of the House Committee that 
helped draft the Securities Act, stated, 
"All I can say is that I happened t _o be a 
member of this committee when the original 
legislation was enacted •••• I have to rely on 
my own recollection of what took place, and I say 
to you, in all sincerity, I cannot remember 
anything that was said or done or written into 
the bill that ever intended, by interpretation or 
otherwise, to carry the implications of 
jurisdiction that you have just stated that now 
exists in the mind of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
"We were seeking to protect the public against 
the issuing of improper securities; to give it 
all of the information that would enable it to 
know whether it was getting something good or 
something bad; but the question of pensions and 
their funds, or the investment of the funds, was 
never even a subject of discussion before the 
committee. I am inclined to think that if the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the 
view that you state that they have taken, ••• 
that then the Commission has strained the 
language that appears in the act. In my opinion, 
it was never so intended when this committee 
reported the bill to Congress. 
"If jurisdiction over employee pension and 
welfare funds is important- and I am not 
disputing that question at the moment- it does 
not seem to me that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is the one to have the jurisdiction 
over such matters." Hearings Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on 
Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 
and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 878 (1941). 
2. 
27. On occasion the SEC has contended that because § 
2 of the Securities Act and § 3 of the Securities Exchange Act 
apply the qualifying phrase "unless the context otherwise 
requires" to the Acts' general definitions, it is permissible 
to regard a particular transaction as involving a sale or not 
3. 
depending on the form of regulation involved. See Schillner v. 
H~ vauqhn · clark · & · co~, 134 F.2d 875, 878 (2d Cir. 1943): 1 L. 
Loss, Securities Regulation 524-528 (1st ed. 1961): 4 id~ 2562-
2565 (2d ed. 1969). The SEC has not always taken this 
position: In 1943 it submitted an amicus brief in the Ninth 
Circuit arguing to the contrary, and it did not begin to rely 
on its "regulatory context" theory until 1951. 1 L. Loss, 
supra, at 524 n. 211. This Court noted the doctrine but 
expressly chose not to endorse it in SEC v. National 
Securities~ · Inc~, 393 u.s. 453, 465-466 (1969). 
In light of the language, structure, and purpose of 
the Securities Acts, it seems more likely that the "context" 
referred to in the Acts• definitional sections is the economic 
context of a particular transaction, not the form of regulation 
that might be applied to that transaction. Cf. United Housing 
Foundation; Inc; v. Forman, 421 u.s. 838, 848-850 (1975)._;When 
Congress wished to exempt certain transactions from the 
registration provisions of the Securities Act but not from the 
antifraud provisions it did so with explicit language in §§ 4 
and 17(c) of that Act. Similarly, Congress in§ 3(a)(12) of 
the Securities Exchange Act gave the SEC express rulemaking 
authority to exempt certain securities from such portions of 





e ercised with respect to pension plans. The existence of 
t ese provisions strongly suggests that except where the 
I 
tatute states otherwise, a transaction is or is not a "sale" 
"security" for all purposes of the Securities Acts. We --
{ ote that with respect to statutory mergers, the area where the 
SEC originally developed its theory about the bifurcated 
definition of a sale, the SEC has since abandoned its position 
and now treats such transactions as entailing a "sale" for all 
purposes of the Securities Act. See 17 CFR 230.145. 
28. Judge Tone, in an opinion concurring in the 
observed that "[t]he SEC has not been as candid as we might 
have hoped in acknowledging and explaining its change in 
----"\ 
position." 561 F.2d, at 12j The di<;~~t1!ftiA<J failure of the 
SEC to deal forthrightly with the variance between its past ( 
interpretations of the Securities Acts and its position in this~ 
case both displays a lack of respect for this Court and 
I 
undermines whatever assistance the Commission might provide us 
as we attempt to interpret the complex legislation governing 
the securities field. 
29. Under§ 203(a), a pension plan must vest in an 
employee at least 50% of prospective benefits after 10 years of 
service, with an additional 10% up to the maximum to be 
5. 
provided for each year thereafter. 
30. Under§ 203(b), all years served after the 
enactment of ERISA ordinarily must be credited regardless of 
any break in service, unless the break extends over a year and 
the employee either does not complete a year of service upon 
returning to the job or the length of the break exceeds the 
number of years of service before the break. Section 
203(b)(1)(F) allows plans to apply their preexisting rules to 
breaks in service occurring before the effective date of ERISA. 
-
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Revised Footnote 22 
22. On occasion the SEC has contended that 
because S 2 of the Securities Act and § 3 of the Securities 
Exchange Act apply the qualifying phrase "unless the contex~ 
otherwise requires" to the Acts' general definitions, it i3 
permissible to reqard a oarticular transaction as involviTJq 
a sale or not dependinq on the form of. rPgulation involvefl. 
See 1 Ih · Loss, Secur.ities R~gulation 524-528 (1st ed. 1961); 
4 id., at 2562-2565 (2d ed. 1969). The Court noted the 
contention in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 u.s. 
453, 465-466 (1969). 
~'1\...vlo\-~.;. 
On stlt•~t occasions the SEC apper\rs to 
have taken a different position: In 1943 it submitted an 
amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit arguing that a transaction 
must be a sale for all purpose of the Securities Act or for 
none, and it did not begin to rely on its "regulatory 
context" theory until 1951. See Brief for the SEC in 
National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University, 
No. 1022 (9th Cir). 1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n. 211: Cohen, 
Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of 
N.Y.C.B.A. 162, 164-165 (1959). We also note that with 
respect to statutory mergers, the area in which the SEC 
originally developed its theory as to the bifurcated 
definition of a sale, the SEC since has abandoned its 
position and findg the presence of a "sale" for all purposes 
in the case of such mer.qers. See 17 rFR § 230.145. In view 
of our. disposition of this case, we express no opinion as to 
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of our disposition of this case, we express no opinion as to 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the ppinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a noncontributory, 
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the 
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Securities Acts"). 
I 
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local 
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Wa.rehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees repre-
sented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and non-
contributory. Employees had no choice as to participation 
in the plan, and did not have the option of demanding that 
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the employer's contribution he paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension cligibility.1 The collective-bargaining 
agreement initially set employrr contributions to the Pension 
Trust Fund at $2 a week for each man-week of covered 
employment.2 The Board of Truste-es of the Fund, a body 
composed of an equal numbrr of employer and union repre-
sentatives. was given solC' authority to Ret the l<'vel of ben0fits 
but had no control over the amount of required employer 
contributions. Tnitially eligible employees received upon 
retirement $75 a month in benefits. Subsequent colkctive-
bargai.ning agreements called for greater employer contribu-
tions, which in turn kcl to higher benefit payments for retirees. 
At the time respondent brought suit, Nnployers contributed 
$21.50 per employee-man week and pension payments ranged 
from $425 to $52!5 a month dC'pending on age at retirement. 
Because the Fund made equnl payments to each employee 
who qualified for a pension, regarclleRs of the amount. of 
employer contributions attributahlc to his period of service, 
the plan provid<'cl a "defined benefit." 3 in order to receive 
a pension an employee was required to ha.ve 20 years of con-
tinuous service, with work before 1955 counted toward this 
total. 
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center of 
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver 
i For exnmplrs of other noncontributory, compulsory pen:;;ion plans, 
see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus. - U. S. -, - (1978); 
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama 
Power Co v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581, 590 (1977). 
2 Contribution!' were t.ird to 1 he number of rmplo~'N'S rnther than the 
amount of worl.;: performed. For rxnmple, pa~·mcnts hnd to be made even 
for weeks where nn emplo~·ec was on l~:wo of [lbsencr, di :;;nblcd, or work-
ing for only a frnction of t.hc week. Conversrly, rmplo~·rrs did not h::we 
to inrren e thrir contribution for weekR in whieh an employee worked 
overtime or on a holiday. Trust A~~:rrcment , Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a .. 
8 See 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (35); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, supra, a.t 
593 n. 18. 
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in the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the follow-
ing year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent 
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year 
service requirement because of his earlier work experience. 
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for 
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent 
was ineligible beca.use of a break in service between December 
1960, and July 1961.4 Respondent appealed the decision to 
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the 
trustees to waive the continuous service rule as it applied to 
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent. 
brought suit in federal court against the International union 
(the "Teamtsers"), Local 705 (the "Local''), and Louis Peick, 
a trustee of the fund. 
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the 
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state material 
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest 
in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that 
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in con-
nection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5, 
17 CFR § 240.10 (b)-5. 5 Count II charged that the same 
4 Danirl was laid off from Decembrr 1960, until April 1961. In addi-
t.ion, no contributions were paid on hiR behalf between April and July 
1961, brcause of embezzlrment by his ('mployer's bookkeeper. During 
this Reven-month period re~pondent could have preserved his eligibility 
by making the contributions himself, but he failed to do so. 
5 Section 10 (b) provides: 
"It Rhall be unlawful for a.ny prrson, dirrctly or indirectly, by thr use 
of :my mrnns of instrumentality of interstMe commerce or of the mails, 
or of any facility of any na,tional securities exchang'e-
"To use or employ, in connection with thr purchMe or sale of any 
security rrgistered on a national srcurities ·exchangr or any security not 
so registered, any manipul11tive or deceptjve device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the CoiDlni sian may pre-
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conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U. St C. § 77q.6 Other counts alleged viola-
tions of various labo?~1d common-law duties.7 Respondent 
sought to proceed on b ehalf of all prospective beneficiaries of 
Teamsters pension plans and against all Teamsters pension 
funds.8 
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors." 
The Commission's Rule 10b-5 declares, 
"It shall be unlawful for any prrson, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumrntality of interstate commerce, or of the ma.ils, 
or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(1) to employ nny device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
"(2) to make fillY untrur statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact neoessary in order to makr the statements made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mi~leading, 
or 
"(3) to engag'c in any act., practice, or coursr of bm(iness which operates 
or would operate as a frnud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security." 
6 Section 17 (a) provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for nny person in the offer or salr of any securi-
t'ies by the usc of any means or inl'truments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly 
or indirectly-
"(1) to emp'oy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement 
of a material fact or any omif'sion to "tate a materia] fact necessary in 
order to make the statements madr, in light of the circumstances under 
-wbich they were made, not misleading, or 
"(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or coun:e of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
7 Count III charged the Teamsters nnd the Local with violating their 
duty of fair representation undrr § 9 (a) of the National La,bor Relations 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI) 
charged the TcamsterR, the Local, Peick and all other Teamsters pension 
fund t.ruste<:'s with violating thrir obligations under § 302 (c) (5) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5). Count IV 
accused all defendants of common-law fraud and deceit. 
8 As of the time of appPnl to the Srvpnth Circuit the District Court had 
not yet ruled on any class certificatjon issues. 
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The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the 
.complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 (1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), and § 3 (a)(10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (10),9 because 
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had 
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
( 1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of 
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of 
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a)(14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14).10 It 
9 Section 2 (1) of the Securitios Act define;: a "security" as 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participaijon in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganizaiion certificate or subscription, trans-
femble share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit for a security, fractional nndivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rightR, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 
The definition of a "security" in § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange 
Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of this case, ihe coverage 
of the two Acts may be regarded as the same. United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Form.an, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 342 (1967). 
10 Section 2 (3) of the Secmities Act provides, in pertinent pa.rt, that 
"[t]he term 'sa.lo' or 'sell' shall include every cont.ract of sale or disposition 
of a security or interest in a ~ecurity, for value." Section 3 (a) (14) of 
the Securities Exchange Art states that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'Bell' each 
include any contract to sell or otJH'nrise diRpose of." Althongh the latter 
definition docs not rrfer rxpresf'ly to a disposition for value. the court 
below did not decide whrther the Srcurities Exchange Act nevertheless 
impliedly incorporated the Securities Art definit.ion, cf. n. 9, supra, as in 
its view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension plan. In 
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believed respondent voluntarily gave va.Jue for his interest in 
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agTee-
ments that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead 
of other wages or benefits. 
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to 
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying 
on its perception of the f'Conomic rf'alities of pension plans 
and various actions of CongTess and the SEC with respect to 
such plans, the court ruled that respondent's interest in the 
Pension Fund was a "security." According to the court, a 
"sale" took place either when respondent mtified a collective-
bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he 
accepted or retained covered employment instead of seeking 
other work.11 The Court did not believe the subsequent 
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., affected the 
application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, as the 
requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to be 
different from those of the Securities Acts.12 We granted cer-
tiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse. 
II 
"The starting point in every case involving the construc-
tion of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (PowELL, J., 
concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 
light of our dispol'ition of the question whether respondent's interest was 
a "security," we need not decide whether the mraning of "sale" under the 
Securities Exchn.nge Act is any different from its meaning under the 
Securities Act. 
11 The Court of Appeals and thr DiRtrirt Court also held that § 17 (a) 
provides private parties with an implird cause of action for damages. In 
light of our disposition of this case, we express no views on this issue. 
12 Respondent did not. have an~· cau~c of action under ERISA itself, as 
that Act took effect after he had retired. 
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197, 199, and n. 19 ( 1976). In spite of the substantial use 
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted, 
neither § 2 (1) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in 
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to 
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in 
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest 
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument 
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.13 
To determine whether a particular financial relationship 
constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the 
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enter-
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of 
"the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-
rather than the names that may have been employed by the 
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 
851-852 (1975); 'Pcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336 
(1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concur-
ring) ("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of 
the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at each element 
of the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee's partici-
pation in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan does 
13 Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of interest 
in or part icipation in a profit- baring agreement." The court below did 
not consider this claim, as Daniel had not seriously prrssed the argument 
and the disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it unnecessary 
to decide the question. 561 F. 2d 1223, 1230 n. 15 (1977). Similarly, 
Daniel here docs not serious~y cont.end that a "err! ificatr of interest 
in ... a profit-sharing agreemrnt" has any broader mraning nuder the 
Securities Acts than an " invC'slment. contract." In Forman, supra, we 
obserwd that the H oweu test, which has beE'n nscd to drtermine the 
presence of an investment contract, "embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 421 
U. S., at 852. 
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not comport with the commonly held understanding of an 
investment contract. 
A. Investment of Money 
An employee who participates in a noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the 
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the con-
ditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retire-
ment. Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" in 
the Pt>nsion Fund by permitting part of his compensation 
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension 
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the 
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return 
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of 
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to 
regulate. 
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the 
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it 
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which 
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. In every 
decision of this Court recognizing the presence of a "security" 
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an 
investor chose to give up something of value in return for a 
separable financial interest with the characteristics of a 
security. Sec Tcherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital 
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 
(1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of 
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium paid for variable annuity con-
tract); Howey, supra (money paid for purchase, maintenance, 
and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 ( 1943) (money paid for land and oil 
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest ac-
quired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the 
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements 
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of investment contracts .... " Variable Annuity Life Ins. 
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring). 
In a pension plan such as this one, by contrast, the pUr· 
ported investment is a relatively insignificant part of an 
employee's total and indivisible compensation package. No 
portion of respondent's compensation other than the potential 
pension benefits had any of the characteristics of a security, 
yet these noninvestment interests could not be segregated 
from the possible pension benefits. Only in the most abstract 
sense may it be said that respondent "exchanged" some por-
tion of his labor in return for these possible benefits.14 He 
surrendered his labor as a whole, and in return received a 
compensation package that was substantially devoid of 
aspects resembling a security. His decision to accept and 
retain covered employment must have had only an extremely 
attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived investment possi-
bilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic reali-
ties, it seems clear that respondent was selling his labor to 
obtain a livelihood, not making an investment for the future. 
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on 
his behalf constituted hiR investment into the Fund. But it 
is inaccurate to describe these payments as having been "on 
behalf" of any employee. The trust agreement used em-
ployee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employ-
er's overall obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measur-
ing the employer's obligation to any particular employee. 
Indeed, there was no fixed relationship between contributions 
to the Fund and an employee's potential benefits. A pension 
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's. does not tie a 
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked. 
Sec n. 4, supra. One who has engaged in covered employ-
ment for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person 
14 We need not. decide here whether a person's "inYestment," in order to 
meet the definition of an invef'tment contract, must take the fonn of cash 
only rather than of goods and services. See Forman, supra, at 852 n. 16. 
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who has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked 
twice as long and induced a substantially la.rger employer 
contribution.1 5 Again, it ignores the economic realities to 
equate employer contributions with an investment by the 
employee. 
B. Expectation of Profits From A Common Enterprise 
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Howey 
test "is the presence of an investment in a common venture 
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived 
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's 
expectation of profit derived from the Fund's successful man-
agement and investment of its assets. To the extent pension 
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on 
earnings from the assets. it was thought they contained a 
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial 
efforts which produced this profit element. 
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an 
expectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on 
one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more 
significant elements. It is true that the Fund, like other 
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings 
from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a 
far larger portion of its income comes from employer contribu-
tions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the 
Fund's managers. ·The ·Local 705 Fund, for example. earned 
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between 
February 1955, and January 1977. During this same period 
employer contributions totaled $153 million.16 Not only does 
1 5 Under the trrms of the Locnl'" prnsion plan , for example, Daniel 
received credit. for t.he five ~·rnr;;; lw workrcl bPfon• the Fund wns created, 
even though no ·employer contributions had been made during that 
period. 
1 6 In addition , the Fnnd 1weiwd $7,500,000 from smnller pension funds 
w'ith which it merged over the y•ea.rs. 
X 
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the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come 
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who 
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on 
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself 
has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings.17 
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other 
benefits received from employment is diminished further by 
the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to 
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's 
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of 
the Fund. Rather, it is his own ability to meet the Fund's 
eligibility requirements. Thus, even if it were proper to 
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypotheti-
cal investment by the employee, this profit would depend 
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting 
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success.' 8 
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an 
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension ben-
efits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a 
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial 
to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts," 
Forman, supra, at 856. 
III 
The court below believed that its construction of the term 
"security" was compelled not only by the perceived resem-
blance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by 
various actions of Congress and the SEC's inte-rpretation of 
the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion. the court 
gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, 
17 See Note, The Applirntion of the Antifraud Provi iom; of the 
Srrurit.ics Laws to Compu!Ror~', Non rant ribut.or)' PenRion PlanR After 
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 54 Va. L. Rev. 305, 315 
(1978 (Missing Copy) 
18 See Note, Interest in Prn ~ion PlnnR n.~ Securitie~: Daniel v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev . 184, 201 (1978). 
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an explanation which for the most part the SEC repeats here. 
Our own review of the record leads us to believe that this 
reliance on the SEC's interpretation of these legislative and 
administrative actions was not justified. 
A. Actions of Congress 
The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions 
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension 
plans are securities. A close look at each instance, however, 
reveals only that Congress might have believed certain kinds 
of pension plans, radically different from the one at issue here, 
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no 
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory 
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regu-
·lation as securities. 
The first action cited was the rejection ·by Congress in f934 
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have 
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans 
from the Act's registration requiremcnts.19 'The amendment 
passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The 
defeated proposal dealt with plans under which employees 
contributed their own funds to a segregated investment 
account on which a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. 
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on 
Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong .. 1st Sess., -
(1941). It did not contemplate, and could not have been 
construed reasonably to apply to a noncontributory plan. 
19 The am('ndment would have added the following language to § 4 (1) 
of the Secttritjes Act: 
"As used in this paral!raph, the term 'public offering' shall not be 
·deemed to include an offering mndr solely to employees by an issuer or by 
· its affllintes ·in connection with a bonrt fide plan for the payment of extra 
compensation or stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such 
employees.'' 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934). 
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The SEC also relies on an 1970 amendment of the Securi-
ties Act which extended § 3 (a) (2)'s exemption from registra• 
tion to include "any interest or participation in a single o't 
collective trust fund maintained by a bank , . , which interest 
or participation is issued in connection with (A) a stock 
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the require-
ments for qualification under section 401 of title 26, ... ,,, 
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a regis-
tration exemption, the amendment manifested Congress' 
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment 
otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.20 It interprets 
"interest or participation in a single ... trust fund ... issued 
in connection with ... a stock bonus, pension, or profit• 
sharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter-
est in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970 
amendment ignores that measure's central purpose, which waa 
to relieve banks and insurance companies of certain registra-
tration obligations. The amendment recognized only that a 
pension plan had "an interest or participation" in the fund in 
which its assets were held, not that prospective beneficiaries 
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bank-
maintained assets or the plan itself.21 
20 Section 17 (c) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 71q (c), and§ 10 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (when read with 
§§ 3 (a) (10) and (12) of that Art), indica.te that the antifraud provisions 
of the respective Acts continue to apply to intrrests that come within the 
exemptions created by § 3 (a,) (2) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (12) of 
tho Securities Exchange Act. 
21 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings before the Senate 
Banking and Curn.'nC~' Committee on Mutual Fund Lrgislation of 1967, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1341-1342 (1967); Mundhrim & Hrnderson, Appli-
cability of the Federal Seeurit ies L1.ws to Pension and Profit-Sharing 
Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 705, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller, 
Common Trust Funds, 53 Goo. L. J. 994 (1965). The SEC argues that 
the addition by the House of the language "single or" before "common 
trust fund" indicated an intent to cover the underlying plans tha-t inve ted 
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B. SEC Interpretation 
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, that 
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans 
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are 
asked to defer to what is seen as a longstanding interpreta-
tion of these statutes by the agency responsible for their 
administration. But there are limits, grounded in the lan-
guage, purposel\and history of the particular statute, on how 
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role. 
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is 
clear here that tho SEC's position is neither longstanding nor 
"even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to inter-
·pret these Acts. 22 
in bank-maintained funds. The lrgif'!ntive . l1i~ory, howevrr, indicates that 
· the change was mem1t only to rliminate the negative· infcrrnce suggested 
by the unrevisrd language that banks would have to register the scgrega.ted 
investment funds they rtdminist.ered for partirubr plans. Bec.'luse the 
provision as a whole. dealt only with the relation'ship between a plnn and ,:-
its bank, the revision did not affect the regiRtrat ion status of the lmder-
lying pension plnn. See 116 Cong. Rer. '33287 (1070). · This was consist,. 
ent with the SEC's interpretation of the proviRion. · Hearings, supra, at 
' 1326. The subsequrnt rtddition of another provi,.ion except.ing from the 
exemption funds "under which an amount in rxr.css of the employer's 
contribution is allocated to the purchaRo of securities ... issued by the 
employer or by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled 
by or under common control with the emplo)·er" appe::trR to have been. 
simply an additional safeguard to confirm tho SEC's nuthority to require 
such plans, and only such plans, to register. Soc H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 
91-1631, p. 31 (1970). 
22 It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative 
·agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which 
· it operates is entitled to conP-iderable weight. United States v. National 
Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 
419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 
617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). This 
deference is a product both of an awareness of the practical expertise 
which an agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some 
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unfore-
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As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plan 
at iEsue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of finan-
cial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate. 
Further, the SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by 
its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public 
record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered 
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pen-
sion plans. In 1941, the SEC first articulated the position 
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment character-
istics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the 
same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory 
plans were not covered by the Securities Acts because such 
plans did not involve a "sale" within the meaning of the 
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 75,195 (1941); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941).28 
seen problems over time. But this deference is constrained by our ob'iga-
tion to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, 
·purpose and history. On a number of occasions in recent years this Court 
has found it necessary to reject t.he SEC's interpretation of various provi-
sions of the Securities Acts. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 117-119 
(1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 41 n. 27 (1977); 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-214 (1976); Forman, 
supra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring); Reliance Electric Co. v. 
Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418,425--427 (1972). 
23 Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even 
contributory, voluntary pension plans except. where the employees' contri-
butions were invested in the employer's securities. Cf. n. 21, supra. It 
also continued to disavow any authority to regulate noncontributory, 
compulsory plans. See Letter from Assistant Director, Division of Cor-
porate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,[ 2105.51; Letter 
from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 2105.52; Hearings before the Senate Banking and 
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In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the 
SecurWes Acts with is present stand, the SEC now augments 
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it 
is argm'd. noncontributory plans arc "~ecurities" even though 
a "sale" is not involved. Second. the previous ronccssion that 
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to 
apply only to the registration and rPporting requirements of 
the Serurities Acts: for purposE's of the antifraud provisions, 
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition. we observe 
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or wstimony cited to 
us address the question . As for the second, the record is 
·unambiguously to the contrary.24 Both in its 1941 statements 
Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Lrgishtion of Hl67 , 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1326 (HJ67} ; 1 L. Loss, Recnritirs Rrgula.tion , 510-511 (1st. ed. 
1961) ; 4 id .. nt 2553-2554 (2d Pd. 1969) ; JI~rcle . EmployN' Stock Plans 
and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Rrs. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1964); 
Mundhcim & Hender~on. Applirnbilit? of the FrdC'rnl Rrruritirs Ln.ws to 
Pension and Profit-Rhnring Plnns, 29 L. & Contrm1). Prohs. 795, 809-811 
(1964); Note, Pension Plans ns Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, '549-551 
(1948). 
24 We doubt as A. genernl mntter whrthrr the definitions of the Securities 
Acts may be read to permit a single trnnE:nrtion to conRtitiltr a "sale" for 
one purpose of tho Sermities Act but not. othrrs. On occasion the SEC 
has contrndcd that becnusc § 2 of the Securities Art nnd § 3 of the 
Securities Exchnnge Act npply the qualifying j)lmtl'e "unless the context 
otherwise requirr " to the Arts' grnrml definitions, it is permir::.<:ible to 
rega.rd a part.irular trnnsnct.ions ns inYolving a ~ale or not dej)rndinp; on 
the form of rrguhtion involved . See Schillner v. H. Va1tghn Clark & Co., 
134 F. 2d 875, 878 (CA2 1943) ; 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 524-528 
(1st ed. 1961) ; 4 id., 2562-2565 (2d ed. Hl69). But the SEC has not 
always tn ken this position: In 1943 it ·ubmittrd an amicus brief in the 
Ninth Circtut arguing to the contrnry, and it did not begin to rely on its 
· "regulatory context" theory until Hl51. 1 L. Loss, supra, at 524 n . 211; 
Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 14 Record of 
N. Y. C. B. A. 162, 154-165 (1959}. This Court. notecl the doctrine but 
expressly chose not to ndopt. it in SEC v. National Se('urities, Inc ., 393 
U. S. 453, 465-466 (1969) . It seems more likely that the "context" 
referred to in the Acts' definitional sections is the economic context of a 
' . 
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and repeatedly since then, the SEC has declared that its "no 
sale" position applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See 
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer 
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 75,195, at 75,387 (1941); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 
1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941); Institutional Investor Study 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. R. 
Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971) ("[T]he Securities Act does not 
apply ... "); Report of Special Study of Securities Markets 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Part II, H. R. 
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 869 (1963); Hearings 
before A Subcommittee of Senate Labor and Public Welfare 
Committee on Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 943-946 (1955). Congress acted on this 
understanding when it proceeded to develop the legislation 
that became ERISA. See, e. g., Interim Report of Activities 
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S. Rep. 
No. 92-634, p. 96 ( 1972) ("Pension a.nd profit-sharing plans 
are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 
1933 ... unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension 
plan and invests in the securities of the employer company 
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the 
employer.") (emphasis added). As far as we a.re aware, at 
no time before this case arose did the SEC intimate that the 
antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts nevertheless 
applied to noncontributory pension plans. 
particuhr tranRartion, not the form of regulation that might be applied 
to that transaction. Cf. United Ilousing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 
U. S. 838, 848-850 (1975). See also n. 20, supra. We note that with 
respect to statutory mergers, the area where the SEC originally developed 
its theory about the bifurratcd definition of a sale, the SEC since has 
abandoned its position nnd now treats such transactions as entailing a 
"sale" for all purposes of the Securities Act. See 17 CFR § 230.145. 
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IV 
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that 
pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the 
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put 
the matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals 
expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires 
pension plans to disclose specified information to employees 
in a specified manner, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021-1030, in con-
trast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations 
imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, 
see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 474-477 
(1977); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 
438 (1976). Further, ERISA regulates the substantive terms 
of pension plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits 
on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For 
example, with respect to the underlying issue in this case-
whether respondent served long enough to receive a pension-
§ 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. § 1053 (a) , now sets the mini-
mum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing 
specified years of service, and § 203 (b) , 29 U. S. C. § 1053 
(b), governs continuous service requirements. Thus if Daniel 
had retired after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been 
required to pay him at least a partial pension. The Securi-
ties Acts, on the other hand, do not purport to set the substan-
tive terms of financial transactions. 
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing 
the use and terms of empioyee pension pians severely under-
cuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to non-
contributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress believed 
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA , a 
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the 
extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsup-
ported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light 
of ERISA it serves no general purpose. See Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets, 
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Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970). "What-
ever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the 
Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form 
through ERISA. 
v 
We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a non-
contributory, compulsory pension plan. Because the first two 
counts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for 
relief in federal court, the District Court should have granted 
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This case presents the question whether a noncontributory., 
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the 
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts) . 
I 
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local 
705 of the International Brotherhood of Tean1sters, Chauf-
feurs , Warehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees repre-
sented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and non-
contributory. Employees had no choice as to particjpation 
in the pian, and did not have the option of demanding that 
' . 
,. 
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tl1e employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing 
to the plan themselvE'S.1 
The collective-bargaining a.greeme11t initially set employer 
contributions to the Pension Trust Fund at $2 a week for each 
man-week of covered employment.2 The Board of Trustees 
of the Fund. a body composed of an equal number of employer 
and unio11 representatives, was given sole authority to set the 
level of benefits but had no control over the amount of 
requirrd employer contributions. Initially, eligible employees 
received $75 a month in benefits upon retirement. Subse-
quent collective-bargaining agrrements called for' greate•· 
employer contributions. which iu tum led to higher benefit 
payments for retirers. At the time respondent brought suit, 
employers pontributed $21.50 per employee mau-week and 
pension payments ranged from $425 to $525 a month depend-
ing on age at retirement.3 In order to receive a pension an 
employee was required to have 20 yea.rs of contilluous service, 
including time worked before the start of the plan. 
The meaning of "continuous sel'vice" is at the center of 
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver 
'-For examplP~ of other noneonf rihutory, compnlsor~· pC'n~ion plans, 
see Allied Struct·u1'al Bteel f'o . v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. -, - (1978); 
Malone v. White Motor Corp., -K~5 U. S. -!n7, 500-.501 (19711) ; Alabama 
Power f'o v. Davis. 4:H U . S. 51\1, 590 ( Hl'77) . 
2 Coni ribution:,; werP t,ied to the nnmlwr of C'mplo~·pes ratlwr than the 
mnount oJ work performed. For exampl<', pa.ymrnts had to hP made even 
for week~ wlwre an rrnployee was on kavo of ahsC'ncr>, di,;abled, or work-
ing for rmly a fra.etion of t.Jw wef'k. Conver~ely, employers did not ha.ve 
to increa;;e t lwir contribution for Wf>Pb in which a.n <'tnplo~·('p worked 
overtime or on a. holida~·. Tru:,;t AgreemPnt, Art. 3, § 1, A pp. 6:3a,. 
3 HPcanse t.hP Fund made thfl samf' pa.yments to Pach <'mpluy<'e who 
qualified for a. pen~ion and rPtin•d at the same age, ratlwr than establish-
ing nn inchv1dual account for each employee t.wd to the amount of 
employM contribution:,; attributable to hiH JWriod of servirC', the plan 
prov1dr>d a. "defined bPnefit." See 20 U . S, C. § 1002 (35); Ala.bamq 
Po'tt.'r·r ( 'o v. Dav·is, stttJra., a.t 593 n . 18. 
,, 
'17- 753 & 11-754-0PINION 
TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL 
in the Chieago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the follow-
ing year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent 
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year 
service requirement because of his earlier work experience. 
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for 
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent 
was ineligible because of a brea.k in service between December 
1960, and July 1961.4 Respondent appealed the decision to 
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the 
trustees to waive the continuous servicP rule as it applied to 
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent 
brought suit in federal court against the International union 
(Teamsters), Local 705 (Local), and Louis Feick, a trustee of 
the fulld . 
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the 
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state matet·ial 
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest 
in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that 
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in con-
nection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of 
the Securities E}!:change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78j (b). and the Securities and Exchange Commission 's Rule 
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. Count II charged that the same 
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84. 15 U. S. C. § 77q. Other counts 
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties.'' 
4 Daniel was lnid off from Dr.cember 1960, until April 1901. In addi-
tion, no contributions were paid 011 hi,; behalf between April and .Tuly 
1961, brcau::;e of embezzlrment by his ('lllployc;r's bookkePper. During 
this ~:;even-month period respondmt could have pn-servPd his eligibility 
by ma.king thr. contributions him~elf, but. he failed to do so. 
5 Count III charged tlw TPam::;ter~ and the Local with violating their 
duty of fair representation undPr § 9 (a.) of the N a.tiona.L L1bor Relations 
Act, 29 U . S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI) 
charged the Teamsters, the Local, Peick and all othrr TPam::;ters pension 
t,md trustee::> with vio!Ming the.ir obligations under § 302 (c) (5) (()f t1le 
'' 
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Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective 
beneficiaries of Teamsters pE>nsion plans and against all Team-
sters pension funds." 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the 
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's iuterest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S. C. §77b(1), and §3(a.)(l0) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(l0),7 because 
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had 
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
(1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of 
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of 
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a) (14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14).R It 
National Labor Relations Ac1 , 29 U. S. G. § 186 (c)(5) . Count IV 
accused all defendants of common-htw fraud and deceit. 
6 As of the time of appeal to fhe Seventh Circuit the District Court had 
not yet ruled on any class c·ertification i::;sues. 
7 See;t.ion 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a "security" as 
" any note, stock, tre.asmy st.ock, bond, debt>nture, rvidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interr~t or pa.rtieipation in any profit-sharing ngreement, 
collateral-trust. certificate, prrorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable sharP, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit for a I!Pcurity, fractional undivided interetit in oil , gas, or other 
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as :=t 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participa.tion iu, temporary 
or interim certificate for, rect>ipt for, gua.rantee of, or warrant or right to 
~ubscribt> to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 
The defiuit10n of a "security" in § 3 (a) (10) of the Securitirs Exchange 
Act is virw:dly idrntical and, for the Jmrpc;;es of this case, the coverage 
vf 1hr two Acts ma.y be regarded Hti the same. United Hou8i11(J Founda-
:tum. inc . v. /lorman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 ( 1975); 'l'chetepnin v. 
Rnight. :389 lJ. S. a:~2, 342 (1967). 
8 Section 2 (3) of the Securitit>s Act providr.s, in pertinrnt part , tha.t 
·" Lt]he term 'sale' or 'st>ll' shall inch1d~ E'very con.t.ruct of sale or dispo::~ition 
, ., 
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in 
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agree-
ments that chose employer contributions to the Fund i11stead 
of other wages or benefits. 
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to 
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying 
on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans 
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to 
such plans. the court ruled that respondent's interest in the 
Pension Fuud was a "security." According to the court. a 
"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collective-
ba.rgaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he 
accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seekiug 
other work.0 The Court did not believe the subsequent 
rnactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832. 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., 
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, 
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to 
be different from those of the Securities Acts.10 We granted 
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse. 
of a securit~· or iuteretit in a secunty, for value." Section :1 (a) (14) o( 
the Sccurit.ies Exchange Act stateH that "Lt]lw terms 'sale' and 'sell' each 
include any contract to sell or ot.hrrwitic disposr of." Although the latter 
definition dors not rrfrr rxpm.,;,sly to a dispotiition for val·ue. the court 
below did not decide whet her the Sfcurities Excha.nge Act nevertheless 
impliedly incorporated the Securities Act drfinit.ion, cf. n. 9, S'U1Jra, as irr 
its view Daniel did givH v:-due for his interest in the pen~ion plan. In 
light of om disposition of the qur~tion whether respondent's interest was-
a "security," we need not decide whether the meaning of "sale" under the 
Securitie:; Exrhange Act is any different from its meaning under the 
Securities A<'l 
9 The Court of Appeals and the District Court also held that § 17 (a.) 
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. In 
light of our dispm;ition of this case, we express no viPws on this issue. 
10 H(:'spondent. did not have any cause of action undrr EHISA itself, m:;; 
tha1t Aet t,ook efl.f:>ct; after he had retired, 
'. 
'• I, 
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II 
"The starting point in every cas<' involving the constl'uc-
tion of a statute is the lauguage itself." Blue (:hip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. R. 723, 756 (1975) (Pow~~LL, J., 
concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 
197, 199, and n. H) (1976). In spite of the substantial use 
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted, 
neither § 2 (1) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in 
considemble detail and with numerous examples, refers to 
peusiou plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in 
the statutes, responde11t contends that an employee's interest 
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument 
which is included in the statutory definitions of a secmity.ll 
To determine whether a particular financial relationship 
constitutes an investment contract, " [ t J he test is whether the 
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enter-
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of 
"the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-
rather than the names that may have been employed by the 
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 
851-852 (1975). Accord, 'I'cherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Va.riable 
11 Daniel also argm>s that his int('I'Pi-it con:stitntrs a "cPrtificai.o of interest 
in or participation in a profit-sha.riug agreemPHL" Tlw court below did 
not comnder thi::; c.lnim, a;; Daniel had not :seriou~ly prrl:lsed the argument 
and the dispositjon of the " invrsiment eoutraet" is~nr mad<' i1 mweccssa.ry 
to decirl<' t.be que<;tion. 561 F . 2d 122;{, 12:~0 n. 15 (Hl77). Similarly, 
Daniel here does not Sl•rious!y contend that a "certificate of interest 
in ... a profit-sharing agreemeut." has any broader meaning under the 
Securitie::; Aets than an "inve~tnwnt; contract." In For-man. supra, we 
ob~rrved that the Howey tPst, which has lwen tli:led to determine the 
presence of an inve~tment contract, "rmbodie:; ·the f'Ssential att.ributes 
that mn through all oJ the Court's deci:;io.ul" dd1ning a security." 421 
11 •. s ' "~ 852,., 
77-753 & 77-754-0PINION 
TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL 
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) ("[O]ne must apply a test in terms of the 
purposes of the Federal Acts ... ',). Looking separately at 
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an 
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory 
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with 
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract. 
A. Investment of Money 
An emplvyee who participates in a noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan by definition makes no payme11t into the 
pensio11 fund. He only accepts employment, one of the con~ 
ditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retire-
meut. Daniel contends. however, that he has "in vested" in 
the Pension Fund by permitting part of his compensation 
from his employer to takf. the form of a deferred pension 
benefit. By a.llowing his employer to pay mone,y into the 
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer· in return 
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of 
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to 
regulate. 
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the 
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it 
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which 
he obtained a chance t6 receive pension benefits. In every 
decision of this Court recognizi11g the presence of a "security" 
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an 
investor chose to give up a specific consideration i11 return for 
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a 
security. See 1'cherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital 
stock); SE'C v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 
(1\Jo7) (portiou of premium paid for variable component of 
mixed variable and fixed annuity 'contract); Variable An.nuity 
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium paid for variable annuity con~ 
tract) ~ Ho11!1e:rJ, wpra (money paid for purchase, maih1.teuance, 
. ' 
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and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Co1·p., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (mo11ey paid for Janel and oil 
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest ac-
quired had intermingled security aud nonsecurity aspects, the 
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements 
of investment co11tracts .... " 11 ariable A.nnuity Life Ins. 
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). In every case 
the purchaser gave up somr tangible and definable considera-
tion in returu for an interest that had substantially the 
characteristics of a 'Security. 
In a pension plan such as this one, by contrast. the pmported 
investment is a relatively insignificant part of an pmployee's 
total and indivisible compensation package. No portion of 
an employee's compensa,tio11 other than the potentia] pension 
benefits has any of the characteristics of a security. yet these 
noninvestment interests cannot be segregated from the pos-
siblE:' pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sensf' may 
it be said that an employee "exchanges" some portion of his 
labor in retmn for these possible benefits. 1 ~ He surrenders 
his labor as a whole. and in return receives a compensation 
package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a 
security. His decision to accept and retain covered employ-
ment must have only all extremely attenuated relationship, if 
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension. 
Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an 
employee is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making 
a.n investment for the future. 
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on 
his behalf constituted his investment into the Fund. But it 
is iuaccuratr to describe these payments as having been "on 
behalf'' of a11y employee. The trust agreemeiJt used em-
ployee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employ-
.,~ 'W<' need not. decide herr whetlJPr a. person'~ ·'inver;tment," in order to 
mrrt. tlw <irfinition of an illn'stmcnt cont.raet., muHt f<tkc the form of cash 
only rnther than of goods and Hordcr~. Seo Forznun , snpra, nt 852 n. 16 • 
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er's owrall obligation to the FumL not as a means of measur-
illg the employer's obligation to any particular employee. 
Indeed, therr was no fixed relationship bE:' tween contributions 
to the Fund and an emploype's potPntial benefits. A pension 
plan with "fixed benefits," such as tlw Local's, does not tie a 
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked. 
See n. 3, supra. One who has engaged in covered employ-
ment for 20 yc>ars will receiv<' the same benefits as a person 
who has worked for 40. even though the latter has worked 
twice as long and induced a substa.11tially largN employer 
contributio11.t'1 Agaill, it ignorrs the economic realities to 
equate employer contributions with an j n VC'stmcnt by the 
employee. 
B. Expectat'ion of Profits From A Commo11 Euterpr·ise 
As we observed in Forman, tlH' cctouchstone" of the Howey 
test "is the prE'seiJCC of an investment in a common venture 
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be deriveJ 
from the entrE>peneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's 
rxpectatio11 of profit derived from the Fund's successful man-
agement and investment of its assets. To thr extent pension 
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on 
rarnings from the assets. it was thought th('y contained a 
profit <>h•mf'nt. The Fund's trustees provided the mauagerial 
efforts which produced this profit elemeut. 
As in otlwr parts of its analysis, the court below found an 
expectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on 
one of its lPss impm·taut aspects to the exclusion of its more 
sig11ificant clem<:'nts. It is true that the Fund, like other 
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earniugs ""r 
- --- 1( i ~lvOITid 
la tTndf\r flu> f<•rms of th0 TJornl '~ pension plan, for l'Xumplr, ~ 
recPI.vf'd <·Jwlit l'or t.lw fi\'l' ~·par,; h<· worked lwfon' the Fund was erca.ted, 
even thou~h no cmployPr <'Ontrih!lt ions had been made during tl1at 
period. 
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from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a 
far larger portion of its income comes from t>mployer contribu-
tions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the 
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned 
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between 
February 1955, and January 1977. Duri11g this same period 
employer contributions totaled $153 million. 14 Not only does 
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come 
from new contributions. but unlike nwst entrepeneurs who 
manage other people's mo11ey, a plan usually can count on 
increased employer contributions. over which the plan itself 
has no control. to cover shortfalls iu earnings. 1r' 
The importance of asset earuings in relation to the other 
benefits received from employment is diminished further by 
the fact that where a pla.n has substantial preconditions to 
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's 
realization of pension benefits is not thP financial health of 
the Fund. Rather. it is his ow11 ability to meet the Fund's 
eligibility requiremeuts. Thus. even if it were proper to 
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned ou some hypotheti-
cal investment by the employee, this profit would depend 
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vestiug 
requiremeuts. rather thau tbe Fund's investment success.1n 
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an 
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension ben-
efits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a 
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantia1 
to bring the entire transactiou within the Securities Acts," 
F'omuw, supm, at 856. 
11 In acldnton , the Fund I'(•rciVPd $7,500,000 from smallrr p<'n8ion funds 
with whieh it ml·rp;f>ll over thr ~'('ar:;. 
15 S('t> :\otr. Tht> Application of thE> Antifraud Provision~ of the Secmities 
Lnw~:~ to Compulsory, '\' ontontributury Prn!;iou Plan,; Aftrr Daniel v. 
Tntl'rnational Brotherhood of 'J'eam~ters, 64 Va. L. R<•v. :~05, :n5 (197R). 
11' See Note, Inten'st. in Pen::<iun Plans as Securitirs: Daniel v. Intl'ma. 
rf..ional Brotherhood of 'l'eam.~ters, 78 Cohun. L. Rev. 184, 201 (1978) . 
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The court helow l>elieved that its construction of the tet·m 
1'secul'ity" was compelled not only by the perceived resem-
blance of a pe11sion plan to an investme11t contract. but by 
various actions of Congress and the SEC's intf'rprt>tation of 
the Recurities Acts. In rf'aching this conclusion. the court 
gave great weight to thr REC's f'xpla.natioll of these events, 
an explanatiou which for the most part the REC repeats here. 
Our own review of the recor<.l leads us to believe that this 
reliance 011 the REC's interpretation of these legislative and 
administrative actions was not justified. 
A. Actions of Congress 
The SEC' in its amicus curiae brief refers to sevPm1 actions 
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension 
plans are securities. A close look at each installer, however, 
rewals only that Congress might havP beliewd cC'rtain kinds 
of pension plans. radically cliffrt·ent from the one at issue here, 
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no 
evidence that Congress at any time thought ttoncontrihutory 
plans similar to the 011e before us were suhject to federal regu-
lation as securities. 
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934 
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have 
exempted employee stock investmrnt and stock option plans 
from the Act's registration requireme11ts.1 ; The amendment 
passed thr Senate but was rlimiqatecl in cottferencC'. The 
legislative history of the defC'atecl proposal indicates it was 
1 7 Tlw iunmdnwnt would hn\'C :~dd<·d the following langna~~:r to § 4 (1) 
·of t hr fk<'llrlt I<'~ .\t•t : 
" AH ll::<l'd m rhi ,.( paragra-ph, 1 lw I rnn ' puiJiie offrring' ~ha II not be 
dP<'lllPd to inelndr au offrring mad<• ~olt·l~· to rmplo~·P<~~ b.'· :111 i:<.~IIPI' or by 
ih· aflill:ttr~ m <·onn<•<·tion with a bona fidt> plan for tiH' p:t~ ·uwnt of rxtra 
compPu~ation or Htoek inw~fllH'lJt, plan for thr PX<"in::<ivP hmefii of such 
<:•mployt'('' ·" 7 Cong. Rcc . R708 (1934) . 
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intended to cover plans under which employees contributed 
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which 
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the House Committee on 
Interstate aud Foreign Commerce on Proposed Anwndments 
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895-896 (1941). In rejecting the 
amendment, Congress revPaled a concem that certain interests 
havittg thE> characteristics of a security not be excluded from 
Securities t\ct protectiou simply because investors realized 
their return in the form of retirement benefits. At no time, 
however. did Collgress indicate that pension benefits in and 
of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a 
security. 
The SEC also relies on a 1970 ame\1dment of the Securities 
Act which extended § 3's exernption from registration to 
include "any interest or participation in a single or collective 
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or par-
ticipation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing pla11 which meets the requirements 
for qualification under section 401 of title 26 ..... " § 3 (a) 
(2) of the Securities Act. as amended, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498, 
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a regis-
tration exemption, the amendment ma11ifested Congress' 
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment 
otherwise were subject to the Recurities Acts.18 It interprets 
"interest or participation in a single ... trust fuud ... issued 
in cmmection with .. . a stock bonus, pensiou, or profit-
sharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter-
1 ~ &c·tion 17 ((') of the Sermiti<'8 Art, 15 U.S. C. § 77q (c) , nnd § 10 (b) 
of the S<>cnrities Exehang<> Act, 15 U. S. C. § i~.i (b) (when read with 
§§:) (<t)(lO) and (12) of that. Act), indic<Lte that the antifraud provisions 
of the f<':-ip<·rtive Act,; rontinu(' to apply to intPm-.i.-s that come within the 
exemption>l crea,t<>d by § 3 (n) (2) of tho Scruritie~ Act and § 3 (Ll) (12) of 
t.hll Re<·qritie.s Exchange Act. 
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-est in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970 
amendm.ent ignores that measure's central purpose, which was 
to relieve bauks and insurance companies of certain registra-
tration obligations. The amendment rE>cognized only that a 
pension plan had ccan interest or participation" ill the fund in 
which its assets were held. not that prospective beneficiaries 
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bank-
maintained assets or the plan itself.tu 
B. SEC Interpretat·ion 
rrhr court below believed. and it now is argued to us, that 
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans 
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are 
asked to defer to what is seen as a. longstanding interpreta.-
19 Srfl S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969): Hrming;:; brforf' tllf' Smato 
Banking ttnd Cunen<"y CommittPP on 1\lnt.ual Fund Legislation of 1907, 
'90th Cong., 1st. Srsfl., pt. III, at 1:141-1842 (1967); Mundlwim & Hender"on, 
Applicability of the Federal Secmiti<'8 Law~ to PPnsion and l'rofit-Sba.ring 
Plaus, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 7H5, ~19-8:fi (Hl64): Saxon & Miller, 
Common Tm.;t. Fund:;, 53 Geo. L. J . 094 ( 19()5). The SEC a.rgues that 
the addition b~· the Hems~' of the language '·sing1e or" brfore "common 
tru~t fund" imlicatecl an intent to <'over the uutkrlying plan~ that invested 
in bank-maintnined fund:-~. The legi~httivc hi:storr, howrver, indieatrs tl1a:t 
the cha.ng<· was mPa.nt only to eliminc~te the nr~ative inferenre sugge:;ted 
by the unrevi~ed lan~1tage tha.t bank~ would have to l'Pgi::;t('r the segregated 
inv<·~tnwnL funds they aclmini:;tered for partielllilr pla.n:s. Ber·ause the 
provi:;ion a,; n whole dealt. only with 1 he rela.t ionship bPtween a plan and 
its bank, the revision did not affPc1 t.he regi:;tmtion status of the under-
lying ]Wnsion piau. See 116 Coug. H<-w. :~;32R7 ( H170). This WHH consist,.. 
ent with Uw SEC'~ interpretation of Hw provisi011. Hearing;;, supra, at 
l32G. Tho snb:sefJuent :tcldit.ion of :motlu:w provi~ion exrept.ing from the 
exemptiou funds " nnc!Pr whir.h an amount. in exoe,;;~ of the rmployer's 
contribution iK allocilt,cd to the pmcha.-:e of secnritir,; ... issued by the 
rmplo~'I'T or h~· an~r rompa.ny di1wt !~· or indirertl~r eOJ1t.rolling, eon trolled 
h~r or nnder common control with t.Jw employ~·r" appear~ to luwe been 
~imply :1.11 additionaJ ~aJeguarcl to ronfinn the SEC'" authority to require 
~ueh plu.11,;, a.ncl only :such p!n.n:s, 1 o regi~ter . See H. R. C'ou r. Re,p. No. 
m-w:n, p. 31 {1970). 
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsiblf' for their 
administration. But there are limits. grounded in tlw lan-
guage, pmpose aud history of tlw particular statute, on how 
far au agency properly may go in its interpretative role. 
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is 
clear hPre that the SEC''s position is neither longstandiug nor 
even ar12:uably within the outer limits of its authority to illter-
pret these Acts.~0 
As we have demonstrated above. the type of pension plan 
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to thr kind of finan-
cial interests the Securities Aets were design(•d to regulate. 
Further, the SEC''s present position is flatly con tradictcd by 
its past actions. r ntil the instant litigation arose, the public 
record t'<'veals no evidmiCe that the SEC had ever considered 
the St>curities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pPll-
sion plans. Jn 1941, the SEC first articulated the position 
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment character-
istics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the 
~u It. ts a commonplarP in onr .imi~prudenee that nn administrative 
agency's eon~istrnt ., loug~tanding int(•rpretation of th<' :sta.tutt• undt•r which 
it operntt'l:! is t•ntit led to cou:sidC'rahle weight. United State:s v. National 
Assn. of 8ecunties Dealers. -t22 P. R. n94-, 719 (1975); Saxbt• v. Bustos, 
419 F. s. n5, 74 (HJ74); l11Vt:'l$tiiii!Jtt eo. ]m;titute \'. C'Oirlfl, 401 U. s. 
617, 620-627 (1971); ( 'doll , .. Tallman. :180 1' . S. 1. Hi (Hln5). This 
defer<>uce iR a product hot h of an a wareup,.:s of t hr pmd-iea.l rxpertise 
which an ageney normal!~· dPvrlops, and of a williugnt>,.:s to :wrord some 
mPasur!' of flexibility to such an ageney as 1t C'n<•otmter,.: new and unfore-
seen problems over tinw. But thi,; dPfNC'Ilr<' I~< eonstrainP<l b~· om obliga-
tion to honor the clt•ar mpauing of a ,.:latutP, a::: rrvP:tlc•(t' hy it;; lnngua.ge, 
purpo.;;e and lnstor~·. On a munber of occ.1.sion,; in n·cent ~·rar::: thi:-< Court 
ha:i found tt 111'CPs~trr to rejeet t.he SEC'~ int~'rpretation of variou;; provi-
siOn,; of the S<•euntie>< Art,.:. Sc·e :::)E(' \'. 8loan . .Jo:{() { T. 8. 10:~, 117-119 
(1H7:--); P1per ''· ('hris-Craft lndu~>trit>s, Inc ., 4:10 r. 8. 1, 41 n. 27 (Hl77); 
Enl8t l~· /l,'mst v. llochfelder, 4:25 ll. S. li\5, 212-:214 (197fl): Forman, 
1$Upra. at H5~ 11 . 25; Blue Chip Staw ps v . . 'Han or Druu 8tores. -!:21 U. S. 
723, 75\l u. 4 (1975) (Pow~~LL, .1., <·onemring): Reliance Rfectric Co. v. 
Emerson E'l~.:ctric Co. , 40-1- F . S. ·:1:18, 425-427 (197.2) .. 
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same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory 
plans were lJOt covered by the Securities Acts because such 
plans did not involve a "sale" withjn the meaning of the 
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,-[ 75,195 (1941); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Com~nerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of Connnis-
sioner Purcell). 21 
In an attempt to recqncile these interpretations of the 
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC now augments 
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it 
is argued. noncontributory plans are "securities" even where 
a "sale" is uot involved. Second, the previous concession that 
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to 
apply only to the registration and reporting requirements of 
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions, 
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition, we observe 
that none of the SEC opinicms, reports, or testimony cited to 
us address the question. As for the second, the record is 
21 SubsequE>ut lo 1941, the SEC made no fmther efforts to regulate E>ven 
contributory, volunta.~· penl'1ion plans except wlwre the employees' contri-
butions were inve::;ted in thP emplo~7er's ;,;eruritie.s. Cf. 11 . 21, supra. It 
also continued to dio:<wow any authority to regulate noncontributory, 
eompnl;;ory plan;,:. See Letter from A:,;:;istant Din•etor, Divi~:>ion of Cor-
pomto .Finance, May 12, 195:~, CCH FE>d . SE>c. L. Rep. ,r 2105.51; Letter 
from Chif'f Counsel, Division of Corporate Finanee, Augu;;t 1, 1962, CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ,r 2105.52; Hectrings before thf) Senate Banking and 
CurrPncy Conunittee on Mutual Fund Legisla.tion of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 13:26 (Hl(17) ; 1 L. Lo::;::~, Srcurities Regula.tion, 510-511 (1st ed. 
1961) ; 4 id .. at. 2553-2554 (2d f'd. 195!1); Hyde, Employ•fe Stock Plans 
a.nd tlH' St'curitw:-; Act. of 1933, 15 W. Res. L. Hev. 75, 85 (1954); 
Mundheim & H(•ndPrson, Applicability of the Federal Securitiei:l Laws to 
Pension nud Profit-Sharing .Plan:;, 2H L. & Contemp. Prob~. 795, 809-811 
(1904) ; Not.e, Pension Plans a:> Securitie:.;, 96 U. J>a. L. Rev . 549, 549-551 
fl948). 
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unambiguously to the contrary.~~ Both i11 its 1041 statements 
and n'peateclly sinee then. tlw SEC has drclared that. its "no 
sale" positio11 applied to the Securities Acts as a "·holt~. See 
Opinio11 of .\ssistant Ge11eral Counsel, [ 1941-1044 Transfer 
Binder 1 CCH Fed. f-icc. L. Rt>p. 1T 75,105, at 75.387 ( 1041); 
Heariugs before the House Committee on Interstate ami For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1034. 77th C'_,ong .. 
1st Sess .. 888, 806-897 (HJ41); Institutional lnvf'stor ,Study 
Report of tlw Securities and Exchm1ge Commission. H. R. 
Doc. ~o. 02-64, p. 096 (Hl71) ("fT]he Securities Act does not 
apply ... "); Hearings on Wt'lfa.re and Pension PlallS Inves-
tigatiotl before the Subcommittc'e on Welfare and Pension 
·~2 Wr doubt a,., a g('Jl<'l'almattPI' wlwth<'l' ilw d<'finition~ of the• Sc·curities 
A cis mn~· be n·ad to p<'nnit a ;.cinglt· t l'a ,n~:wt .ion to ron:;titnf(' :1 "sale" for 
one Jllii'J)08Cn of the S<'('llriti(•s Aet b11! 11ot. othPr~. On occasion the SEC 
Ita.~ rontl'nded 1 ha.t bt•(·m•,;<• § 2 of the SreuritiPf' Aet ami § 3 of the 
SPcurilit•,; Exrlwng;c Art. appl~· tlw qu:dif\in~J: phra,;t• "unlr:-<;; thn context 
otherwi><(' r·equin·~" to the Arts' g<•urral dPfinitionH, it i~-: pPrmi;;.,;ihle .to 
rrgn.rrl a p<lt'!.ieiJlar transaction,: a,; iuvolviu~ n o:alr or· not d('J>Pnding on 
tho form of rr~J;uhtion iuvolv<'<1. Sel' Schill ner v. If. Vnuolm C'la.rk (~· Co., 
la4 F. :2d ~7.rs, 87R (CA2 19·4:~); l L. Lo~H, S<'euritie~ Hrgulntim1 524-528 
(1st. <·d. 19111); 4 id .. at, 2562-2565 (2d rd. Hlf\~l). Hut tJw SEC has not 
r.Jwa~·K t.nk('ll f.lus pmii1ion: lu Hl.J.a if ,;uhmit.trd an amicus IH'id in the 
Nin1h Circuit arguing to tlw ('Ontrar~· , a.nd it dul not hrgin to r·ely on its 
· " rC'gulafor~ · euntPxt.'' tlwory mrt.il 1951. 1 L. Loss, supra, nf, 524 n. 211; 
Colwn, Hulo 1:3:3 of f lw SrcuritiPH Excha.ng<' Commi,;sion, l.J. Hecord of 
N. Y. C'. B. A. 1G2, W-!-Hl5 (1959). Thi:.; Court noted tlw doc·trino but 
exprr:s,;ly (·ho,;n not. to adopt. it in ,'l,fi}(' ,., N(f.tionul 8ec·uritil:'8. Inc .. 393 
U. S. 45:~, +H5-.J.G(i (HIH9) . H :-<('('111H mon• lik(•ly tlmt the ·'eontext" 
referred Lo in t.hP Art" ' dcfini1mn;1.1 :<r('I,Jons is the ceonomi(· context of a 
partirula.r trr\.ll~aetioll, .not the form of rrgulation Om! might be applied 
to t ha1, t mn::;artion. Cf. Forrna:n. S'Upra. a.t 84R-R50. Src also n. 20, 
xupm. We nato that with l'f';;j)Prt to ~tatu1ory ITH'rgrrs, 1lw arPa whrrc 
thn SEC ongiually drvrloprd i1.~ throry ahout. the bifun·afPd dt>finition of 
a ~alt> , ilw SEC :<im•p has nbandmwd ih position ami now trra.i,; ~urh 
· rnn~netions w; entailing a "::;ale'' for all pnrpone::; of the S(•curitiPs Act. 
81:<' 17 C FR § 230.145, 
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·Funds of th<• Rf'nat<• Lahor and Puhli<' Wc•lfarP CornmittN•, 
R4th ('oug., 1st Ress .. !l4:{-!J4H (1\lf>,)). Cor1gn•ss aetf'd on this 
understanding wlwr1 it proec•ecled to develop tlw l<"gislation 
that bc•eanw F~Rl~A. f-1<><', e. if., Interim HPport of Activities 
of the• Private• \\'elfare and Prnsiou Plan Study, S. Hep. 
No. 92-6:~4. p. ~)6 (1!J72) ("Peni",ion and profit-sharing pla.ns 
t:trr rnn11pt frolll ('OVCnLU< ' undt•r the SPeuritic>s Act of 
193:~ ... unh·ss the plan is a voluntary contributory pellsion 
plan and irlvPsts in the securities of the employ<•r company 
an amouut greah•r than that paid into tlw plan by the 
('mployc•r.") (Pmphasis rulded). As far a::-: m' an• aware, at 
no time bdorP this casr arost> did thP SEC intimate that the 
antifraud provisiom; of the· S<•curities Aets llPvertlwl<~s!'l 
applied to noneontributory pension plans. 
IV 
If any further evitlf'llCP ·wrr<' rH•t-dPd to d(•mom;trat<' that. 
pension pla11s of thP type• involwd an• not sub,jpct to the 
Re<'uritics Acts. the enactnwnt of ERISA in HJ74 would put 
the matter to r·est. PtJiike the Se<'urities Acts. EHl~A deals 
exprpssly and in ddail ·with JH'Ilf'ion plans. ERlSA requit·es 
JWllsion plan1' to rliselosc• spPC'ifird information to (•mployeeB 
in a speeified manrwr. SPP :2!1 C. S. C. ~~ 10:21-1000. in con-
trast to the iudefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations 
iruposeu by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, 
HI'C Snnln Fe Industries, l/1('. v. Grceu, 430 'F.,'. 40:2. 474-477 
(1977); 'Ff::JC Industries, Inc. v. Nurtl11my, f11c., 42(i U. S. 
438 (HJ7f>). Furtht-r. EH1S.-\ n~gulates tlw substantive terms 
of p('llsion plans. S<'tt.iug starHlards for plan funding and limit:;; 
011 tlw Pligibility requiremenb.; an employPe must rueet. For· 
t•xampk. \nth 1'<-'SJH"d to tlw IIIH!l'l'lying issue in this case-
" hPtlwr n•spouderJt st•rved long puough to I'I'CPi V<' a pension-
~ 203 (a) of EH ISA. 2H l-. R. C. ~ 1053 (a). now sds tlw mini-
nruut h.•vp] of bPuefits an employ<'<' must recPiV<' aftPr accruing 
·sp<>eifkd years of s<'rri<'e, arHI ~ :w:~ (b). 2\J 1'. H. C. s 105'3 
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(L). governs continuous servic<' requirements. Thus if Daniel 
had rf'tired after ~ 10.53 took rft"cct. tlw Fund would have been 
requin'd to pay him at least a partial ppusion. Thc :;;ecuri-
ties Acts, on the other hand. do not purport to Sf't the substan-
tive term.s of financial transactions. 
Tlw existPnC<' of this comprehensive legislation govrrning 
tiw use and terms of employee pension plans sev<'rely uHder-
cuts all argunwnts for extending the RecuritiPs Acts to non-
contributory, compulsory pension plans. Congn"ss beJiPvecl 
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enactPd ERISA. a 
bPlit-f which tlw SEC .actively eucouragecl. ~ot only is the 
extension of the Securities Acts by thr court bPlow unsup-
ported by thP language and history of those Acts. but in light 
of 'ERISA it serves no getwral put'pose. Rt-e Coiifnno v. 
Sanders, 430 U. R. ~)9, 104-107 ( 1977). Cf. Boys .lictrkels, 
Inc. Y. Retail Clerks Fwio'll, 398 F. S. 23f5. 250 (HJ70). \Yhat-
ever benefits employees might derive from the pffect of the 
Securities Acts are now provided in more dcfiu.ite form 
through ERISA. 
v 
We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a non-
contributory, compulsory pE'ttsion plan. Beeause thf' first two 
counts of responde11t's complaint do not provide grounds for· 
relief in federal eourt., the District Court should havP granted 
the motion to dismiss them. The judgmPnt below is therpfore 
Reversed. 
·, 
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unamlJiguously to the contrary.~~ Both i1\ its 1041 stat{'nwnts 
and rcpcakdly since tlwn , tlw SEC has drrlarccl that its "no 
sale" }Jositio'' nppli<'d to the St'turitirs Acts as a \\·hole. See 
Opinion of .\ssist:wt General Counsel, l Hl41-1044 Transfer 
Binder] CCH Feel. :t;t>c. L. R!'p. 'if75,Hl5, at 75,387 (Hl41); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Anwndmcnts to th<' Securities Act 
of 1!1:13 and the Srcurities Exchange Act of 1034_. 77th C'ong., 
1st Sess .. 888. SDG--8!)7 (1041); Institutional Im·rstor Study 
Report of the Scemitirs and Exchange Commission. H. R. 
Doc. Xo. 92--64, p. !lOG (Hl71) ("[T]hc Securities Act does not 
apply ... "); Hrarings Oll "-elfarr anrl Pension Plans Inves-
tigation before the Subc-ommitt.c'c 011 \\'elfarc and Pension . 
:.J-¥."!1~ . 4,,)<-.t.l lh i.- pu.,it 1.,n: 1n J! q:~ it .-nhmitt<"d :tn rn11icu;:; hrid in the 
J\inth Circ·uit :trp;uinl! t . . .. ·, . lj did nut lH ·I!ill tu n•ly on its 
"rc·gu ;dor~· tOiltl'xt.' tlwory 11111il 1951. 1 L . Lo,;s, supra. :n i)~-l n. :211; 
Coh<•n , Huh• 1:3;:; of t lw SPt'tlrit il'o-: Ex<·h:1 n~t· Commi . .;_.-ioJ!, H R<·rmd of 
N'. Y. C. B. A. 1111, ](i.J- JG5 (1\l.'i ~ l). Thi,.; ('o11rt notrd tlw doctrino but. 
. '!l!'t to :tdopt it in :i8C ,._ ll"otir,llal St•curitiN;. l11c. , 393 
lJ. 8. ~5:), -lti5- -lli(i (J!IIi9). It. -.(•t·m~ nwn• likt·!~ · th:t1 the "('ontrxt" 
refcrrctl to in tl1<' .-\1'1~ ' d..f1nit ional ~<Ttion~ j,; tlw c<·unolni!' t·tmtt·xt. of a 
pa rticular tran~:t l' tiun, nut. tlw fom1 of n·)!;tll:ttion th:t.1 Jliil!ltt he [!pplied 
to that. 1 r:tll"ICtiun. Cf. Formm •. supm. at. S.JS- F-:50. St'<' :tl,:o n. 20, 
_ ' IIJllll . \\'t · notr that \\·ith fl'::']Wrt Jo ,;f;ttutor~· nu·rgrrs, thr :trl':l whrre 
d·~?~ ~f'"' oH; ,,,,;,,u,. rl<·,oloped ;,; ' " "")'"''""'the b;r,,,.,INI ,,,.r,,;,;,, of ;, -a le . lht • :-;J-:C .-< itH·<· ha.;; :d>:t ndnnl'd it,; ])(b ition and now trP:t1 ." ~ urh 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
Nos. 77- 753 AND 77- 754 
International Brotherhood of Teamw 
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, 
I 
Petitioner, 
77- 753 v. 
John Daniel. 
Local 705, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Chauft'eurs, Ware-
housemen and Hdpers of 
America, et al., 
Peti tione1·s, 
77- 754 v. 
John DanieL 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
[Jauua.ry -, 1979] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents. the question whether a noncontributory, 
compulsory pension pla.n constitutes a "security" within the 
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts) . 
I 
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local 
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs , Warehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees repre-
sented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and non-
contributory. Employees had no choice as to participation 
in the plan, and did not have the option ·Of demanding that 
( 
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the employet·'s contribution be paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing 
to the plan themselves.1 
The collective-bargaining agreement iHitially set employer 
contributions to the Pension Trust Fund at $2 a week for each 
man-week of covered employment.~ The Board of Trustees 
of the FullCl, a body composed of an equal number of employer 
and uniou representatives, was given sole authority to set the 
level of benefits but had no control over the amount of 
requirPd employer coutr·ibutions. Initially, eligible employees 
received $75 a month in benefits upon retiremeut. Subse-
quent collective-bargaining agreements called for greater 
employer contributions, which in turn led to higher benefit 
payments for retirees. At the time respondent brought suit, 
employers coutributed $21.50 per employee ma11-week and 
pension paymeuts ranged from $425 to $525 a month depend-
ing on age at retirement.3 In order to receive a pension an 
employee was required to have 20 years of continuous service, 
including time workecl before the start of the plan. 
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the cellter of 
this dispute. Rt>spondent began working as a truck driver 
1 For PxamplP,; of other non eon! rihuf ory, compnl:'iory prll~ion plans, 
set> Allied Structural Steel ea. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. -, - (1978); 
Malone v. Ff'hite Motor Corp., 435 F. 8. 407, 500-501 (1978); Alabama 
Power Oo v. Da.v·is. 4:n U. S. 581, 590 (1977) . 
2 Contribution~ WPr<' tird 1 o the mnnht>r of rmployreR ra tlwr thnn the 
amount oJ' work pNformrd . For example, pa.,,·mrnts had to be m<tde even 
for wePk~ where nn rmplo~·ec was on l<ea_vc of ah~ence, di~:thkd, or work-
ing for only n, fmetion of tht• wrrk. C'onver,;ely, rmplo~'f'l'~ did not ha,ve 
to increase tlll'ir contribution for WPt>h in which n.n l'tnplo~·t>e worked 
overtime or on n hohdny. Tru::>t AgrePmrnt, Art. :3, § 1, App. 63a. 
3 Hec:mse tht> Fund ma.de lhr satnf' payments t·o !'nch <'mployer who 
quahfied for n. prn,;iou nnd rrtired at the same age, rathrr tha.n establish-
mg au individual ncconnt. for rach rmployee tied to thl' :unmmt of 
emp(oyPr eontributiom: nttributable to hi~ period of sf'l'vice, the plan 
provJcit'CI a "defined bmefit." S<-'r 2!l U. S. C. § 1002 (35); A.labama 
Pou:e'~' f'o . v . .Davi<l, s~tpra, a.t 59a 11. JS. 
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in the Chicago area in 19.10, all(] joined Local 705 thr follow-
ing year. When the plan first wPnt into effect. respondent 
automatically rPceived 5 years credit toward the :20-year 
service rf'quirrmeut becausf' of his f'arlier work experience. 
He retired in 1973 and applif'd to thf' pla11 's administrator for 
a penswn. The administrator determined that respondent 
was ineligible because of a brf'ak in sf'rvicr betwef'1l Decf'mber· 
1960, and July 1961.1 Respondent appealed the decision to 
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the 
trustees to waive the continuous servic<' rule as it applied to 
him. After the trusteE's refus<>d to waive th<> rule, respondent 
brought suit in federal court against tlw International union 
(Teamsters), Local 705 (Local) , and Louis Feick. a trustee of 
the fund. 
Respondent's complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the 
Local, and Feick misrepresented and omitted to state material 
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest 
in th<' rwnsion pla11 . Count I of the complaint charged that 
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud i11 con-
nection with the sale of a S<'curity in violatio11 of § 10 (b) of 
the Securities E~change Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78J (b). and the Securities and Exchange Commission 's Rule 
10b-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b- 5. Count II charged that the same 
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84. 15 L'. S. C. § 77q. Other counts 
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties." 
4 DaniPI wn;; lnid off from DPc<'mber Hl60, until April 1961. In addi-
tion, no contributions were paid 011 hi:< behalf bet.ween April and July 
1961, IH·<: HU:<t' of Pmbezz1rment hy Ius ('mployrr's bookk<>q)('r. During 
tlus :;ewn-month period re;;pondent euuld havr preservf'd his eligibility 
by makmg thr contribution~ him:-:rlf, hut lw fail<'d to do ::;o . 
5 Count III eharged the Temn~t<>r,; and the Local wtth violatmg their 
duty of f:nr n•prP~entation under § 9 (a) of thP ~a.tional Labor RPlations 
Act, 29 l' . S. C. § 159 (a), aml Count V (lat<>r amended a.~ Count VI) 
chargrd the TPmust('r,:, the Local, Prirk and all otlwr Team~l<•r;; pPnsion 
tund trn:;tee:; with vtolating tlwir obhgation~ under § 302 (c) (5) .of tbe 
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Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective 
beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans a,nd against all Team-
sters pension funds.n 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the 
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b ( 1), and § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(10),' because 
the plan created an "illvestment contract" as that term had 
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
( 1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of 
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of 
the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a)(14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a)(14).~ It 
National Lttbor Helationtl Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5) . Count IV 
accused all defendant;; of common-law fmud and deceit. 
6 As of the time of appeal to fhe Seventh Circuit the Di~trict Court had 
not yet ruled on any class ct>rtificat.ion bsue8. 
7 8<-'et.ion 2 (1) of the Securities Act dPfines n, ''secmity" ns 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debentnre, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateml-trust. certificate, preorganization certifieatc or subscription, trans-
ferable shan', investment contract, vot,ing-trust certificate, eertificate of 
depo;;it for a 1:1ecurity, fractiomu undivided intere::;t in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, or, in general, any intrrest or instrumE-nt commonly known 
as n. 'security,' or any ePrtificate of intere-::;t or pa.rtiripa.timl in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
l"Ubscribe to or purchase, any of t.he forrgoing. " 
The drfinition of a "t>ecurity" in § :3 (a) (10) of thP Securities Exchange 
Act is virtmtlly idPntical and, for th<' purpc:;es of this casr, t.he coverage 
vf thP two Acts may be regarded a::; the same. United Hous£ng Founda-
t ion, Inc . v. Pumwn, 421 U. S. 887, 847 n. 12 (1975); 'l'cherepnin v. 
Kmght , :189 U. S. 8a2, 342 ( 1967) . 
8 Section 2 (3) of the SecuritiE-s Act providf'::;, in pertinent pa.rt, that 
" [t,jhe term 'sale' or 'srll' shall include rvrry contract of saJe or dispoii!ition 
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in 
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining a.gree-
ments that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead 
of other wages or benefits. 
The motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to 
28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying 
on its perception of the economic realities of pensio11 plans 
and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to 
such plans, the court ruled that respondent's interest in the 
Pension Fund was a "security." Accordillg to the court, a 
"sale" took place either when respondent ratified a collective-
bargaiuing agreement embodying the Fund or when he 
accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seekiug 
other work.0 The Court did not believe the subsequent 
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA). 88 Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., 
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, 
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to 
be different from those of the Securities Acts.10 We granted 
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse. 
of a security or iuterc~t in a 1:1ecurity, for value." Section 3 (a.) (14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act slate;; that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each 
include any conf.raet to ,;ell or ot.lwrwise dispose of." Although the latter 
definition dot',; not refer t'Xprt'.-;,;ly to a. disposition for val·ue, the court 
below did not decide whether the Securitirs Exchange Act nevertheless 
impliedly incorporaf.ed the Securilie« Act dPfinition, cf. n. \J , supra, as in 
its view Daniel did give value for his intere1:1t in the pen~ion plan. In 
light of onr disposition of the qurstion whether respondent's iutPrest wag 
a "security," we nPPd not decidP whethN the meaning of "sale" under th·e 
Securities Exchange Act iR any different from its meaning undet· the 
Securities Ad. 
11 The Court of Appeals and the District Court also held that § 17 (n.) 
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. In 
light of our disposition of thil:-l case, we express no view,; on this issue. 
t{) Hespondent did not have any cause of action nndrr ERISA itseJf, res: 
tha1t A('.t t,ook efl"ect, after he had retired, 
',. 
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II 
"The starting point in rvery case involving the construe~ 
tion of a statute is the language itself." Blue (}hip Stamps v. 
M'anor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (PowJ<;LL, J .. 
concurrihg); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 
197, 199, and n. 19 (1976). In spite of the substantial use 
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted, 
neither § 2 (l) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in 
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to 
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in 
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest 
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument 
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.n 
To determine whether a particular fi11ancial relationship 
constitutes an investment contract, "r t]he test is whether the 
scheme involves an investment of mo11ey in a common enter-
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of 
"the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-
rather than the names that may have been employed by the 
parties." United Housing Corp. v. J?orrnan, 421 U. S. 837, 
851-852 (1975). Accord, rPcherepnin v . .Knight, 389 U. S. 
332. 336 ( 1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable 
11 Daniel abo argues that his i11terr~t constituirR a "cr'rtificaio of interest 
iu or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." Tlw eourt below did 
not con>~ider thi~ claim, a;,: Daniel had not .serion~ly prE•8sed the argument 
and the di~po~it.ion of the "iuve8tment routract " is~nr made it unnecessary 
to decidP the que;;tion. 561 F . 2d 1228, 12a0 n. 15 (Hl77). Similarly, 
Daniel here does not ,;eriously eontf'nd tha.t. a "crrtifieatr of interest 
in , .. a. profit-sh:uing agreemrnt." has any broader me.Hning under the 
Srcun1iel:' Act~ than an "invel:ltment, contract." In Fonnan. supm, we 
ob~erwd that, the Ho·wey tr::;t, which has hePn us<•d to detc"rmine the 
prr:>l:lence of an iiJve::;tment. coni met, "pmbodie::< ·the r:>S8entia1 att.ributes 
that nm through all of thr Cou.rt's deri::;io.m~ d~·fining f1 secu.rity."' 42:1 
lL. S ..• a-t F-52., 
.,. 
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Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) ("rOJne must apply a test in terms of the 
purposes of the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at 
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an 
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory 
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with 
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract. 
A. Investme,nt of Money 
An employee who participates in a noncontributory, conl-
pulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the 
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the con-
ditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retire-
ment. Daniel contends, however, that he has "invested" in 
the Pe11sion Fund by permitting part of his compensation 
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension 
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the 
Fund, and by coutributing his labor to his employer in return 
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of 
iuvestment which the Securities Acts were intended to 
regulate. 
[n order to determine whether respondent invested in the 
Ji"und by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it 
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which 
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. In every 
decisio11 of this Court recognizi11g the presence of a "security" 
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an 
investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for 
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a 
security. See 'l'cherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital 
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 
( Hlo7) (portion of premium paid for variable component of 
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable A'nnuity 
Life Ins. Co., s'Upra (premium pa,id for variable allnuity con-
tract)~ Ho1cey, ~pra (money paid for purchase, maintenance. 
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and harvesting of orang£> grove); SEC v. C. M. Jo·iner Lecu,"'ing 
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (mo11ey paid for land and oil 
exploration). Even in thosp cases where the interest ac-
quired had intermingled security and nonsecurity asppcts, the 
interest obtained had "to a very substantial df'gree elements 
of investment co11tracts .... " Variable A.nnuity Life Ins. 
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J .. concurring). In Pvery case 
thP purchaser gave up some tallgible and df'finabl<' considera-
tion in retum for an interrst that had substantially the 
charactf'ristics of a security. 
In a pension plan such as this one. by contmst, thP purpm·ted 
investmeut is a relatively insignificaut part of an (•mployf'e's 
total aml indivisible compensation package. No portion of 
an employee's compensation other thall the poteutial pension 
benefits has any of the eharacteristics of a security. yf't these 
noninvestmellt interests cannot be segregated from the pos-
sible pf'nsion benefits. Only in tlw most abstract sensf' may 
it be said that an employeE' "exchanges" some portion of his 
labor in return for these possiblE' benefits.'~ Hr surr'<'tH1ers 
his labor as a whole. aud in rE'tum receives a compensation 
package that is substantially devoid of aspects rE'sembling a 
security. His dE'cision to accept and retain covered employ-
ment must have only au extrf'mely at ten uatE'd relationship. if 
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a futurf' pension. 
Looking at thE' ecouomic rE'alities, it seems clear that an 
employee is selliug his labor to obtain a livf'lihood, 11ot making 
au investmf'nt for the future. 
RespondPnt also argues that employer constributions on 
his bf'half constituted his investment into the Fu11d. But it 
is inaccurat<> to d<>scribe theS(> payments as having been "on 
behalf" of any employee. Thr trust agrf'ement used em-
ployee man-weeks as a convenient 'vvay to m<>asure a.n employ-
1 ~ \\'!' nPrd not. dl•ciclt\ hrrr whrthrr a JX·r~on'~ ''invr,.;!nwn1," in ordrr to 
llLt>Pt. th1• drfinitwn of :.111 inn•,;tnwnt contra!'!, 11111~1 takr thr form of cash 
(1111)· rnth<:r than of good:; and ,;ernt·t·~ . Sco Forman, supra, at. 852 n. 16. 
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<>r's owrall obligation to thP Fund. not as a means of measur-
illg the employer's obligation to any particular employee. 
Indeed, therf' was no fixed relationship ht>tween contributions 
to the Fund and an employf'<"'s potf'ntial benefits. A pension 
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a 
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked. 
See n . 3, S'upra. One who has engaged in cowred employ-
ment for 20 years will r·eceivc- the sanw beuefits as a person 
who has worked for 40. <wen though the latter has worked 
twice as long and induced a substantially larger Pmployer 
contribution. 1" Agaiu. it ignores the economic realitif's to 
equate cn1ployer eontributions with an invPstmcnt by the 
employee. 
B. E:rpectal'io11 of Profit.~ From A Common Enterprise 
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Ho-wey 
test "is the prf'sencf' of an irrvf'stment iu a common venture 
premised on a reasonablP expectation of profits to be derived 
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's 
cxpectati011 of profit derived from the Fund's successful man-
agement and investment of its assets. To thf' extent pension 
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on 
rarnings from the assets. it was thought they contained a 
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial 
efforts which produced this profit eleme11t. 
As in othPI' parts of its analysis, the court below fouud an 
Pxpectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on 
one of its lpss important aspects to the exclusion of its more 
significant clements. It is true that the Fund. like other 
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings _ 
I( {'SfoA~l)E/11'1 
13 lTndrr fhr 1rrm~ of the Lorn!'~; JWnsion plan, for <'X<lmplr, ~ 
t'eerivrd <'n,dit for t.lw fi\'(' yrar:-: IH' worked brforr the Fund waR {'I'Ca.trd, 
ewu tho111!:h no ·<·mploypr l'Ontrihlltiom; had been made during tl1at 
pl'riod. 
'. 
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from its assets. In the case ot a pension fund, however, a 
far larger portion of its income comes from employer colltribu-
tions, a souree in no way dependent on the efforts of the 
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example. ea.rned 
a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between 
February 1955, and January 1977. Duriug this same period 
employer eontributions totaled $153 million.' 4 Not only does 
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come 
from new contributions. but unlike most entrepeneurs who 
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on 
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself 
has no control, to cover shortfalls iu earnings.' " 
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other 
benefits received from employment is diminished further by 
the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to 
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's 
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of 
the Fund. Ra.ther, it is his own ability to meet the Fund's 
eligibility requirements. Thus. even if it were proper to 
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypotheti-
cal investment by the employee, this profit would depend 
primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting 
requirements. rather than the Fuud's iuvestment success.10 
When viewed in light of the total compeusa.tion package an 
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension ben-
efits. it becomes clear that the possibility of participating iu a 
plan 's asset earnings "is far too speculative a.nd insubstantia1 
to bring the entire transaetion within the Securities Acts," 
Fonnan, supra, at 856. 
14· In <~ddition, I he Fund 11eceived $7,500,000 from smallrr pension funds 
with which it merged over the y~eari!. 
1 " See Note , ThC' Application of thr Aniifraud ProvisionR of the Securities 
Laws to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pen:;ion Plnm; Aftrr Daniel v. 
International Bmther-hood oj 'l'earn-~Jter-s, fi4 Va.. L. Rev. 805, :n5 (1978). 
H I See Not«:>, Intrre.st in Prn:sion Plans as Securities : Daniel v. lnterna~ 
t(ional Brotherhood of 'l'eamsters, 78 Cohun. ·L . Hev. 184, 20J (1918). 
t 
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III 
'fhe court below Lelievecl that its cot1struction of the term 
1'secur•ity" was compelled not only by thf:' perceived resem-
blance of a peusiou plan to an investment contract. but by 
various actions of Congress and the REC's interprt•tation of 
the Recurities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
gave great weight to the REC's explanation of these events, 
an explanation which for the most part the REC repeats here. 
Our owu review of the t•ecord leads us to believe that this 
reliance on the REC's interpretation of these legislative and 
administrative actions was not justified. 
A. Actions of Congress 
The REC' in its amicus C1tria.e brief refers to sevrral actions 
of Congress said to cvidE:'nC<' an understanding that pension 
plans are securities. A close look at each instauce, however, 
rewals only that Congress might have believed certaiu kinds 
of pension plans. radically different from the one at issue here, 
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no 
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory 
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regu-
lation as securities. 
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934 
of a11 amendment to the Securities Act that would have 
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans 
from the Act's registratio11 requiremeuts.17 The amendment 
passed the Senate but was rlimi11ated in conferPnce. The 
legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was 
17 'l'lw murndmrnf would hnvc nddf•d the followinl!: bngnngr to § 4 (1) 
t>f f hr , <·eu ni iP~ At'f : 
"A::; 11:-<l•d 111 1hi~ paragra.ph, flw fl'l'ln 'puhlir offering' ~hall not be 
dermPd to mrludt> :m off<'ring madr "ol<· l~· fo emplo~w~~ b~· nn i~HII<'I' or by 
it;; a lfiliatr,; Ill <'Olllll'<'tion with a, bonn fidr plan for t IH· p;Jyuwnt of Pxtra 
compt>n~ation or ~toek inw,;t nwnt plan for ilw l'X<·Iu"ive lwnl'fit, of such 
t'mploy<'C:<." 78 Cong. Rec. R708 (1934). 
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intended to cover plans under which Pmp]oyees contributed 
their own funds to a segregated investment account Oil which 
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 41 (1934); HParings before the House Committee on 
Interstate allcl Foreign Commerce on Proposed Anwndments 
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess .. 895-896 (1941). In rejecting the 
amendment, CongrPss revealed a concern that certain interests 
havi,.g the charactPristics of a security not be excluded from 
Securities Act protection simply because investors realjzed 
their return in tlw form of retirement benefits. At no time, 
however. did Congress indicate that p<:>nsion benefits in and 
of tht-mselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a 
security. 
The SEC also relies on a 1970 ame1Hlment of the Securities 
Act which extended § 3's exemption from registration to 
include "any interest or participation in a single or collective 
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or par-
ticipation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, 
pension, or· profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements 
for qualification under section 401 of title 26, .... " § 3 (a) 
(2) of the Securities Act, as amended. 84 Rtat. 1434, 1498, 
15 U. R. C. § 77c (a) (2). It a.rgues that in creating a regis-
tration exemption, thP amendment manifested Congress' 
understanding that the intf'rests covered by the amendment 
otherwise were subject to the Recurities Acts.18 It interprets 
"interest or participatio11 in a single ... trust fund ... issued 
in connection with .. . a stock bonus, pension, or profit-
sharillg plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter-
1~ Section 17 (e) of thH &·rmiti!'s Art, 15 U.S. C. § 77q (c), and § 10 (b) 
of the 1:\Pcurities Ex('hauge Act, 15 lT. S. C. § 7Rj (h) (when rend witl1 
~§ ;3 (a) (10) and (12) of that. Act), indieate t.lmt the antifmud provisions 
of the respective Act:; c·ontinu(• to apply to iutrrc'-"t"' thnt com(' within the 
exemptions c·rE'<tted by§ 3 (n)(2) of the Seruritic•:-; Act and § 3 (a) (12) of 
"t-he SPl'llrihe.s Exchnngc Act. 
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€St in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970 
amendlllent ignores that measure's central purpose. which was 
to r<'lieve banks and insurance companies of certain registra-
tration obligatiolls. The anH-'rHlmcnt rpcognizf'd only that a 
pension plan had "au interest or participation'' in the fund in 
which its assrts werP held. not that JWOSJWctive benf'ficiari<'s 
of a plan had any interest in either the plan's bank-
main taine<l assets or the plan itsel£. 10 
B. SEC' lnterptetat·ion 
Thr com-t helow believed. and it now is argued to us, that 
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded peusion plru1s 
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are 
askeu to defPr to what is sf'en as a longstanding interpreta-
1" SPn S. Rep. No. 91-1R4, p. 27 (1960): Hearing~ befor<· tlw Smat~ 
Banking ami CunrrH·y Commit1ec on \Iut.ual Fuud Legislation of 1967, 
'90th Cong., 1st.&>~~-. pt. III, at l:Hl-1842 (19()7); Mundlwim & Heuder~on, 
Applicability of the Frderal SeeuritiPi-' Law:< to Pmsion and Profit-Sharing 
Plans, 29 L. <~ Cont<·mp. Prol>S. 7\1.'), l'l!H:m (Hl64): Saxon & Miller, 
Common Tru:<t. Fund", 5~ Geo. L. J. H94 (19().')). Thr SEC argue;; tha:t 
the addition b~- the Houfle of the languag<' '·single or" bPforo ''common 
tru:st fuutl" indicated an intrnt to <'OV<'I' tlw underlying plan,.; tlu~L invested 
in bank-maintairll'd fundi". The lrgi~lative histor~·. howewr, indic·atf'S fha't 
the changt• wa" rrwant only to rlimitwtr thr rwgative inferPn<·<' :sugge;;ted 
by thP unn•vi:-<rd [;Ulgllal!:e that hank,.; would hav<' to n·gi,.;(<'r the srgregated 
invr,.;tnwnt. fund:; they achnini,.;t<•red for particular plan;-;. Bec;tuse the 
provi,..ion as a whole dealt onJ~- with t lw rpfat ion,.;hip lwtwpc•n n plan nnd 
itfl bank, tlw n•vision did not afft•rt the n•gistration :<t~t.tu;-; of tlH• under-
lying Jl('ll:<iou plaJJ. s('(' 116 Cong. HPc'. :~;~2~7 (1970). Thi~ was eonsi~t~ 
ent. with the· SEC':< interpretation of the JH'ovi;-;ion. Hea.ring,.:, supm, n.t 
1326. Tho ,;ub:s~·qtH•nt addition of nnothf'r provi~<ion excrpt.inl!: from the 
rxcmption fund,.; ''uudPr which a11 amount in excx..,;~ of tlw Pmployer's 
L'ontrihution i;-; nllocated. to thl' pur<'hH:<(1 of s~·t•mitie:; ... i~urd b~' the 
rmplo~·pr or h~ au~ eompmt~· dir<'l'tl~- or indirw·tl~· controlling, eontrolled 
h~· or nndrr common control with th<• employer" apJWHT1' to havr been 
-:nupl~ an additional o<afcguard to confirm tlw SF.('',_ a11thorit_,. to require 
~ueh pl;tlls, .md only :m<'h plan.o;, to r<:'gi:stl'l'. &'€ H. H. ('onf'. HeJ>. No. 
'91- HW, p. 31 (1970). 
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsible for their 
administration. But there are limits. groullded in thP lan-
guage, pmpose aml history of the particular statute, on how 
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role. 
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is 
clear here that the REC's position is neither longstandiug nor· 
even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to inter-
nret these Acts.20 
As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plaJl 
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of finan-
cial interests thr Secur·ities Acts wer·e designed to n'gulate. 
Further, thr SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by 
its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public 
record reveals no evideuce that the SEC had ever considered 
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pen-
sion pla11s. In 1941, the SEC fi.rst articulated the position 
that ·voluntary, contributory plans had investment character-
istics t,hat rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the 
2" It. is a commonplacP iu our jmisprudence thnt nn arlmiHistrativ~ 
agency's con:sist.ent, lon~:standing illtt•rpretation of thP :statute under which 
it operate~:; iR ·entitled to considerable weight. Un-ited States v. National 
Assn. of Securitie~ Dealrrs. 422 H. S. 694, 71H (1975); Sa.tbe v. B-ustos, 
419 U. S. 65, 74 (HJ74); Invel!tmeut r'o. Institute v. CamJI, 401 U. S. 
617, 62fi-()27 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 F. S. 1. Hi (Hl(i5). This 
deference is a prochtc1. both of a11 awareue"" of the pradica.l c~xpertise · 
which nn agPIICY norrnall~' develop~, n.nd of n. willingnP:ss to accord some 
rnca::;ure of flexibility to such an agency as it encouJtters new a ,ud unfore- · 
seen problems over time. But. thi:s dPfCI'PllC.P i;.; con;;traitwd. by our obliga.-
tion to honor the clear mt>a.ning of a. ~tH.tnte, a;; rrvPalPd. b~· its langua.ge, 
purpoi:ie and hi~tor~'· On a, nmnber of occasions in recPnt. ~·t'lll'il this Court 
hm: found it twcc;;sa.ry to rejec·t t.he SEC':; interpt'Pta1ion of variou:,; provi-
~ion::~ of the Securities AetK Sec SEC v. 8loan. 4:)(i TT. S. 10:~, 117-119 
(HI/~) ; Piper v. Clwi;s-Craft Industries. Inc., 4:30 n. S. 1, +1 n. 27 (Hl77); 
E'l'nst t(: h''l'nst v. Huchfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-21+ (197(1); F'onnan, 
wpra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. M anur Dm11 Stores. 421 U. S. 
'723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (Pow1m,, J., <'OH<'lllTing); lleliance Electt·ic Co. v. 
Emr.rson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425:-427 -(1H72) .. 
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same time, however. the SEC recognized that noncontributory 
plans were 11ot covered by the Securities Acts because such 
plans did not involve a "sale'' withju the meaniug of the 
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~75,195 (1941); 
Hearings before the House Committee on lnterstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to th€' Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong .. 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of C'onunis-
sioner Purcell).2 1 
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the 
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC Dow augments 
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it 
is argued. noncontributory plans ar€' "securities'' even where 
a "sale" is not involved. Second, the previous concession that 
uoncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was mf'ant to 
apply only to the registration and reportiug requirements of 
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions, 
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition. we observe 
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimouy cited to 
us address the question. As for the sf'cond, the record is 
21 SubsequPnt to 1941, thP SEC made no fmther pffort~; to regulate even 
contributory, voluntary peno:ion plans except whPrP the employee,;' contri-
butions wrre investrd in th(' Pmployer'R :>f'rmit.ie~>. Cf. 11. 21, supra. It 
H,)so continued to dio:avow any tLuthority to regulate noncontributory, 
compul::>ory plan:>. Ser Lt'tter from As:;istant. DirP<"tor, Divi,;ron of Cor-
porate Finance, ~lay 12, 195:~. CCH Frcl. S<'C. L. R.rp. ,r 2105.51; Letter 
from Chirf ( '01msel, Division of Corporate .Finan<'P, August 1, 1962, CCH 
Fed. Se<•. L. Rep. ~ 2105.52 ; Hmring~ before the SenatP Banking and 
CurrPnry Committt-H on :\Iutual Fund LPgislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st 
Scss., 1:32() (Hl67) ; 1 L. Lo~s. SPcuritiPs Regulation, 510-511 (1st. ed. 
1901), 4 1<! .. at. 255a-2554 (2d rd. H)t)!)); Hyde, Employee Stock Plans 
:md tlw Seeuritit·~ Act of 19:3:3, W W. i{(•s. L. Hrv. 75, 8(i (1964); 
Mundlwrm & H<·mkrson. Applicahrlity of the Fcdl'ral SeCllritiP,; L,'\,ws to 
]>eno:ion and Profit-Sharing Plans, 2U L. & C'ontemp. Probs. 795, 809-811 
(1904! , Note, Pension Plaut; a:s Seeurities, 96 U. Ya. L. Rev . 549, 549-551 
(194~) . 
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unambiguously to the contrary.~~ Both in its 1041 statements 
and repeatedly since then, tlw f-lEC has deelared that. its "no 
sale" position applied to the Seeurities Acts as a whole. Sec 
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel. 11941- 1044 Transfer 
Binder I CCH Feel. Sec. L. R(•p. ~ 75,HJ5, at. 75,:387 (1941); 
Hearings beforf' the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce Otl Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities ExchaDge Act of 1034. 77th Cong .. 
1st Sc•ss .. 888, 896-897 (1041); lnstitutionaJ IJ1vestor Study 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission. H. Jl. 
Doc. ~o. 9:2- ()4, p. 096 (l\l71) ("[T !he Securities Act does not 
apply ... "); Hearings on Welfarf' and Pension Plans Inv<'s-
tigation before the SubcoHnnittPc on Welfare and Pension 
, a.,., a ,.. <'·a. a <'I' w H'i wr 1h<' 
<: R ma.~· he rend io pPrmit a ~ingl<· tr·a.n,.;aei .i()ll to~<':!,!OJl,it ,.,;il.. J,I. JJ.I.l;~~H@o"'""''tl~ 
me 1iii')('i;;e0T H'. t· Ot1H'l'" On O<'ea~ion the SEC 
haH contl'mled 1 hat b(•<·au,;c• § :1 of lite Sccnriti<>~ Art and § 3 of the 
Securilie~ Exrlwngc Art. 11ppl~· tltf' cpwlif\illg phra.o;c " mrlf':-:s tho ron1ext 
oLlwrwi"t' n•quir('~" to the Arts' ~<'BPral d<·finition>~, it iN Jll'l'mi,:,"ihle to 
regnrd n. part-ie1Jiar traBsaelion( ns inn>h·iug a ~alP or not dt'pmding on 
t Iw form of rq~ulat ion involwc1. S<·t' Schil/ner v. If. Vau1Jitll Cla.rk & Co., 
134 F. 2d ~i5, RiS (CA2 Hl-l~); l L. Lo"'"• St·enrrti<'~ Hegulation 524-528 
(1st. ('0. Wol): 4 l~rl., at. 25n2-2565 (2d Pd. Hlt\0). n~ rt t .hi~o~EC h:rlllil"lt 
:W.rm.~:l i;d;n1.1 .t.lw· Jo~:Jttil'!n : In Hl+:~ it ~uhmit.tPd an amir-111> hri(·f in t.he 
Ninth Cireuit arguing t . · , 1St clid not lwgin t.o r·ply on its 
·rC'gu a . or·~' <'Oil l'Xt th<:'or·y unt.il 1951. I L. Lo'*i, ~'li]J1'a, aL 524 n. 211; 
ColH'n, Hul<• 1~:~ of t lw SPeltrrtit•s Ex('h:t.ngt• Commi::;.~ion, I+ J1,<·cord of 
N. Y. C. B. A. 102, W+-105 (HJi)~l). Thi:-; Court noted tlH· doetrino but 
. to adopt·. 1t in ,'IE(' v. Nntiona/. Srcw·itii:'IJ. fuc., 393 
U. S. 45:~, -lH5-4Gti (Hl(i9). lL "<'.t'li1H mon• Jilwly that the "eon text" 
referred to 111 t.lu· Aets' ddinitJOna.l ,.;f'('LionR i,.; the •ceonomic· co.ntext of a 
parti<•HJar tmu"adiou, .no(. th<• form Of n•gn]at.ion 1hu.t might he 3pp)ied 
to that. 1 ran~actwn. Cf. Formm1, s'Upra, a.t. 84F:-~50. S<'C' nl~o n. 20, 
'Wpw. IV!' not0 that with rrspPrt , to :<tatutory mergPrs, 1h<• arPa whrrc 
~------~~~~~ t ht• SEC ongina lly drvrlop<:'d it.~ theory a bout the bifml'atPd dpfinition of 
&u..~ 
~
JLt_ .5 f!C., 
~~ 
4.fl-#~·c.f ~;~~: 
a "ale, tlw SEC ,;Jilt'<' has nband01wd it:-: position am! now trPn1s surh 
•rnn,;ndiou::> m; entailing a ";.;,\lc" for all pnrpo~<.\~ of the SPeuriti<:s Act. 
SP.<' li C~'H §2:30.145. ~ ~ ~ ~ 
4 1'1 , , ~, ...; 
~'~t9-j~C~-L~~~~ 
~~~Hut!_.~~ He~ •• ; 
~ ~~-k.-~.L ,Lo ~a.­
~Lc.., J-,· zt.+LAL.d~~ ,to  
a- ~~~,,~p~~a.r~ 
~4:1~~-. 
·Funds of tlw SC'uah• Lahor a11d Public Welfare C'onlnlitleC', 
f;4th Con g .. 1st Sesf': .. !14:3-!141) ( 1 \lr).:')). Congn•ss aetPd on th if$ 
undN:stand i 11g " ·hc•11 it procc•pded to dew lop tlw lPgisla tion 
that hc•r.anH' RH 1:-IA. Sec•. e. If., Tnterim Hc•port of Activities 
of tlw Privu,tp \Yc•lfare and Pe11sion Plan fitudy, S. Rep . 
.r~o. 0~- 6!~4. p. 0() (1!172) ("Pc•nsion awl profit-sharing plans 
Ill'<' e.rempt from covcrayc lllHkr til!' :-\pc·uritie~ ,\ct of 
HJ3:3 ... un]pss the plan is a voluntary contributory peJisiml 
pla11 and inv<•sts in the SC'curiti<•s of th<' employc·r company 
an amount greatc•r tha11 that paid into the plan by thP 
f'lllployc·r.") (Pmphasis adclc,d). As far as we at·e aware, at 
110 tinH' lwfon• this case> arol:i<' did the' SE<' intimate that tlw 
antifraud provi~ion ~ of the• :-l<'curities Acts ne,·ertlwlesll 
applic·d to noneontributory ]Wllsion plaus. 
IV 
lf any further evidPtiC<' wrn• n<'<'Ut'd to ckmonstrat<' that 
JH~ IIHiou plans of tlw iy]H' involwd an• not ~ombject to tlw 
, pc•uritics Acts. the <•nactnwllt of EIUSA iu Hl74 would put 
the matter to rest. Fulike the Sec·uritie~ Acts. BRIRA deals 
expn•ssly awl in detail with ]H•nsion plans. ERlf.IA n•quires 
JWIIsion pla11:-: to disclose• sp<'cified information to <'ll1ployecs 
in a. spt•cified ma1111E:>r. ~<'<' :.W l ~ . S. C. ~~ 1021-10:~0. i11 con-
tJ·ast to the indefi11ite a11cl uncertain disclosure obligations 
imposc•u by the antifraud ]H'ovisiolls of the , ecurities Aets, 
H<'C k anla Fe lodustries, Inc . v. Green, 430 C. ~- 4(i:l, 474-477 
(1977); ?'SC Industries, Inc. v. Yorti11NLy, l11c., 42(i lT. S. 
43S (1D7fi). FurthPr. EHl~.\ n'gulatt•s tlw substantive tNms 
of JWIJ ~:iion plans. H<'ttlllg standards for plan fundi11g aud limit.<~ 
on tlw Pligibility requin'llH'Ilts au <'!tlployee must tueet. For· 
t'XUlnpl<•. w1th rrsp<'ct to tlw uncfpt·lying issue in this case-
wlwthc·•· n·spo ndt'll t sf'rved long <'llO ugh to I'<'Ct->i V<' a 1 ><'nsion-
~ 2m (a) of EHIRA. 20 l·. R. ('. ~ 1053 (a). now sds tlw mini-
llllllll lt•vpl of bPnPfits a11 prnployl'(' must ree<'ivt· aft~·r accruing 
·sp<'t'ifit·d years of ~:~<·nic<'. a11d ~ 2m (h). 2\l 1·. fi. C. ~ 10.:)3 
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(1>). gowms eontinuous ~rrvie<• r·pquir<'lll<'llts. Thus if DaniC'l 
had rrtired afkr ~ 1053 took pff<'et. tlw Fund would have• hC'<'n 
requin•d to pay him at lt-'ast a partial p<'nsion. The f-ipeuri-
ties Aets. on tlw other hand. do not purport to sf't tlw ~ubstan­
tiv<' tNms of financial tramoactim1s. 
Tlw <'XistmC<' of this comprt'hensivc IPgislation gov<'ming 
tlH• US<' and terms of employN' JWnsion plans S<'VC't'<'ly und<'t '-
euts all argun)('nts for f'xtrnding the RrcuritiPR Ad~ to non-
contrilJutory, compulsory P<'llHion plans. Congrf'~s beli<•ved 
that it was filling a regulatory void when it <•nactf'd ERlf-;A. a 
ul'liPf which thf' REC' actiwly cncourag<'<L Xot only is tlw 
extension of the Recuritics Arts by tlw court below unsup-
ported uy tlw language and history of those Acts. but in light 
of ERTHA it sf'rves no genf'ral purpose. , PC C'nlifano v. 
Sanders, 430 U. R. 99, 104- 107 ( 1977). Cf. Boys Jt arkets, 
Inc. '· Retail C'lerks rrnio11, :39R FR. 235.250 (ln70). What-
ewr· L<•nefits employers might der·ive from the pffect of the 
Secuntirs Acts arc now pwvi( led i11 mor·p definite form 
through ERISA. 
v 
'W<• holcl that the 8<'curili('K Acts do not apply to a non-
contributor·y. compulsory pension plan. Becausp thP first two 
counts of respondent's complaint do 110t Jll"Ovide grounds for 
relief in fed<'ral court. thP District Court should haY(' gran ted 
the motioll to dismiss them. Th<• judgment below is tlwrc•forc 
Revensed. 
January 11, 1979 
77-753 Int'l Brotherhood v. Daniel 
Dear Chief: 
In accordance with suggestions from you and Byron 
I have rewritten footnote 22. Byron agrees that, in my 
second draft circulated today, the note is in satisfactory 
form . 
The other sugqestion in your letter of January 2, 
relates to the paragraph that commences on page 12, which 
you suggest may not be necessary. It probably isn't 
essential to the opinion, and yet it seems desirable to me 
to include it in view of reliance by the SEC, and 
respondent, on specified legislative and administrative 
actions. 
The inference in your letter is that the 1970 
amendment of the Securities Act really has nothing to do 
with this case. I agree. Inasmuch, however, as the SEC 
argues that it is relevant, it seems desirable to meet the 
argument. 
I appreciate your commenting on my draft. 
Sincerely, 
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' Dear Chief: 
Tn ~ccordance with ~uqq•stion~ from you and Byron 
I have rewritten footnote ~2. Byron aqreoq that, in my 
second draft circulated t0day, the note is in satisf~ctocy 
for11. 
TJP oth~r suon~stion in your letter of January 2, 
rel~tes to the paraqraph t~at co~mencP~ on paqp 12, which 
you suqgPst rnav not be qpcessary. It probably isn't 
ess~ntial to thP ooinion, and yet it sa8~S desirable to me 
to i ncl ud"" it in vi~w of reliance by t~w cn-;c, and 
respondent, on snecifie~ lPqisl~ti•e and 3dministrative 
actions. 
The inferencr in your lett~r is that the 1970 
~mendm~nt of t~~ ~ecuriti~~ Act rPallv has not~inq to rio 
with this cAse. I aqr~~. In~smuch, howev~r, as ~he SEC 
argues that it is rc>le"ant., it se<?ms dN3ir.able to meet the 
arqul"(lent. 
I opnreriate vour commenting on my ~raft. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief JusticP 
lfp/ss 
,, 
11 J~N 1979 
.5' ~ ' ~ ., \to) '<6 
·. 
2nd DRAFT 
~UPREME COURT OF THE .UNITED STATFB 
Nos. 77-753 AND 77-754 
International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 




Local 105, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of 
America, et al., 
Petitioners, 
'17- '154 v. 
John Daniel. 
On Writs of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. 
[January - , 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the ppinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a noncontributory, 
compulsory pension plan constitutes a "security" within the 
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Recurities Acts). 
I 
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local 
705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ,Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago 
trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees repre-
sented by the Local. The plan was comp:ulsory and non-
contributory. Employees had no choice as to participation 
in the plan, and did not have the option of demanding that 
I 
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the employer's contribution be paid directly to them as a 
substitute for pension eligibility. 'The employees paid nothing 
to the plan themselves.1 
The collective-bargaining agreement initially set employer 
contributions to the PensiOn Trust Fund at $2 a week for each 
man-week of covered employment.2 'The Board of Trustees 
of the Fund, a body composed of an equal number of employer 
and union representatives, was given sole authority to set the 
level of benefits ·but had no control over the amount of 
required employer contributions. Initially, eligible employees 
received $75 a month in benefits upon retirement. Subse-
quent collective-bargaining agreements called for greater 
employer contributions, which in turn led to higher benefit 
payments for retirees. At the time respondent brought suit, 
employers contributed $21.50 per employPe man-week and 
pension payments ranged from $425 to $525 a month depend-
illg on age at retirement.M In order to receive a pension an 
employee was required to have 20 years of continuous service, 
including time worked before the start of the plan . 
The meaning of "continuous service" is at the center of 
this dispute. Respondent began working as a truck driver 
1 For examples of other noncontributory, compulsory pension plan.~, 
see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. -, - (1978); 
Malone v. White Mot01· Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama 
Power Co v. Davi.s, 431 U.S. 581, 590 (1977). 
:2 Contributions were t.ted to the number of employees rather than the 
amount of work performed. For \)Xample, payments had to be made even 
t'or weeks where :m emplo:-·ee was on Leave of absence, disabled, or work-
ing for only a fraction of the week. Conversely, employers did not have 
to increase their contributiOn for weeks in which an employee worked 
overtime or on a holiday. Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 63a. 
3 Because the Fund made the same payments to each employee who 
qualified for a prnsion and retired at the same age, rather than establish-
. iug an individual account, for . each employee tied to the amount of 
employer contributions attnbutable to his period of service, the plan 
provided a "defined benefit." See 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (35); AlabaJ'IUJ 
Power Co v. DaVIs, supm, at, 593 n. 18 
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in the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the follow~ 
ing year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent 
automatically received 5 years credit toward the 20-year 
service requirement because of his earlier work experience. 
He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan's administrator for 
a pension. The administrator determined that respondent 
was ineligible because of a break in service between December 
1960, and July 19(H. 1 Respondent appealed the decision to 
the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the 
trustees to waive the cot1tinuous service rule as it applied to 
him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent 
brought suit in federal court against the International union 
(Teamsters). Local 705 (Local), and Louis Peick, a trustee of 
the fund. 
Respondent's complaint alleged tha.t the Teamsters, the 
Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state material 
facts with respect to the value of a covered employee's interest 
111 the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that 
these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in con-
nection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78j (b), and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 
lOb-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b-5. Count II charged that the same 
conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q. Other counts 
alleged violations of various labor law and common-law duties.5 
4 Daniel was laid off from December 1960, until April 1961. In addi-
tion, no contributions were paid on his behalf between April and July 
1961, because of embezzlement by his employer's bookkeeper. During 
th1s seven-month period rrspondent could have preserved his eligibility 
by maldng the contribution~ hnru;elf, but he failed to do so. 
5 Count III chargrd the Tramsters and the Local with violating their 
·duty of fair representatiOn under § 9 (a.) of the National Labor Relation!!! 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI) 
charged the Teamsters, the Local, Peick and ull other Teamsters pensioa 
lund trustees w1th violating their obligations under § 302 (c) (5) of th~ 
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Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective 
beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans and against all Team~ 
sters pension funds. 0 
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the 
complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of 
action under the Securities or Securities Exchange Acts. The 
District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 
1976). It held that respondent's interest in the Pension Fund 
constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), and § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(10),7 because 
the plan created an "investment contract" as that term had 
been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 
(1946). It also determined that there had been a "sale" of 
this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of 
the Securities Act, t5 U.S. C.§ 77b (3), and§ 3 (a)(14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a)(14).8 •It 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (e) (5). Count. IV 
accused all defendants of common-law fraud and deceit. 
0 As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit the District Court had 
not yet ruled on any class certification issues. 
7 Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act defines a "security" as 
· "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, 
certificate of interest or participat.ion in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorgani~ation certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment cont,ract, vot.ing-trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a 'security ,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 
The definition of a "security" in § 3 (a) ( 10) of the Securities Exchange 
Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of this case, the coverage 
of the two Acts may be regarded as the same. United Housing ·Fourcda-
t!on, Inc . v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. 
Knight , 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967) . 
8 Section 2 (3) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent part., that 
"[t lhe term 'sale' or 'sell ' shall mclude every contract of sale or dispositiou 
·. 
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believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in 
the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agree-
ments that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead 
of other wages or benefits. 
The order denying the motion to dismiss was certified for 
appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). and the Court of 
Appeals for·. the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 
( 1977). Relying on its perception of the economic realities of 
pension plans and various actions of Congress and the SEC 
with respect to such plans. the court ruled that respondent's 
interest in the Pension Fund was a "security." According to 
the court. a "sale" took place either when respondent ratified a 
collective-bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when 
he accepted or retaiued covered employment instead of seek-
ing other work.0 The Court did not believe the subsequent 
enactment of the Employee Retir~ment Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA). 88 Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,. 
affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, 
as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to 
be different from those of the Securities Acts.10 We granted 
certiorari, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse. 
of a security or interest in a security, for value." Section 3 (a) (14) of 
the Securities Exchange Act stat~s that "[t]he terms 'sale' and 'sell' each 
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Although the latter 
definition does not refer expressly to a disposition for value, the court 
below did not decide whether the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless· 
impliedly incorporated the Securities Act definit.ion, cf. n. 9, supra, as .in 
its view Daniel did give value for his interest in the pension plan. In 
light of our disposition of the question whether respondent's interest was· 
a "security," we need. not decide whether the meaning of "sale" under the 
Securities Exchange Act is any different from its meaning under the-
Securities Act 
8 The Court of Appeals and the Distnct Court also held that § 17 (a) 
provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. .In 
hght of our disposition of thi:; case, we express no views on this issue. 
10 Respondent did not. have any cause of action under ERISA itself, as; 
·fthat Act took effect after he had retired. 
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II 
"The starting point in every case involving the construe~ 
tion of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (HowELL, J., 
·concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 
197, 199, and n. 19 (1976). In spite of the substantial use 
of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted, 
neither § 2 (1) of the s~curities Act nor § 3 (a)(10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which define the term "security" in 
considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to 
pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in 
the statutes, respondent contends that an employee's interest 
in a pension plan is an "investment contract," an instrument 
which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.n 
To determine whether a particular financial relationship 
constitutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the 
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enter~ 
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 
Howey, supra, at 301. This test is to be applied in light of 
"the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-
rather than the names that may have been employed by the 
parties." United Housing Corp. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 
851-852 (1975). Accord, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 
332, 336 (1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable 
11 Daniel also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of interest 
in or participation in a profit-sharing agreement." The court below did 
not consider this claim, as Daniel had not seriously pressed the a.rgumen.t 
and the disposition of the "investment contract" issue made it unnecessary 
to decide the question. 561 F. 2d 1223, 1230 n. 15 (1977). Similarly, 
Daniel here does not :-::f'nously contend that a "certificate of interest 
in , , . a profit-sharing agreement" . has any broader meaning under the 
Secunties Acts than an "iuve~tment contract." In Forman, supra, we 
obserVlcd that the Howey tc.>Ht, which has been used to determine the 
presence of an mve::;tmc.>nt rontract, "embodies the essential a.tt.ributes: 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." 421 
tL S 11.t 852 
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Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) (" [ 0] ne must a,pply a test in terms of the 
purposes of the Federal Acts ... "). Looking separately at 
each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an 
employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory 
pension plan such as the Teamsters' does not comport with 
the commonly held understanding of an investment contract. 
A .. Investment of Money 
An employee who participates in a noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the 
pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the con-
ditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retire-
meut. Daniel contends. however, that he has "invested" in 
the Pensiou Fund by permitting part of his compensation 
from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension 
benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the 
Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return 
for these payments, Daniel asserts he has made the kind of 
investment which the Securities Acts were intended to 
regulate. 
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the 
Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it 
is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which 
he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. in every 
decision of this Court recognizing the presence of a "security" 
under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an 
investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for 
a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a 
security. See Tcherpnin, supra (money paid for bank capital 
stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 
(1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of 
mixed variable and fixed annuity contract); Variable Annuity 
Life Ins. Co., supra (premium pa.id for variable annuity con-
tract); Howey, supra (money paid for purchase, maintenance, 
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and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (money paid for land and oil 
exploration). Even in those cases where the interest ac" 
quired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the 
interest obtained had "to a very substantial degree elements 
of investment contracts .... " Variable Annuity Life Ins. 
Co., supra, at 91 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). In every case 
the purchaser gave up some tangible and definable considera" 
tion in return foy £Ll1 interest that had substantially the 
characteristics of a Security. 
In a pension plan such as.this one, by contrast, the purported 
investment is a relatively insignificant part of an employee's 
total and indivisible compensation package. No portion of 
an employee's compensation other than the potential pension 
benefits has any of the characteristics of a security, yet these 
noninvestment interests cannot be segregated from the pos-
sible pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sense may 
it be said that an employee "exchanges" some portion of his 
labor in return for these possible benefits.12 He surrenders 
his labor as a whole, a1id in return receives a comp~nsation 
package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a 
security. His decision to accept and retain covered employ-
ment must have only an extremely attenuated relationship, if 
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension. 
Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an 
employee is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, not making 
an investment for the future. 
Respondent also argues that employer constributions on 
his behalf constituted his investment into the Fund. But it 
is inaccurate to describe these payments as having been uon 
behalf'' of any employee. The trust agreement used em-
ployee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employ" 
H Tim; iK not to ~ny tlwt n per~on 'H " investment ," in order to meet the· 
clC'fi111t10n of an mvC'Stment rontntct, mu~t, take the form of cash only 
rnthrr than of good~ and ~eJ:virrH . Sec Fomum, supra, at 852 n. 16. 
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er's overall obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measur-
ing the employer's obligation to any particular employee. 
Indeed. there was no fixed relationship between contributions 
to the Fund and an employee's potential benefits. A pension 
plan with "fixed benefits," such as the Local's, does not tie a 
qualifying employee's benefits to the time he has worked. 
See n. 3, supra. One who has engaged in covered employ-
ment for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person 
who has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked 
twice as long and induced a substantially larger employer 
contribution.13 Again, it ignores the economic realities to 
equate employer contributions with an investment by the 
employee. 
B. Expectation of Profits From A Common Enterprise 
As we observed in Forman, the "touchstone" of the Howey 
test "is the presence of an investment in a common venture 
premised 011 a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived 
from the entrepeneurial or managerial efforts of others." 421 
U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel's 
expectation of profit denved from the Fund's successful man-
agement and investment of its assets. To the extent pension 
benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on 
earnings from the assets, it was thought they contained a 
profit element. The Fund's trustees provided the managerial 
efforts which produced this profit element. 
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an 
expectatio11 of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on 
one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more 
significant elements. It is true that the Fund, like other 
holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings 
1·' Ondrr f]1(1 trrms of tlw Local'~ pension plan, for rxampiP, rpspondent 
received credJt. for t.he five yrars hP worked before the Fund was created, 
even though no emptoy('r contrihnt10ns ha.d been made during that 
period. 
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from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, -a 
far larger portion of its income comes from employer contribu-
tions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the 
Fund's managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned 
a total of $31 milliop through investment of its assets between 
February 1955, and January 1977. During this same period 
employer contributions totaled $153 million.14 Not only does 
the greater share of a pension plan's income ordinarily come 
from new contributions, but unlike most entrepeneurs who 
manage other people's money, a plan usually can count on 
increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself 
has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings.15 
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other 
benefits received from employment is diminished further by 
the fact that wherB a plan has substantial preconditions to 
vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee's 
realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of 
the Fund. Rather, it is his ow11 ability to meet t~e Fund's 
eligibility requirements. Thus. even if it were proper to 
describe the benefits as a "profit" returned on some hypotheti-
cal investment by the employee, this profit would depend 
primarily 011 the employee's efforts to meet the vesting 
requirements, rather than the Fund's investment success.16 
When viewed in light of the total compensation package an 
employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension ben-
efits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a 
plan's asset earnings "is far too speculative and insubstantial 
to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts," 
Forman, supra, at 856. 
14 ln addition, the Fund r.eceived $7,500,000 from smaller pension fun~ 
with which it merged over the years. 
1 '' See Note, The Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities· 
Laws to CompuiBory, Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 Va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978) . 
10 See Note, Interest 111 Pension Plans as Securities: Daniel v. lnterna-
·'tional Brotherhood of 1'eamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 201 (1978) . 
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III 
The court below believed that its construction of the term 
usecurity" was compelled not only by the perceived resem-
blance of a pension plan to an investment contract, but by 
various actiolls of Congress and the SEC's interpretation of 
the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
gave great weight to the SEC's explanation of these events, 
an explanation which for the most part the SEC repeats here. 
Our own review of the record leads us to believe that this 
reliance on the SEC's interpretation of these legislative and 
administrative actions was not justified. 
A. Actions of Congress 
The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions 
of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension 
plans are securities. A close 1ook at each instance, however, 
reveals only that Congress might have believed certain kinds 
of pension plans. radically different from the one at issue here, 
came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no 
evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory 
plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regu-
lation as securities. 
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934 
of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have 
exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans 
from the Act's registration requirements.17 The amendment 
passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The 
legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was 
17 The amendment would have added the following language to § 4 (1) 
of the Securities Act : 
' 'A:s used in this parngra.ph, the term 'public offering' shall not be 
deemed to mcludc an offermg made solely to employees by an issuer or· by 
its affi.liatt's in conncction with a bona fide plan for the payment of extr$ 
compensatiOn or stock mvestment plan for the exclusive benefit of sqc}\ 
-employees." 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934) . 
' ' I 
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intended to cover plans under which employees contributed 
their own funds to a segregated investment account on which 
a return was realized. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments 
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895:--896 (1941). In rejecting the 
amendment, Congress revealed a concern that certain interests 
having the characteristics of a s~curity not be excluded from 
Securities Act protection simply because investors realized 
their return in the form of retirement benefits. At no time, 
however, did Congress indicate that pension benefits in and 
of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a 
security. 
The SEC also relies on a 1970 amendment of the Securities 
Act which extended § 3's exemption from registration to 
include "a.ny interest or participation in a single or collective 
trust fund maintained by a bank ... which interest or par-
ticipation is issued in connection with (A) a stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements 
for qualification under section 401 of title 26, .... " § 3_(a) 
(2) of the Securities Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498, 
15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a regis-
tratiOn exemption, the amendment m11nifested Congress' 
understanding that the interests covered by the amendment 
otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts.18 It interprets 
11interest or participation in a single ... trust fund ... issued 
in connection with ... a stock bonus, pension, or profit-
sharing plan" as referring to a prospective beneficiary's inter-
'8 Section 17 (c) of the &•curities Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 77q (c), and§ 10 (b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (when read with 
§§ 3 (a) (10) and (12) of that Act), indicate that the antifraud provisions 
of the respective Act;; contmur to apply to interests that come within the-
exemptions created by § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (12) of' 
the Securities Exchange Act. 
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est in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970 
amendment ignores that measure's central purpose, which was 
to relieve banks and insurance companies of certain registra-
tration obligations. The amendmeJlt recognized only that a 
pension plan had "an interest or participation" in the fund in 
which its assets were held, not that prospective beneficiaries 
of a plan had any interest in 'either the plan's bank-
maintained assets or the plan itself.10 
B. SEC Interpretation 
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, that 
almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans 
as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are 
asked to defer to what is seen as a lqngstanding interpreta-
19 See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings before the Senate 
Banking !!Jld Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. III, at 1341-1342 (1967); Mundheim & Henderson, 
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws oo Pension and Profit-Sharing 
Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller, 
Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L. ,T. 994 ( 1965). The SEC argues that 
the addition by the House of the language "single or" before "common 
trust fund" indicated an intent oo cover the underlying plans that invested 
in bank-maintained funds. The legislative hisoory, however, indicates that 
the change was meant only to eliminate the negative inference suggested 
by the unrevised language that banks would have to register the segregated 
investment funds they administered for particular plans. Because the 
provision as a whole dealt. only with the relationship between a plan and 
its bank, the revis10n did not affect. the registration status of the under-
lying pension plan. See 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970). This was consist-
ent, with the SEC's interpretation of the provision. Hearings, supra, at 
1326. The subsequent addition of another provision excepting from the 
exemption funds "under which an amount in excesS of the employer's 
contribution 1s allocated to tlw purcha . .,;e of securities ... issued by the 
employer or by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled 
by or under common control with the employer" appen.rs to have been 
simply an additional safeguard to confirm the SEC's authority to req).lire 
such plans, and only such plam5, to register. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 
91- 1631, p. 31 (1970) . 
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tion of these statutes by the agency responsible for their 
administration. But there are limits, grounded in the lan-
guage, purpose and history of the particular statute, on how 
far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role. 
Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is 
clear here that the SEC's positiou is neither longstanding nor 
even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to inter-
pret these Acts.20 
As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plan 
at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of finan-
cial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate. 
Further, the SEC's present position is flatly contradicted by 
·its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public 
record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered 
the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pen-
sion plans. In 1941, the SEC first artic~lated the position 
that voluntary, contributory plans had investment character-
jstics that rendered them "securities" under the Acts. At the· 
20 It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative 
agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which 
tt operates is entitled to considerable weight. United States v. National 
Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Sax be v. Bustos, 
419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 
617, 626-627 (1971); Uilall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). This· 
deference is a product both of an awareness of the pract.ica.l expertise 
which an agency normally devrlops, n.nd of.. a willingness to accord some 
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it ·encounters new and unfore-· 
seen problrms over time, But this deference is constrained by our obliga-. 
tion to honor the clear meaning of a statuto, as revealed by its language, 
purpose and history, On a munber of occasions in recent years this Court 
has found it necessary to re,iect the SEC's interpretation of various provi-
sioml of the Securities Act:s. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 117-119' 
(197S) ; Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc ., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n. 27 (1977); 
Er1tst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-214 (1976); F'orman~ 
supra, a.t 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. Mwwr Drug Stores, 421 U. s_ 
723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (PowELL, J., concurring); Reliance Electric Co. v_ 
Emerson Electri-c Co., 404 U S. 418, 425-427 (1972) . 
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same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory 
plans were not covered by the Securities Acts because such 
plans did not involve a "sale" within the meaning of the 
statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1T 75,195 (194l); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of Commis-
sioner Purcell) . 21 
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the 
Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC now augments 
its past position with two additional propositions. First, it 
is argued, noncontributory plans are "securities" even where 
a "sale" is not involved. Second, the ·previous concession that 
noncontributory plans do not involve a "sale" was meant to 
apply only to the registration and reporting requirements of 
the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions, 
a "sale" is involved. As for the first proposition, we observe 
that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimony cited to 
us address the question. As for the second, the record is 
21 Subsequent to 1941, the SEC made no further efforts to regulate even 
contributory, voluntary pension plans except where the employees' contri-
butions were invested in the employer's securWes. Cf. n. 21, supra. It 
also continued to disavow any aut! ority to regulate noncontributory, 
compulsory plans. See LPtter from Assistant Director, Division of Cor-
porate Finance, May 12, 1953, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 2105.51; Letter 
from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, August 1, 1962, CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 2105.52; Hearings before the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee on Mutual Fund Legis)ation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1326 (1967); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 510-511 (1st ed. 
1961) ; 4 id., at. 2553-2554 (2d ed. 1969); Hyde, Employee Stock Plans· 
a.nd the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1964); 
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to-
Pension n.nd Profit-Sharing .Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 809-81! 
(1964) , Note, Pension Pla~1s a~> Securities, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549-55!_ 
(1948) . 
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unambiguously to the contra.ry.22 Both in its 1941 statements 
and repeatedly since then, the SEC has declared that its "no 
sale" position applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See 
Opinion of Assistant General Counsel, [ 1941-1944 Transfer 
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ~ 75,195, at 75,387 (1941); 
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 
1st Sess., 888, 896-897 (1941); Institutional Investor Study 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. R. 
Doc. No. 92-64, p. 996 (1971) ("[T]he Securities Act does not 
apply ... "); Hearings on Welfare and Pensiou Plans Inves-
tigation before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension 
Funds of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess .. 943-946 (1955). Congress acted on·this 
understanding when it proceeded to develop the legislation 
!!2 On orrn;;ion the SEC ha~ contrnded that becRusr § 2 of the Securities 
Ari and § 3 of thP Src1trit ir~ Exclwngr Act apply thP qualifying ph1:ase 
"unlr~~ the ront,rxt othrrwi~r rrquirrs" to the ActR' general drfinitions, it 
id prrmi:-;sihlfl io rrg;ard a partieular trnnHaction as involving a AAlr or not 
drpcnding on thr form of rrgulntion involved. SeP 1 L. Lo;,:~, Securities 
Regulation 524-52~ (bt ed. 19(11); 4 id., at 2562-2565 (2d rd. Hl69). 
The Conri, notrd the rontrntion in SE(' v. National Securities. Inc .. 393 
U. S. 45:3, 4fl5--4fl6 (Hlfi9) . On prrvious occasion" thr SEC apprars to 
have tnkrn 1L clif'ft>rrnt. po,.itiotl: In 1943 it submittrcl an amicus brirf in 
the Ninth C'ir<"uii. arguing that a tranHnrtion must br a salr for all purpose 
oi the SeruritieH Act or for nonr, and it did not begin to rely on its 
" regulatory eontext" theor~· uutil 1951. Sre Brief for thr SEC in National 
S1qrp/y Co. \'.Leland Stanford Jum:or University, No. 10272 (CA9); 1 L. 
Lo~H, supm, at. 52-1- n. 211; Cohrn, Rule 1:3:~ of the SeruritieR Exchange 
CommisHion, 14 Rrrord of N.Y. C. B. A. 162, 164--165 (1959). We also 
note that with re;;pect. to ,.;tatutor~· rnerger8, the arra in which thr SEC 
ongmall~· deVPloped it .~ thror~· as to the bifurratrd definition of :1 sal'e, the 
SEC "inre ha>' abandonrd ii~ po~ition 11.nd find:s thr prrsrncr of a ",.;Rle'~ 
for all purpoHe>' in thr ca;;r ol' :-;urh mergers. See 17 CFR § :2:30.1-1-5, In 
view of our dispo>'ition of tht" caHr, we exprl'<' · no opinion aH to the correct 
l'l'solution of the clivergrnt virwl" on thiH i~uc. 
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that became ERISA. See, e. g., Interim Report of Activities 
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, S. Rep. 
No. 92-634, p. 96 (1972) ("Pension and profit-sharing plans 
are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 
1933 ... unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension 
plan and invests in the securities of the employer company 
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the 
employer.") (emphasis added). As far as we are aware, at 
no time before this case arose did the SEC intimate that the 
antifraud provisions of the Secudties Acts nevertheless 
applied to noncontributory pension plans. 
IV 
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that 
pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the 
Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974 would put 
the matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals 
expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires 
pension plans to disclose specified information to employees 
in a specified manner. see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021-1030, in con-
trast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations 
imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, 
see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 474-477 
(1977); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 
438 (1976). Further, ERISA r~gulates the substantive terms 
of pension plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits 
on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For 
example, with respect to the underlying issue in this case-
whether respondent served long enough to receive a pension-
~ 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U.S. C. § 1053 (a), now sets the mini-
mum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing 
specified yea.rs of service. and § 203 (b), 29 U. S. C. § 1053 
(b), governs continuous service requirements. Thus if Daniel 
had retired after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been 
Tequired to pay him at least a partial pension. 'The Securi-
77-753 & 77-754-0PINION 
18 TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL 
ties Acts, on the other hand, do not purport to set the substan. 
tive terms of financ~'l.-1 transactions. 
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing 
the use and terms of employee pension plans severely under-
cuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to non-
contributory, compulsory pensio11 plans. Congress believed 
that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a 
belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the 
-extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsup-
ported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light 
of ERISA it serves no general purpose. See Califa:no v. 
Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets, 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235,250 (1970). What-
ever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the 
Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form 
through ERISA. 
v 
W<> hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a non-
contributory, eompulsory pension plan. Because the first two 
couuts of respondent's complaint do not provide grounds for 
relief in federal court. the District Court should have granted 
the motion to dismiss them. The judgment below is therefore 
Reversed. 
Mn. JusTICrJ fi'l'EVENS took ro part in the consideration or \ 
' dt'eision of this case. 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. 
January 11, 1979 
) 
y 
RE: No. 77-753 & 77-754 International Brotherhood of 





Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Dear Lewis: 
~uprtmt <!fltltrl af tqt ~b ~htttg 
._as£ringhtn. ~. <If. 20~~~ 
January 11, 1978 
Re: (77-753 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
( Daniel 
(77-754 Local 705 v. Daniel 
Thank you for accommodating my view on your 
Note 22. 
As to the 1970 Amendment I will "flag" the problem 
with the brief concurrence as attached. This should 
not hold things up. 
r 
llf;d~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 











































































































































































































































Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Just ice Powell 
Mr. Just ice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: _J_AN_l_l_l_97_9_ 
Ro~i r.rmlated: ____ _ 
No. 77-753, International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. Daniel and No. 77-754, Local 705, Teamsters v. Daniel. 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring. 
I join in the opinion of the Court except as to the dis-
cussion of the 1970 amendment to section 3(a) (2) of the Secur-
ities Act. There is no need to deal, in this case, with the 
scope of the exemption, since it is not an issue presented for 
decision. 
The Commission argues that the new exemption from the reg-
istration requirements of the Act applies to participation in a 
pension plan, and infers that Congress must have understood 
that such participation is a security which otherwise would be 
subject to the Act. It is not necessary to evaluate the Comm-
ission's interpretation, however, because even if it is cor-
rect, it does not support the conclusion the Commission draws. 
First, the inference concerning Congress' understanding of 
the Act in 1970 is tenuous. The language of the amendment cov-
ers a variety of financial interests, some of which clearly are 
- 2 -
"securities" as defined in the Act. Congress most likely acted 
with a view to those interests, without considering other fin-
ancial interests like those involved here, for which registra-
tion never had been required. 
Second, even if a draftsman concerned with exempting a 
variety of interests from the registration requirements may 
have believed, in 1970, that certain pension interests were 
within the statutory definition of "security," that would have 
little, if any, bearing on this case. At issue here is the 
construction of definitions enacted in 1933 and 1934. 
The briefs at least suggest that the construction of the 
1970 amendment may be problematic. The scope of the exemption 
may be of real importance to someone in some future case--but 
it is not so in connection with this action. Accordingly, I 
rserve any expression of views on the issue at this time. 
This case comes to us;ffrom the Court of Appeals 
~ 
for the Seventh Circuit. It presents a question as to the 
applicatio~f the Federal Securities Acts to ~ 
nodcontributory, compul ~ory pension plan. __,. ;::. 
Under the plan at issue,;'contributions to a 
pension fund~ere made by the employer~ased on the number 
of weeks worked by employees. Upon accepting employment, f an 
~t~~~-~~ 
employee was automatically covered by the plan. ~~e paid no ·--,/ 
money into the fund. The employee was required, however, to 
have 20 years of continuous service to be entitled to a 
pension. 
Respondent in ~case was employed for more than 
'\ 
20 years 'l'but because his service was not entirely 
continuous/ he did not qualify for a pension. He thereupon 
brought this suit against the International Union, / the local 
to which he belonged/ and the pension fund. He alleged that 
petitioners had misrepresented/ and failed to disclos,; 
material facts about the plan. He charged common law fraud 
and deceit, violation¢ of the National Labor Relations Act, 
and violation? of the Federal Securities Acts. We are 
concerned in this cas~o~ with the claim under the 
securities Acts. 
The applicability of these Act~turns upon whether 
an employee's interest in a pens ion plan is a "secur i ty'/ as 
f:~Vv ~ defined by the Acts. Respondent argued, successfully before 
1\ 
the Court of Appeals, that his interest in the plan was an 
! I ~ "investment contract" within the definiton of the term ... 
"security". llfteer tft.ti. Aeta-s. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
A no~ontributory, com~sory pension plan/ is ~t a security 
withing the meaning of the Federal Securites Acts. We base 
our decision on the plain langu~e of these statutes,j on 
standards applied in our pr~r opinions,/ and on the actions 
of Congress / and t1.~e SEC/ with respect to pension plans of the 
type involved in this case. 
We express no opinionJ'as to respondent's 
entitlement to proceed on the other counts;fset forth in his 
complaint. 
The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT.Fi 
Syllabus 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS 
OF AMERICA ET AL. v. DANIEL 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 77-753. Argued October 31, 1978-Decided January 16, 1979* 
A pension plan entered into under a collective-bargaining agreement 
between petitioner local labor union and employer trucking firms 
required all employees to participate in the plan but not to pay any-
thing into it. All contributions to the plan were to be made by the 
employers at a specified amount per week for each man-week of covered 
employment. To be eligible for a pension, an employee was required 
to have 20 years of continuous service. Respondent employee, who 
had over 20 years' service, was denied a pension upon retirement because 
of a break in service. He then brought suit in Federal District Court, 
alleging, inter alia, that the union and petitioner trustee of the pension 
fund had misrepresented and omitted to state material facts with respect 
to the value of a covered employee's interest in the pension plan, and 
that such misstatements and omisRions constituted a fraud in connec-
tion with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
Rule 10b-5, and also violated § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
Denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the District Court held that 
respondent's interest in the pension fund constituted a "security" within 
the meaning of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (10) of the 
Securities Exchange Act because the plan created an "investment con-
tract," and also that there had been a "sale" of this interest to respond-
ent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (14) 
of the Securities Exchange Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 
*Together with No. 77-754, Local 705, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America et al. v. 
Daniel, also on certiorari to the same court. 
I 
in :;ylbbu;;. · 
I-JJ;~nY Pu'l':t.BL, jr . 
Reporter of Deci;;ion;;. 
II TEAMSTERS v. DANIEL 
Syllabus 
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act do not apply to a 
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan. Pp. 6-18. 
(a) To determine whether a particular financial relationship consti-
tutes an investment contract, "[t]he test is whether the scheme involves 
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 
293, 301. Looking separately at each element of this test, it is apparent 
that an employee's participation in a noncontributory, compulsory pen-
sion plan such as the one in question here does not comport with the 
commonly held understanding of an investment contract. With respect 
to the investment-of-money element, in such a pension plan the pur-
ported investment is a relatively insignificant part of the total and 
indivisible compensation package of an employee, who, from the stand-
point of the economic realities, is selling his labor to obtain a livelihood, 
not making an investment for the future. And with respect to the 
expectation-of-profits element, while the pension fund depends to some 
extent on earnings from its assets, the possibility of participating in 
asset earnings is too insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within 
the Securities Acts. Pp. 6-10. 
(b) There is no evidence that Congress at any time thought noncon-
tributory plans were subject to federal regulation as securities. Nor 
until the instant litigation arose is there any evidence that the SEC had 
ever considered the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act to be 
applicable to such plans. Accordingly, there is no justification for defer-
ence to the SEC's present interpretation. Pp. 11-17. 
(c) The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which 
comprehensively governs the usc and terms of employee pension plans, 
severely undercuts all argument for e:-.iending the Securities Act and 
Securities Exchange Act to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans, 
and whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of these 
latter Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA. 
Pp. 17-18. 
561 F. 2d 1223, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opmwn of the Court, in which BRENNAN, 
STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUI!>'l', JJ., joined, 
and in nil but the last paragmph of Part III-A of which, BuRGER, C. J., 
joined. BuRGER, C. J., filed an opinion conrurring in part. S'l'EVENS, J., 
took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. 
J~nuarv 18 , 1979 
77-753 and 77-754 Teamsters v. Daniel 
MEMORANDUM 'rO •rr-m CONFERENCE: 
Absent ohiection, ! am a~tinq Mr. Putzel to mate 
the editing changes in the last two sentences on oaqe 8 of 
the Court's opinion, as indicated on the enclosed copy of 
that paqe . 
At our Conference o~ Fridav, I will state why I 
propose these changes. 
L . F . P ., Jr . 
ss 







~·f ~ l 
I would appreciate your making the changes indicated 
on the enclosed copy of my opinion for the Court in the 
above case. 
The changes are purely stylistic, except for those 
on page 8. These were approved by the Court at our 
Conference on Friday. .Q 
Mr. 
